THE MOX EXPERIENCE:
THE DISPOSITION OF EXCESS RUSSIAN
AND U.S. WEAPONS PLUTONIUM IN CANADA
J u l y 1 9 9 7
Part One
Franklyn Griffiths
George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies
University College, University of Toronto
15 King’s College Circle
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3H7
tel (416) 978-7417 fax (416) 971-2027
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary
3. International Security Benefits
3.1. Nuclear Non-proliferation
4. Direct Benefits and Costs to Canada
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
SUMMARY
The CANDU MOX initiative is a Canadian proposal to assist the Russian Federation and the United States in relieving themselves of a combined amount of up to 150 tonnes of weapons plutonium. This material has been rendered excess to the defence needs of the two countries as a result of the end of the Cold War and various nuclear arms reduction agreements.
The proposal originates with the Canadian nuclear industry. It would have Russia and the U.S. each blend some of their weapons plutonium, amounts yet to be determined, in oxide form with uranium oxide, and to send the mixed oxide (MOX) as nuclear reactor fuel to Canada. There it would be irradiated to produce electricity in CANDU reactors at the Bruce nuclear generating station on the shore of Lake Huron about 300 km north of Detroit over a period of up to 25 years, and then held in Ontario in the form of spent reactor fuel for ever.
The CANDU MOX initiative is presented as a swords-into-ploughshares venture that would first convert megatonnes of destructive potential into megawatts of socially useful electricity, and then secure the waste in Canada in perpetuity so that the plutonium remaining in it could never be used again for military purposes by the two principals, or be diverted to potential nuclear-weapons states or terrorist organizations.
The CANDU MOX initiative has the informal backing but not the firm support of the Canadian government. Ottawa is assessing the international and national value of the undertaking before it decides whether or not to commit firmly to the proposal as a means of excess weapons plutonium disposition. Since plutonium, with its immense radioactive longevity and carcinogenic quality can not be ”disposed of,” the term ”disposition” is used here with its connotation of moving plutonium from one place to another without ever actually getting rid of it.
This study recommends that the Canadian government refuse to give the CANDU MOX initiative its support any longer, and that the proposal be consigned to oblivion.
If implemented, the initiative would impose direct and substantial security, safety, financial, and governance costs on Canadians and on Ontarians in particular. At the same time, the nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament benefits of the initiative, which are presented as its principal advantages, prove to be woefully inadequate. When implementation of the CANDU MOX initiative is not ineffective for purposes of nuclear non-proliferation, it is actually counterproductive.
As to nuclear disarmament, the initiative holds little or no promise of making the world a safer place when the Russian Federation and the United States are determined, as they are, to retain the potential to resurrect their Cold War strategic nuclear arsenals. An undertaking that would produce substantial direct costs to Canadians and would yield no offsetting benefits for international peace and security is not in the public interest.
Giving careful consideration to the interplay of political, technological, and financial considerations among the leading Western states and the Russian Federation over excess weapons plutonium disposition, this study also finds that the CANDU MOX initiative is a viable proposition when viewed solely in terms of its international negotiability. It is viable internationally mainly because Canadian-based reactor disposition offers part of the answer to Russia’s lack of nuclear reactors that can be made safe for weapons MOX use.
Not only would implementation of the CANDU MOX initiative be detrimental to the Canadian interest, but the initiative could be taken up by the G-7 and Russia (now the S-8) as early as the end of 1998 , if the United States were to hold to its decision to select from among its disposition options by that time.
Were the Canadian offer to be picked up, Canadians would absorb the direct costs of CANDU MOX implementation, and would make an international contribution not so much to peace and security as to the smooth functioning of the S-8 as an institution. This would not be worth the cost.
If the CANDU MOX initiative is so inept and unfortunate as it stands, might it nevertheless be improved upon? This study concludes that when the Canadian government of the day has seen fit to give its informal backing to a poorly framed venture of the Canadian nuclear industry, there is little likelihood of Ottawa making the abrupt turnabout required to safeguard the initiative against its own inadequacies.
This study therefore recommends that the CANDU MOX initiative be rejected outright by Canadians and rejected forthwith by the Canadian government.
If the Canadian government opts to move forward with the initiative, 21 changes are proposed to reduce the damage that would be done to Canadians and Ontarians, and to strengthen the initiative’s potential to make an authentic contribution to international peace and security.
The first few of these suggest that the government distance itself from the reactor preferences of the Canadian nuclear industry, do what it can for the immobilization option, and, if that cannot be fully sustained, incorporate the underlying principles of immobilization into a vigorous effort to resist the further spread of civil plutonium fuel-cycle technology.
Foreword
The George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies was established at University College in the University of Toronto in May 1996. Named in honour of a distinguished Canadian diplomat and, later, peace activist, the Chair supports public understanding and research on questions of international peace and security. The holder of the Chair is Franklyn Griffiths, a University of Toronto political scientist with scholarly and policy interests in Russia, arms control, and Arctic affairs.
The first act of the Chair was to arrange for a meeting between Canadian stakeholders in the proposal, announced by the Prime Minister in April 1996, to relieve the Russian Federation and the United States of some of their excess weapons plutonium. This would be done by transporting the plutonium in mixed oxide (MOX) form to Canada, irradiating it as fuel in CANDU reactors at the Bruce nuclear generating station in Ontario on the shore of Lake Huron, and then holding the waste in perpetuity in Canada.
Needless to say, there was plenty of interest in the meeting. It was held as a stakeholders’ retreat, October 17-18, 1996, at the Hockley Valley Resort and Conference Centre, outside Toronto. The exchange among about 50 participants was intense, at times impassioned. Everyone present learned from it. Certainly I did. A summary account of the discussion, written by Peter Gizewski and entitled, ”The CANDU MOX Initiative: Report on a Stakeholders’ Debate,” is available on request from the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Canada K1A 0G2.
The present study seeks to evaluate the CANDU MOX initiative in its major dimensions as of July 1997. Thanks are owed to Irene Koch of the Nuclear Awareness Project, and to Norm Rubin of Energy Probe, who were kind enough to critique an earlier version of this piece which was also circulated to officials. I however take full responsibility for all errors of commission and omission which may be found here.
F. G.
INTRODUCTION
Plutonium divides opinion. Occurring only very rarely in nature, it can be produced in large quantities when uranium is transmuted in nuclear reactors. It can then be separated from spent reactor fuel and reused for the generation of electricity, or employed to form the “pit” at the centre of a nuclear weapon.Not only can plutonium be used for both civil and military purposes, but you can’t have the one without inviting some of the other. The more widespread the commercial use of plutonium in the generation of electricity or heat, the greater the risk of some amount falling into the hands of those bent on weapons use. Conversely, the more intensive the weapons application, the better the context for civil use.
In a weapon, plutonium is capable of unleashing instant and all but unimaginable physical destruction. Disseminated into the environment as the result of a weapons detonation or failure of technology and procedures associated with civil use, it is carcinogenic in the extreme when the minutest particle is inhaled. It is also persistent in the extreme: let loose or carefully secured at a disposal site, its isotopes have half-lives averaging in the thousands of years — actually ranging from 14 to as long as 370,000 years.
Large numbers of people in many countries are understandably horrified at the thought of increased reliance on civil, to say nothing of military, plutonium. From this standpoint, plutonium is indeed “the pits.” And yet there are also those, governments included, who view this element as the most economic and environmentally responsible energy source now available when all due safeguards are put in place and maintained.
Following a variety of procedures which are referred to broadly as the closed or plutonium fuel cycle, plutonium is separated from spent uranium reactor fuel in an operation called reprocessing, and then fabricated into new fuel comprised of mixed uranium and plutonium oxides. The mixed oxide (MOX) fuel is then irradiated or burned in a reactor, the spent fuel reprocessed for recovery of plutonium, and additional uranium added to the recovered plutonium to make new MOX, which is then burned over and over again in a cycle. At each step — irradiation, reprocessing, and renewed irradiation — nuclear waste is produced. The closed or plutonium fuel cycle, it should be noted, is distinct from a “once-through” cycle in which fresh reactor fuel is irradiated, not reprocessed, and retained in waste form. Use of the plutonium fuel cycle is said to yield cheap and safe energy capable of greatly reducing the volume of greenhouse gasses in an era when the developed countries must lower their emissions if poorer nations are, as seems likely, to increase theirs.
Today, in Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries including Canada, the civil nuclear industry and its supporters are looking to make good on the potential of plutonium fuel-cycle technology. They are doing so in a context of mounting reserves of civil plutonium in Europe, and of steadily diminishing public and investor support for the nuclear energy option in most of the industrial economies.
Meanwhile, events marking the end of the Cold war, most notably the START I and START II nuclear disarmament agreements struck by Moscow and Washington in 1991 and 1993, have served to create large and growing stockpiles of excess weapons plutonium from the pits of retired and dismantled strategic nuclear warheads in the two countries. Until recently, Russia and the United States were thought likely to have assembled at least 50 metric tons of surplus weapons plutonium each as of the year 2003, and very likely considerably more on the Russian side, as they followed through on the two START treaties and completed the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear warheads designated as no longer required for defence purposes.
Pits derived from the two countries’ strategic nuclear warheads are not however directly governed by treaty. The existing START agreements, the second of which is yet to be ratified by the Russian Duma, specified sweeping destruction of launchers and downloading of warheads from launchers, but left disposition of the excess plutonium for future consideration by the parties.
Whatever the fears and hopes that currently surround reliance on plutonium as a civil energy source, awareness has grown that reliable means must be devised for the safe disposition of the Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium excess. Russia’s circumstances being what they are, Western and especially U.S. financial and technical assistance are bound to figure heavily in the Russian Federation’s disposition effort. Moscow and Washington are actively considering the matter, as is the G-7 group of leading industrial states following their nuclear safety and security summit meeting of April 1996 in Moscow, which included discussions with the Russian President.
There is general agreement among the G-7, and with the Russians as well in their political or “P-8” and now Summit Eight or “S-8” association with the Seven, that the problem of excess Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium must be resolved without delay. It must be resolved if the benefits of nuclear disarmament are to be “locked in,” and if the particular weaknesses of the Russian custodial system are not to result in the diversion of weapons plutonium into the hands of potential nuclear-weapons states and terrorist organizations. Enter Canada.
Speaking at the 1996 Moscow summit meeting, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced that Canada was in principle willing to dispose of the Russian and U.S. excess. As subsequently elaborated, the offer was essentially this: some 100 tonnes of their surplus would be fabricated into MOX fuel at facilities in the Russian Federation and in the United States or possibly in Western Europe, and then transported to Canada where over a period of up to 25 years it would be disposed of in CANDU civil power reactors at Ontario Hydro’s Bruce nuclear generating station on the shore of Lake Huron roughly 300 km north of Detroit.
In truth, there is no “disposing of” or “getting rid of” plutonium, what with its extreme toxicity and immense radioactive longevity. Nor can it be safely lifted off the planet or, as yet, transmuted into short-lived isotopes. Hence the use throughout this study of the awkward word “disposition,” with its connotation of moving material from one place to another without actually disposing of it. To be precise, then, Canada’s idea was and is to subject MOX fuel made from excess Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium to “once-through” reactor irradiation which would serve not only to produce electricity, but to embed the Russian and U.S. excess in radioactive waste which would be secured forever so that no one could ever get at it again.
Though Ontario Hydro would consume weapons MOX and then retain the spent fuel in perpetuity, it would enter into contracts for MOX fuel supply with Russian and U.S. agencies only if the cost were competitive with that for natural uranium fuel normally used in CANDU reactors. As to the Canadian government, it would not subsidize the supply of MOX, whose cost would have to be borne by others, and would insist that approval to proceed in Canada be governed by the full array of nuclear-physics, health, safety, and environmental assessments mandated by federal and provincial law.[1]
The CANDU MOX initiative was framed from its beginnings as a swords-into-ploughshares contribution to international peace and security. As the Prime Minister put it in Moscow,
“What is worrying is that [excess weapons plutonium] could still be used in unwanted or undesirable ways…. CANDU is the reactor that could use it in the most efficient and useful way. We should assume our responsibility.”[2]
Subsequent statements from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade presented the venture as a safe and efficient means of turning vastly destructive material to productive social and economic use.[3]
Canada was volunteering to ensure that surplus Russian and U.S. military plutonium would never be returned to weapons use by those two states, or turned to weapons use by other states and non-state entities as a consequence of nuclear leakage from Russia in particular. Canada was offering to help convert military into civil plutonium for the benefit of all, provided that others carried all of the financial burden.
There was something odd about this. As a G-7 member, Canada might have undertaken to bear some of the shared cost of disposition unless it were making a sacrifice for the common good. But, as presented, the CANDU MOX initiative entailed no sacrifice to Canadians.
There was also an oddity in the Canadian government’s stance on the proposal. Despite the Prime Minister’s words of approval and significant behind-the-scenes support for the venture from federal departments, the government did not formally commit itself to the proposal. Instead, Ottawa portrayed it as a promising idea which had been brought to its attention by others and was worthy of international consideration. Canada had thus
- “agreed in principle,”
- “agreed to study the issues further,”
- “agrees with the need for international attention” to the matter, and
- “believes that a MOX fuel project involving CANDU reactors should be given serious consideration.”[4]
The decision to commit or not to commit seemed likely to come after an impending federal election, and after the prospects and pitfalls of the proposal had been more clearly defined. As of July 1997, the election has been held and the Liberal government returned. The time is approaching for Canadians and the Canadian government to decide whether or not to commit formally to the CANDU MOX initiative.This study aims to evaluate the CANDU MOX initiative in its major dimensions.
First, I take a close look at the proposal, the proponents, and the sequence of events that could ensue until well into the next century if the initiative were to be implemented.
The discussion then moves to an assessment of the international alternatives for excess weapons plutonium disposition. From this perspective, which concerns only the negotiability of alternative international means of handling the Russian and U.S. excess, Canadian-based reactor disposition turns out to be a viable, if inevitably an iffy proposition. It is iffy, for one thing, because the Russian-U.S. relationship could be derailed for a time, and with it the continuance of nuclear disarmament. Or the Canadian initiative itself could run afoul of technical difficulties, for example the inability of CANDU reactors to live up to claims made for their capacity to consume large amounts of MOX fuel rapidly. But sooner or later, very preferably sooner, the strategic weapons plutonium problem will have to be dealt with, whatever the difficulties. CANDU MOX disposition will remain a live international option as long as it is left on the table by Canada and not ruled out by political or technical considerations.
Next, I examine the international security benefits to be had from implementation of the Canadian proposal. Likely benefits turn out to be much less than suggested on first impression of the proposal as it stands. Potential costs, which do not figure in statements made on behalf of CANDU MOX disposition, turn out to be significant. Viewed in its entirety, the initiative has far-reaching implications for Canadian approaches to international peace and security, and for internal security and governance within the country. We have a watershed decision in the making.
Finally, I offer conclusions and recommendations which turn on the question with which this study now begins: ought Canadians and the Canadian government to approve the CANDU MOX initiative as is, to amend it to take account of any deficiencies, or to withdraw the proposal altogether?
1. The Proposition
There are 20 CANDU reactors in Ontario, eight of them at the Bruce nuclear generating station with four each at the Bruce A and B sites. MOX would be burned in the Bruce B units, the first of which entered service in 1984 and the last in 1987. With allowances made for normal maintenance and repairs, the four Bruce B reactors can be said to have an operational life of roughly 40 years. They are currently scheduled for end of service in 2028.[5] The total amount of excess weapons plutonium they might consume in MOX form is cited by proponents of the initiative as up to 100 tonnes, which would come in equal portions from Russia and the United States.[6]
The Russian Federation is however thought to possess some 150-170 tonnes of weapons plutonium plus 30 tonnes of weapons-usable separated civil plutonium, whereas the U.S. stockpile is estimated at a little under 100 tonnes.[7] The two governments have moreover stated that disposition “should proceed in parallel, with the goal of reductions to equal levels of military plutonium stockpiles.”[8] The United States has declared an excess of approximately 50 tonnes,[9] which would leave it with roughly the same amount in a retained stockpile.
Although Russian officials have indicated informally that about 50 tonnes of plutonium could be identified as being in excess of defence needs,[10] the Russian Federation will have to find ways to reduce by up to three times that amount. This they will need to do not only to reach equal levels of retained weapons plutonium, but to satisfy the U.S. Congress, which will appropriate the lion’s share of G-7 funding for Russian disposition as well as all costs of the U.S. effort.
Further uncertainties arise from the Russian-U.S. decision, made in March 1997, to postpone completion of the START II reductions from 2003 to the end of 2007, by which time an additional combined reduction of some 2,000 deployed strategic warheads would also have been made under a START III treaty which is now to be negotiated.[11] Although Canadian-based reactor disposition could in principle begin before 2007, the full amount of plutonium pits potentially available for manufacture into CANDU MOX fuel would not be released until the end of 2007, and could add up to more than 100 tonnes.
We will return to these considerations in assessing what might come Canada’s way under different variants of the CANDU MOX option. But to start with, let us take 100 tonnes available by 2003 as reference figures for a combined Russian and U.S. disposition of excess weapons plutonium in Canada.
As currently envisaged, the initiative would be implemented with one of two different procedures. Under the first, four reactors would feed on MOX containing 1.52 percent plutonium in oxide form, to consume 4.2 tonnes of weapons plutonium annually.[12] The second, called CANFLEX by the proponents, would be carried out in two continuous phases without shutdown or loss of time. The first stage, lasting five years, would proceed as above but meld into a second phase which would see the use of MOX containing 2.70 percent weapons plutonium.[13] Fuel would however stay in the reactors longer, and there would be no significant change in the rate of disposition, which would be roughly the same as with 1.52 percent plutonium. The difference is that fewer fuel bundles would be used, thereby permitting the plants that supplied the MOX to be smaller in size.
To simplify, again, let us hold to the procedure using four reactors on 1.52 percent weapons plutonium. Studies are said to show that few or no design or engineering modifications would be required at the Bruce site for this procedure, aside from those needed for storage and security of fresh fuel.[14] Four Bruce reactors are thus claimed to be capable of meeting a disposition mission of up to 100 tonnes within 23 years.
CANDU reactors ordinarily irradiate natural uranium fuel in oxide form, which, when spent, is stored as waste at the location unless and until the day comes when a facility for permanent geological burial is cut deep into the Canadian Shield.[15] Irradiation of uranium fuel in a CANDU reactor is accompanied by the conversion of some U-238 into fissile Pu-239, which itself is subject to fission and adds to the production of heat. Roughly half the energy generated by standard CANDU fuel is accounted for by the fission of plutonium. Accordingly, it is fair to say that there is nothing qualitatively new about reactor use of plutonium in Canada. It has been done for years without incident, and plutonium has long been stored in spent fuel at CANDU reactor sites without breach of security.
Though the cost of civil plutonium has rendered it uneconomic relative to natural uranium for CANDU consumption, the availability of weapons plutonium makes MOX use feasible for Ontario Hydro if the material can be supplied at a cost not greater than that presently being met for uranium. If weapons MOX were to be used, CANDU fuel bundles, which are about 100 mm in diameter and 500 mm long, would be supplemented with depleted uranium, which is generated as a byproduct of little economic value from the enrichment of uranium for light-water reactors in Russia and the United States.
1.1. Proposal and Process
The CANDU MOX initiative envisages a very lengthy sequence of political and financial as well as technical events that needs to be kept in mind from one end to the other. Surplus Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium would be
(1) purified and made into plutonium oxide,
(2) combined with depleted uranium in oxide form,
(3) manufactured into fuel pellets, and
(4) assembled into CANDU fuel bundles by the Russian and U.S. governments.
These steps would be taken by government agencies with or without participation of commercial partners in each of the two countries, and possibly with the use of available MOX fuel fabrication capacity in Europe. European interests could join the interplay either if Russian and U.S.MOX manufacture were judged unable to come on stream promptly enough, as seems likely, or if it were decided to assign to a European consortium a continuing role in the making of Russian MOX for CANDU use.In any event, as 100 tonnes of MOX was made it would be
(5) transported to the Bruce site in shipments, by means yet to be determined, over a period of up to 25 years.
Alternatively, it might be produced as rapidly as possible, shipped to Canada to get it out of American and Russian hands, and held in large quantities at the Bruce station pending its use. On the Lake Huron shore it would be
(6) securely stored, and(7) brought to the spent fuel standard, which signifies a state that renders weapons plutonium “as unattractive and inaccessible for retrieval and weapons use as the residual plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors.”[16]
Finally, the spent fuel would not be returned to the countries of origin, since by reprocessing they could extract plutonium from it for weapons purposes. Rather, it would be
(8) secured at the Bruce site, and
(9) eventually subjected to permanent disposal “in the planned underground facility for permanent disposal.”[17]
All nine steps in the procedure would be governed by international safeguards as warranted by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), and by such additional verification and security measures as might be instituted by the parties. But before any of this even started to happen, the CANDU MOX initiative would have to find its way through an international political labyrinth, to say nothing of any obstacles that might be encountered in the Canadian political process.
As noted, the Russian Federation and the United States, together with other G-7, are already engaged in an assessment of various disposition options. The use of Canadian-based reactors is one of these. But others are starting to take shape, as is interest from the nuclear industry. In December 1996, the United States announced its intention to select from among three options in dealing with its own excess. These are
- reactor disposition in the U.S., in Canada (CANDU MOX), or possibly in both countries simultaneously;
- immobilization in very bulky glass or ceramic blocks, to be corrupted with contaminants of various kinds and held indefinitely in high-security installations; and
- a combination of irradiation and immobilization, referred to as the hybrid option.[18]
Hybrid disposition is the preferred U.S. government choice as of mid-1997. It would see the Department of Energy immobilize roughly a third, or about 17 tonnes, of the declared U.S. weapons plutonium excess of some 50 tonnes.[19] Further, Washington announced that the U.S. selection from among its stated option is to be made by late 1998, though as will be seen it could come later.
Should Canadian-based disposition be favoured, Canada could receive up to two-thirds of the U.S. surplus or roughly 33 tonnes, provided that a portion of the amount suited to reactor use did not also go to U.S. nuclear utilities. If Canada were to be offered something like this amount, Russia, for reasons of national pride, could also be inclined to dispose of less than all of a 50-tonne excess in Canada, preferring to deal with the remainder on Russian soil. These considerations point to a mission of about 66 tonnes which could be accomplished in about 16 years by four Bruce units operating on 1.52 percent weapons plutonium.
The United States, however, may wish to reserve a portion of its excess for disposition by U.S. utilities as well as Ontario Hydro in Canada. Specifically, if about 18 out of 33 tonnes were consigned to domestic reactor use in the United States, and if Russia matched the U.S. remainder of 15 tonnes, a minimum CANDU MOX disposition mission would come to about 30 tonnes. This could be accomplished in roughly seven years. While there is the potential for Russia to assign greatly more to Canada than the United States if equal levels of retained weapons plutonium are to be reached, we now have a minimum CANDU MOX mission of about 30 tonnes.
In contrast to the United States, Russia is embarked on an assessment and decision process that is both without initial time limits and quite susceptible to destabilizing domestic and international developments. The Russian Federation has still to declare how much weapons plutonium is in its possession, and to specify how much is in excess of defence purposes.
Most important, Russian influentials regard their weapons plutonium as a national treasure. They view it as a valuable national resource which cost lives to produce and which ought now to be turned to the benefit of society through the generation of electricity, no matter that its use in a closed fuel cycle would cost more than the use of uranium.[20] Russia heavily prefers the reactor disposition option and tends to be dismissive of immobilization. As stated in a September 1996 joint Russian-U.S. intergovernmental study,
The Russian government has long planned to separate civilian plutonium from spent fuel and use it for its energy value. The Russian government views weapons plutonium disposition largely as an add-on to existing plans for civilian plutonium. The United States, by contrast, abandoned plans for plutonium separation and recycle two decades ago for both proliferation and economic reasons.[21]
Accordingly, the Russian Federation is actively exploring the potential for cooperation on reactor-based weapons plutonium disposition with Europe, where the plutonium fuel cycle is well established. Furthermore, Moscow expects to be paid for its excess weapons plutonium if it is not to be turned to productive use in Russia but sent to Canada in fuel form. Back in 1993, Russia’s Minister of Atomic Energy mentioned a price of $2.4-billion for 100 tonnes of weapons plutonium.[22]
Whatever the role of reactors in Russia’s choice — irradiation in Russia, in Canada or, as will be seen, in Ukraine — the United States and also other G-7 members will have to come up with big money to meet Russian financial and technical needs plus any Russian-related activity performed by governments and subcontracted industry in Europe. This they will do if disposition is to occur.
The international bargaining process that has begun is clearly not one that allows for a choice between Canada, the Russian Federation, and the United States alone if they are to decide in favour of the Canadian offer. On the contrary, the Canadian initiative is one of several alternatives being specified in a process of interdependent assessment and decision that includes Europe and Japan as well as the two surplus weapons-plutonium states and Canada and Ukraine, plus the nuclear industry and the public in each of the countries concerned.
In an effort to structure the process, the United States has announced that it will retain the CANDU MOX option for consideration in its late 1998 disposition decision only “in the event that a multilateral agreement to deploy this option is negotiated among Russia, Canada, and the United States.”[23] This is a deft and amusing move. In effect, it instructs Canada to do what it can to bring Russia to the table with the United States if Canada wants to receive any of the U.S. weapons plutonium excess.
The thought of Canada wanting weapons plutonium for reactor disposition, rather than receiving it with regret when all else had failed, is also an odd one. It should be filed away for later consideration.
To continue our survey of the labyrinth, failure to negotiate a trilateral agreement by the end of 1998 need not take CANDU MOX out of the game unless the United States were prepared to proceed unilaterally with the disposition of its own surplus. After all, the failure could stem from Russian-U.S. differences having little or nothing to do with Canada. For example, it is difficult to see how there could be sufficient confidence to carry on with the difficult next steps in the process if a trilateral agreement were not preceded by the Russian Duma’s ratification of the START II agreement that is to produce a substantial portion of the weapons plutonium we are talking about. If ratification had not been achieved as of late 1998, Washington would presumably continue to negotiate with Moscow, retaining the CANDU MOX option if it seemed to offer a part of the solution in bringing Russia to a mutually agreeable means of disposition.
Alternatively, Canada itself could at some point judge that a trilateral agreement was not on, and endeavour to associate itself politically with a different international arrangement in which all had a part. The permutations of a possible agreement on disposition seen quite open-ended at this point in our discussion, as does the proportion of the Russian and U.S. surplus that might find its way to Canada if the CANDU MOX initiative were to be acted upon.
Let us simplify the picture by assuming that before the end of 1998 a trilateral deal acceptable in technical, economic, political, and international security terms is negotiated for the disposition in Canada of 30 out of a total of 100 tonnes. Though Canada could in principle begin to seek regulatory approval right away, U.S. congressional authorization and appropriations would now be required. The Russian Duma would also have to ratify the agreement before anyone was in a position to proceed in earnest.
Appropriations and ratification procedures in the two countries could be expected to take the CANDU MOX option well into 1999 and possibly 2000, a U.S. presidential election year. But then there is also a Russian presidential election expected around this time. Only around the turn of the century might a stable set of expectations start to take shape. Commercial negotiations between Ontario Hydro and the MOX fuel suppliers in Russia, the United States, and possibly Europe could therefore start around 2000 or 2001. Once possessed of a firm business proposition, Ontario Hydro would apply for regulatory approval from Canadian federal and provincial authorities who could find it necessary to hold extensive public hearings.
At some point in this sequence, let us say in the year 2001, CANDU MOX fuel fabrication facilities would start to be built outside Canada. There would be an urgent international desire to get on with this, in fact to get a head start on MOX manufacture by starting to build the required facilities as soon as a firm agreement on disposition was in hand, if not earlier by launching a MOX fuel fabrication pilot project in Russia.
But it is difficult to see how the construction or modification of plants designed specifically for purposes of CANDU MOX manufacture could be initiated elsewhere before regulatory approvals of the entire venture had first been obtained in Canada. To do otherwise would be to do serious damage to the integrity of the Canadian regulatory process by conveying to Canadians the unmistakeable impression that the environmental and related impact assessment procedure had a foregone conclusion. Similar considerations would apply to the start of reactor engineering and other modifications required at the Bruce site before MOX use could begin.
Let us assume that a year is required to gain regulatory approval in Canada. Neither engineering work at the Bruce nuclear generating station nor the construction of facilities for CANDU MOX fuel manufacture in Russia and the United States would commence much before the beginning of 2002.
Some suggest that it could take up to ten years for a U.S. MOX fuel manufacturing facility to be up and running fully for reactor supply. This figure could be reduced to seven years if existing European MOX fabrication capacity were commissioned to make fuel assemblies on an interim basis, or it could be extended to as much as 15 years if the licensing of a U.S. facility were contested in court and if it were to undergo testing and demonstration before committing to fabrication.[24]
Somewhat similar uncertainties no doubt apply to the startup of full-scale MOX fuel manufacture in Russia, and to the making of CANDU MOX fuel in both countries. Meanwhile, MOX fuel producers in Europe are united in the view that new capacity would be required if they were to meet the combined needs of weapons plutonium disposition and anticipated commercial demand for MOX.[25]
These many and varied considerations suggest that if the international go-ahead were given for CANDU MOX fuel fabrication in the United States, the Russian Federation, or in Europe only after the Canadian regulatory process had yielded an approval by the end of 2001, excess Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium rendered into MOX would not begin to move to Canada in volume until 2008-2011.
Proponents of the initiative are therefore excessively optimistic in stating that Canadian-based disposition would begin in earnest “a few years after the year 2000.”[26] The more realistic date is 2010, if the Canadian regulatory process is to be respected. Given a CANDU MOX disposition mission of 30-66 tonnes at 1.52 percent weapons plutonium fuel content, and no hitches at the Bruce station, the job would be done in from seven to 16 years, or at the outside by 2026 which is about when the Bruce B reactors reach the end of their expected lifetimes.
1.2. Selling Points
Even if the support of the Canadian government for the proposal were greatly increased in the months ahead, the fate of the CANDU MOX initiative will largely be determined by international forces over which Canada has no control. Some of the outcome will nevertheless depend on the skill and cohesion of the Canadian proponents, and on any innate competitive advantages the CANDU MOX solution may possess. There are some advantages.
Though the merits claimed for Canadian-based reactor disposition are neither ranked by the proponents nor compared with alternative means of disposition, we may begin with the promise of reliability in meeting the international need for a means of disposition that is effective, secure, and irreversible in all its aspects. Aside from presenting CANDUs as proven technology that can readily be adapted to MOX use without substantial reactor or operational change, the proponents offer transparent and irreversible disposition with the help of a “trusted third party”[27] that has foresworn nuclear weapons and long striven for nuclear non-proliferation.[28] Thus, in an implicit distinction from other possible locations for MOX disposition, the selection of Canadian reactor use would provide confidence that no plutonium would be returned to weapons use by the host nation , which in this case would also apply full-scope international safeguards against theft or diversion and insist on regulatory approvals as good as or better than could be had in other jurisdictions.
Second, there is timeliness. The concern here is with speed relative to other reactor options not only in completing, but also in commencing disposition. Whereas U.S. and European experience is with light-water and other types of reactor requiring periodic and complete shutdown for refuelling, CANDUs, it is noted, have the advantage of on-line refuelling. Early on, this would allow time savings in MOX fuel testing and qualification for early startup.[29] Subsequently, it would speed the process and bring it to an end more rapidly than could be achieved with other reactor designs.
As well, in contrast to Europe where reactor characteristics are such as to allow only partial loading with MOX fuel, CANDU reactors are said to be capable of full-core MOX loading, thereby accelerating the rate of disposition.[30] CANDU MOX fuel bundles being small and simply handled, they should also be easier and cheaper to fabricate, thereby easing the task of MOX fuel manufacture.
Finally, and this could raise Canadian eyebrows, there is a scheduling advantage claimed in the potential to get a head start on the construction of MOX fuel manufacturing plants by doing so “in parallel with” the licensing process in Canada which, it is implied, should proceed quickly .[31] CANDU reactors at the Bruce generating station are thus being presented as fully tried technology that can be brought into international service with little delay or difficulty, and can then produce rapid rates of disposition once on line.
Symmetry comes next. The thought here is that the cause of disposition is favoured by an arrangement that allows the Russian Federation and the United States to act together in parallel.[32] Disposing of a greater or lesser portion of their combined surplus in Canada would see the two engage in tandem disposition that was transparent in its assurances of what was being done, and reinforced the reality and the appearance of equality between them. As such, I would add, the CANDU MOX initiative could offer a simple focal point solution amongst an array of possibly quite complicated international disposition arrangements that promise to be difficult not only to negotiate but to carry out.
Finally, CANDU MOX can be presented as cost-efficient. Aside from repackaging some of the points already made, there would be the additional advantage of savings to Russia and the United States stemming from the fact that Canada would retain the spent fuel and not return it.[33] Also, and now primarily for Canadian domestic consumption, spent MOX fuel is said to be roughly 15 percent less in volume than the waste produced when natural uranium is burned.[34]
Although there is no commercial experience of CANDU reactor use with MOX fuel, joint testing and demonstration studies are under way with Russia and the United States that could make the CANDU out to be a relatively voracious and reliable consumer of excess weapons plutonium. Taken together, reliability, timeliness, symmetry, and cost-effectiveness could go some of the way in helping to put the Canadian initiative over the top, if that indeed is what Canada is to do.
Nevertheless, the proponents have their work cut out for them. As matters stand, it is not clear that they are cut out for the job.
NEXT: MOX Experience, Part 2
[ The Dangers of Encouraging Plutonium Use ]
[ Bomb Makers Speak Out Against Plutonium ][ Plutonium Sub-Directory ]
THE MOX EXPERIENCE:
THE DISPOSITION OF EXCESS RUSSIAN
AND U.S. WEAPONS PLUTONIUM IN CANADA
J u l y 1 9 9 7
Part 2
Franklyn Griffiths
George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies
University College, University of Toronto
15 King’s College Circle
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3H7
tel (416) 978-7417 fax (416) 971-2027
. . . back to Table of Contents
The CANDU MOX team is divided into designated “proponents” and others who may be termed good officers. The proponents are not the government of Canada and its ministries, but Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), Ontario Hydroelectric Corporation Limited (Ontario Hydro), and Zircatec Precision Industries Ltd. AECL is the lead agency in the “assessment” stage of the CANDU MOX option. Ontario Hydro would lead in the implementation of any international agreement that took the option up.[35] The federal government — specifically the Prime Minister, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN) — and also the government of Ontario, have chosen to cast themselves in the role of providing good offices for the proponents’ initiative, to which they have agreed in principle owing to the potential benefits for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. A Canadian international proposal framed as a swords-into-ploughshares contribution to peace is thus being driven more by industry than by government.
The privatization of foreign policy could be an idea whose time has come. Be this as it may, DFAIT and NRCAN are working quietly to make the most of the Canadian offer internationally. DFAIT, however, has tasked only three persons to the job and they have other responsibilities as well. Meanwhile, at a more basic level, the nuclear industry may be driving the initiative with the warm regard of the Prime Minister and the Premier of Ontario, but the federal government has interests of its own which serve to create space between it and the proponents. Not only is Ottawa to be spared any cost in the implementation of the initiative, but the proponents or their commercial partners are to cover the expense of all regulatory and licensing assessments of the health, safety, and environmental effects in Canada.[36] This may be small potatoes, but the fact is that the government of Canada cannot be wholly at one with the proponents if it is to meet its responsibility to “ensure the initiative’s safety and security.”[37] Before long, however, Ottawa will have to hold public hearings on the venture if it is to move ahead with the larger public interest clearly in mind.
As to the Government of Ontario, it is barely evident in the interplay. As of October 1996, I could find no one in the Premier’s Office who had the issue on their radar screen. The same was true as of early July 1997. Such Ontario business as is being done with federal departments and the proponents on the initiative is being handled by the Environment and Energy Ministry. DFAIT is nevertheless able to report that Ontario “supports the possible contribution to world disarmament using Canadian technology and agrees to continue partnership with the federal government to the next phase of feasibility studies.”[38] The thought of a government of Ontario making a contribution to world disarmament is as original as it is laudable. It may also be said to require further study and assimilation by Ontario policy-makers and the Ontario public, particularly when it comes to the establishment of a long-term relationship with the Russian Federation as a MOX fuel supplier to Ontario Hydro and the province’s consumers of electricity.
Turning to the proponents, we find Zircatec nowhere to be seen, AECL doing most of the running, and Ontario Hydro distracted by endemic deficiencies in its nuclear operations. Zircatec Precision Industries Ltd is located in Port Hope, Ontario, where it operates the largest CANDU fuel fabrication facility anywhere and also makes fuel and reactor components.[39]
AECL was set up in 1952 as a commercial Crown Corporation with a degree of autonomy from the government of Canada. Reporting to Parliament through the Minister of Natural Resources, it conducts research and development operations, and sells and builds CANDU power stations nationally and internationally. Where the CANDU MOX option is concerned, AECL is currently conducting fuel test studies with Russian and U.S. agencies.[40] More to the point, it has led a consortium of firms including British Nuclear Fuels plc and Bechtel National Inc. as well as Ontario Hydro and Zircatec in lobbying the U.S. Department of Energy on behalf of the CANDU MOX option. Though the United States eventually chose itself to own any MOX fuel fabrication facility built in the U.S., the “Team CANDU” consortium led by AECL also sought the privatization and ownership of an unutilized U.S. government MOX fuel manufacturing plant to produce not only CANDU MOX but also MOX for American pressurized- and light-water reactors.[41] AECL may therefore be taken to have a declared interest not only in Canadian-based CANDU MOX reactor burnup, but in MOX fuel fabrication elsewhere.
In South Korea, AECL is also promoting the development of a closed fuel cycle which would allow the use of spent reactor fuel, without reprocessing, in CANDU reactors there.[42] Recently, in an arrangement that would see AECL and Ontario Hydro continue in a joint operator’s role, the federal government sold AECL‘s Whiteshell laboratory in Manitoba to a consortium led by the U.S. subsidiary of British Nuclear Fuels.[43] The Whiteshell lab has specialized in research and development on geological burial of nuclear waste in the Canadian Shield. Commercial interest and indeed the remarks of an AECL vice-president on national television hint at downstream potential for the construction of an international nuclear waste disposal site in Canada.[44] Meanwhile, together with Ontario Hydro, AECL runs the Canadian Fuel Fusion Technology Project which is the Canadian participant in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) effort to achieve controlled hydrogen fusion as an electricity source. AECL and Ontario Hydro aim to locate an ITER power plant at the site of the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station,[45] although the Darlington station may now be the front-runner.
With Ontario Hydro in tow, AECL is therefore interested in exploring a full range of technologies from standard CANDU, through MOX fuel fabrication abroad and on to CANDU weapons MOX disposition plus closed fuel-cycle development in South Korea and hydrogen fusion at the Bruce site, and out to geological disposal of nuclear waste at what could one day become an international repository in Canada. All of this is being ventured on what may be termed a commercial basis with public subsidy.
AECL has created economic activity in Canada and business elsewhere since its formation in 1952, but this has been done at a cumulative cost to the taxpayer that runs to some $15-billion in 1997 dollars, some would say much more.[46] Relative to advanced light-water reactors, CANDU technology has not been competitive except in the Canadian and now the industrializing Third World market where it will sell “only through political influence and financial subsidies that are directly absorbed on the account of some federal agency or program.”[47 ] As for Ontario Hydro, the less heard about it, the better it would be for the CANDU MOX initiative.
Ontario Hydro is among the world’s larger nuclear utilities and owns 20 CANDU reactors of which the operative units account for more than 60 percent of Ontario’s electricity supply.[48] A provincial crown corporation, it reports to the provincial Legislature through the Minister of Environment and Energy. Deeply troubled, this is the entity that would enter into lengthy contracts for MOX fuel supply when today its operating plants are running at 70 percent of capacity owing to declining electricity demand, extensive outages, inadequate safety, and poor management.[49] Its current plan is moreover to reduce the proportion of electricity produced by nuclear generation to 11 percent by 2030.[50] Having written off $3.6-billion of its equity in 1993, a further $2.5-billion was added in 1996, which brought Ontario Hydro’s estimated equity down to less than $3-billion. Given a debt of $32-billion, and saying nothing of monies yet to be spent on permanent nuclear waste disposal, the utility’s debt-equity ratio is currently estimated at 90 percent[.51] To turn things around, it has been necessary for Ontario Hydro to bring in a team of U.S. nuclear utility managers, an act described by Hydro’s president as both “a humbling experience” and “a wake-up call.”[52 ] It happens that one of the team has significant experience in commercial planning for weapons plutonium disposition.[53]
Where the Bruce nuclear station is concerned, one of the four A unit reactors has been closed down because of insufficient electricity demand, and another is out of commission owing to a lead blanket having been left in a boiler by a worker when it was being repaired. A further reactor in the A unit has been mothballed in a decision not to renew its tubing (replacement of pressure tubes containing fuel bundles) so as to allow it to operate past 2000.[54] Whereas Bruce A was initially proposed as the site for CANDU MOX use, DFAIT now refers generically to the Bruce nuclear generating station as the proposed location, meaning Bruce B reactors in effect. These reactors themselves all require retubing some 25-30 years after startup, by around 2015, which would add to the expense as well as the time required for implementation of the CANDU MOX initiative. The report of unexpected corrosion of pipes carrying radioactive heavy water from heating elements to the boilers in CANDU reactors of a type operating in Argentina, South Korea, and Romania[55] could, if confirmed, take away further from the cost-effectiveness claim made by proponents of the CANDU MOX option.
Putting all of this together, a U.S. Government that is in earnest about reliability and safety in the disposition of excess weapons plutonium will surely look twice before turning to AECL‘s CANDU and to Ontario Hydro. Similarly, while the Russian Federation may be less driven by efficiency and safety requirements than is the U.S., Canadians are bound to ask how much safer and more economical it would be to irradiate Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium in Ontario, as opposed to consigning it to immobilization in glass or ceramics in the countries of origin, or even subjecting it to irradiation there despite real dangers of diversion and theft in Russia in particular.
Having only just begun to assess the CANDU MOX initiative and its implications, I come away with misgivings. Some might already say it’s a disaster in the making, and go no further. Others may regard the discussion thus far as biased against the initiative. But I hold to misgivings at this point. However it is done, the disposition of excess weapons plutonium is an undertaking of vast and indeed historic proportions. We are contemplating an extended sequence of extremely complex, time-consuming, and expensive steps which, if done right, will help to rid the world of some nuclear weapons, and to prevent some who are now without them from gaining possession of them. This is surely a cause worth considering. And yet, implementation of the CANDU MOX initiative would not likely begin until around 2010 and, depending on the mission, could carry on into the ‘twenties of the next century or beyond. Through to the end of the next decade, CANDU MOX disposition would in itself do little to address the challenges of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament beyond giving confidence that something would be done in due course. After about 2010, Canada would begin to draw down a portion of the combined Russian and U.S. excess, which would continue to sit there in diminishing quantity. All the while, a nuclear weapon can be made with less than 10 kg of diverted or seized plutonium. The nuclear non-proliferation case for CANDU MOX disposition seems to be leaky. If anything, we appear to be contemplating a worthy Canadian contribution to nuclear disarmament which would be achieved over many years, with great difficulty, and no doubt some cost to Canadians. But even here, as will be seen, there is less benefit in the CANDU MOX initiative than meets the eye.
On the matter of cost, the Canadian government’s press line stresses the potential international security benefits of the CANDU MOX initiative, and says nothing about cost except to refuse to share the burden of finance. If the CANDU MOX initiative offers an effective international solution to the problem of disposition, and if there are no costs to Canadians, why isn’t Canada “assuming its responsibility” and offering to pay a share? The answer is surely that there are costs to Canadians in the initiative, and that the government and the proponents prefer not to advertise them. Further, if the costs to Canadians are significant, and if the Russian Federation and the United States were to retain some of their excess weapons plutonium for domestic disposition and ship only a portion of the total to Canada for burnup, we would have to ask whether the international benefits and the costs to Canadians make it worth Canada’s while to do only part of the job. Similarly, if Russia and the United States were able to deal with a portion of their excess strategic plutonium themselves, why shouldn’t they be asked by Canadians to deal with it all? My misgiving on this point is that accepting only a modest portion of the excess may not be worth it, depending on how the cost to Canadians shapes up — a discussion for later in this study. On the other hand, if the CANDU MOX initiative were somehow to assist the Russian Federation to the disproportionate disposition required to bring Russia and the United States to retained weapons plutonium parity — a tall order and one that flies in the face of the proponents’ symmetry claim — Canadians could prove willing to accept costs.
Beyond this, a concern has surfaced here over the origins, technical-economic base, and political leadership of the CANDU MOX option. The option is too heavily marked by the nuclear industry to breed confidence that it is in the wider public interest. The industry itself is in bad shape, and yet would have to be relied upon at least until the second decade of the coming century. Although CANDU technology is unimpressive by world standards, it could be suited to the untried task of weapons plutonium disposition if allowance were made for the outages[56] and repairs customary in CANDU and Ontario Hydro operations. But then we have the incoherence of an international security venture being led by an industry with an agenda of its own. The whole effort fails to impress. It does not seem up to the opportunities that have been claimed for it. Nor may it be equal to the risks that have already been accepted in placing a Canadian-based disposition option on the table. Risks and opportunities alike start to come into focus when we turn to a consideration of the alternatives for international disposition of the Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium excess.
2. The Alternatives
Stripped to its essentials, the choice among alternative means of disposition comes down to the grotesque question of who pays for what done where and when by whom. Even if all the key players had clearly specified preferences on all these matters, which they do not, there is far more in this statement of the problem than can be handled here. Let me therefore consider the alternatives in terms of how the principal players’ technological capabilities and political and industrial preferences might bear on the process of devising a solution. We are referring to new technology here, new in the sense of being untested and unproven for Canada, Russia, and the United States, although not for Europe.
In devising a means of disposition, the parties, Canada included, will prefer to spread the risk and not rely heavily on any one technology which could prove problematic. If they succeed in this, Canadian-based disposition could figure as a minor contribution to a larger and possibly quite complex arrangement in which a variety of technical capabilities were brought to bear in constructing a generally acceptable solution. In this scenario, the inevitable political as well as technological hitches would be worked out in a more or less continuous process of negotiation that produced broad multilateral agreement. The Canadian government would accept whatever it was offered, perhaps only 30 tonnes or so of the Russian and U.S. excess. Alternatively, preferences could be such that a widely held agreement began to elude the principals. They could therefore consider assigning a larger share of the solution to Canadian-based reactor disposition. Whereas Canada could have expected to figure as a supporting actor in the elaboration of a broad multilateral agreement, it could now be invited to take on more prominent role. It could also find that its capacity to set conditions on its participation had increased. As of mid-1997, the modest part seems the more likely. Nevertheless, to allow for surprise, I will endeavour to specify a number of options for Canadian participation in what follows.
Setting aside failure to act, we can identify four main international outcomes and therefore alternatives for disposition. They are largely keyed to the Russian side of things, which is where the larger part of the difficulty lies.
The first alternative may be referred to as Immobilization-Only. It would see the excess weapons plutonium of the Russian Federation and the United States vitrified or sealed in ceramic form, and then held permanently in each country.
Next is the S-8 Hybrid solution. Here the United States would rely on a combination of domestic irradiation and immobilization, while the Russian excess would be very largely or wholly given over to reactor disposition in Russia with U.S. and substantial European assistance, and with or without U.S. participation in the immobilization of a small portion. As will be seen, there is some scope for the use of Canadian-based reactors here.
Third, the CANDU MOX option could figure more prominently in a Trilateral Hybrid outcome. Smaller Canadian contributions to disposition under a Trilateral agreement could themselves form part of an S-8 Hybrid outcome or, given an impasse in the S-8 negotiation, a larger Canadian role could be secured in a stand-alone Trilateral solution. Under this kind of arrangement, the Russian Federation and the United States would each select as they saw fit from among (1) domestic immobilization of a portion of their excess, and (2) asymmetrical CANDU MOX disposition of the entire remainder with Russia consigning more to Canada than the United States, or symmetrical reactor disposition to Canada with Russia relying on Europe in disposing of the remaining amount required to reach retained weapons plutonium parity with the United States.
There is no great prospect for a fourth possible outcome, Bilateral Hybrid disposition, in which Russia and the United States would deal with their weapons plutonium excess without resorting to the assistance of other parties. Aside from the likely need to rely on Europe for MOX fuel fabrication, Russian-U.S. differences are too great and the task of reactor disposition in Russia is too large for the United States to handle alone. Indeed, much the same — no great prospect — may currently be said of the Immobilization-Only solution. It is considered here largely, but not wholly, as a way of broaching certain questions of principle in the disposition of weapons plutonium.
No less than ten options come to light when these four basic alternatives are assessed in terms of the reference disposition mission of 100 tonnes, and of a 150-tonne mission required to reach equal levels of retained weapons plutonium. The options are laid out in Table 1. In discussing Immobilization-Only to begin with, I will lay in some technical and contextual detail that should shorten consideration of the S-8 and Trilateral Hybrid options, which is where the action lies. Of all the options, it is cell 4 in Table 1 which may best represent the aspirations of the parties. If they are unable to converge on agreement here, their interaction could move in the direction of a free-standing Trilateral Hybrid accommodation.
| ARRANGEMENT | ||
| Immobilization-Only | 50 t RF to immob in RF |
100 t RF to immob in RF |
| S-8 Hybrid | 33 t US to reactor in US, <50 t RF to reactor in RF, |
33 t US to reactor in US, <100 t RF to reactor in RF, |
| Trilateral Hybrida) Symmetrical CANDU | 18 t US to reactor in US 15 t US to CANDU 15 t RF to CANDU <35 t RF to reactor in RF |
18 t US to reactor in US 15 t US to CANDU 15 t RF to CANDU <85 t RF to reactor in RF, |
| b) Asymmetrical CANDU | 18 t US to reactor in US 15 t US to CANDU <50 t RF to CANDU |
18 t US to reactor in US 15 t US to CANDU <100 t RF to CANDUc |
| Bilateral Hybridd | 33 t US to reactor in US <50 t RF to reactor in RF |
33 t US to reactor in US <100 t RF to reactor in RF |
| a Reference amount for current Russian-U.S. assessment.b Amount required to bring RF and US to equal levels of retained weapons plutonium. Calculation, estimated amounts: US WPu stockpile 100 t, RF 150 t; US to reduce by 50 t, of which 17 t is deemed unsuited to reactor use, to 50 t retained WPu; RF to reduce by 100 t, of which some 45 t may be unsuited to reactor use without purification, to 50 t retained WPu; combined reduction approximately 150 t. Source for estimate of RF WPu unsuited to reactor use without purification, Cochran, “Progress in U.S./Russian Transparency,” fn 8. This source is fully cited in note 7 of the present study.c The Russian preference is to purify, not immobilize, all but a small volume of WPu scraps, residue, and irradiated fuel, for reactor use. Joint Study, CS-1, which is fully cited in note 8 of the present study. There would however be an amount left over for immobilization.d Amounts are similar for the S-8 and Bilateral Hybrid options. Aside from the exclusion of third parties from reactor use and MOX fuel manufacture, the principal difference is that the United States alone would meet the financial requirements of Russian disposition.
Fv |
||
2.1. Immobilization-Only
Attitudes toward immobilization are inseparable from attitudes toward the spread of plutonium fuel-cycle technology. For twenty years, the United States has lived with a ban of its own on the burning of MOX fuel, and on the reprocessing of plutonium from spent U.S. civil reactor waste. This self-denying ordinance was enacted by the Carter Administration in 1977 in an effort to check the spread of nuclear weapons by checking the ever greater availability of plutonium for weapons purposes that would come with global spread of reliance on plutonium as a civil energy source. In my view, continued opposition to the spread of the plutonium fuel cycle is of critical importance in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States has been on the side of the angels here. It follows that civil reactor disposition of excess Russian and U.S. strategic weapons plutonium is not the best way to go if nuclear non-proliferation is to be held high as a priority for international security into the next century. Immobilization, however, is entirely consistent with the maintenance of barriers to ever more widespread reliance on variants of the closed fuel cycle.
To be sure, immobilization would leave weapons plutonium in weapons-grade form (not degraded by irradiation), making it relatively accessible to recovery for military purposes. It therefore represents a less than perfect solution from the standpoint of nuclear disarmament. But there are no perfect solutions in these matters. In the event of reactor disposition separately in each country, plutonium would still be available for recovery from spent fuel, aside from also being very much more in circulation than would be the case under an immobilization regime. And even with CANDU MOX disposition in the land of a “trusted third party,” the nature of the Canadian-American relationship is such that Moscow would have to expect Ottawa to grant Washington access to Russian as well as U.S. spent MOX fuel if the United States were to turn to Canada in extremis. Nor is a perfect solution any easier to find when we shift the emphasis from nuclear disarmament to non-proliferation. There are already some 1,200 tonnes of civil plutonium in the world[57] and, as indicated, it can take only a few kilograms to make a nuclear weapon. Immobilizing or for that matter irradiating up to 150 tonnes of weapons plutonium is not going to take us far in reducing the global threat of nuclear proliferation unless we subscribe strongly to the singular danger posed by leakage from the Russian custodial system. But it will take us some distance in strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime against criticism that nuclear-weapons states are failing in their obligation to disarm. In the circumstances, there is no choice but to try to do one’s best. Immobilization is undoubtedly the best disposition alternative for purposes of disarmament and non-proliferation alike. It is also estimated by proponents to be more than 30 percent cheaper to implement than reactor disposition, and to require substantially less time both to begin and to bring to completion.[58]
Most everything done by the United States for nuclear non-proliferation and against the spread of plutonium-based civil nuclear technology over the past two decades is consistent with a choice for immobilization as the preferred disposition option today. But while U.S. capabilities to make and consume civil MOX fuel as they existed in 1977 were not subsequently developed, neither were they dismantled. The United States currently lacks a commercial capacity for plutonium reprocessing and MOX fuel manufacture, but it retains the potential to acquire one. As to U.S. nuclear utilities, they are saddled with a combined debt of some $70-billion (Ontario Hydro’s debt alone being in the order of $30-billion Canadian), and are faced with large new losses as deregulation gives consumers new choices.[59] Still, some of the 110 U.S. light-water reactors using enriched uranium are now ready or could be converted to burn MOX fuel for weapons-disposition purposes.[60] Were the U.S. government to relax its opposition to plutonium fuel-cycle technology, elements of the nuclear industry could seize the opportunity to enter the cycle at midstream with advanced technology funded from the government’s obligation to ensure disposition of the U.S. weapons plutonium excess.
Now, in declaring reactor use to be a principal option for disposition, the Clinton Administration has opened to door to a fundamental reappraisal of U.S. preferences in the matter of nuclear non-proliferation. New perspectives and new interests have evidently been brought to bear. Indeed, in announcing the framework for selection of U.S. disposition options, the Department of Energy indicated there was significant commercial interest in the use of weapons MOX in U.S. reactors.[61] Chief among the U.S. proponents is Commonwealth Edison (Chicago), the largest nuclear utility in the country, and Duke Power, the second largest.[62] British Nuclear Fuels, Cogema (France), and Belgonucleaire are said to be lobbying actively for reactor use.[63] Arrayed against reactor use and for immobilization in the public debate that may come are arms controllers including elements of the federal bureaucracy, health advocates, environmental and nuclear-watchdog non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Among the NGOs are Greenpeace International, the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, the Military Production Network, the Nuclear Control Institute, the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Public Citizen, the Safe Energy Communication Council, and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group.[64] The stakes in the debate are high.
As of today, the Administration still holds broadly to the established view on plutonium fuel-cycle issues. As stated in the December 1996 announcement of U.S. disposition options,
Pursuant to this decision, the United States policy not to encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, not to itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear-power or nuclear explosive purposes, does not change. Although under this decision some plutonium may ultimately be burned in existing reactors, extensive measures will be pursued… to ensure that federal support for this unique disposition mission does not encourage other civil uses of plutonium or plutonium reprocessing.[65]
Still, for the United States — the lead state in the international system — to opt even in hedged and qualified form for MOX reactor burnup already begins to move the world more rapidly down the slope to heavier reliance on the fuel cycle and to the dangers that await there.
Whereas the United States has until now sought to maintain a divide between military and civil plutonium use, in Russia the two have long been fused in the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). Responsible for all aspects of nuclear weapons and civil nuclear energy production, Minatom is today faced with vastly more than the need to dispose of the Russian Federation’s excess weapons plutonium. It must also achieve the conversion of a military-dominated, dual-purpose, and state-run industry into one dedicated very largely to civil purposes. Minatom is also burdened with a dependent population of over a million employees and their families, a decomposing nuclear weapons production and custodial capacity of enormous proportions, and a critical lack of capital for conversion and custody alike.[66] But beyond all this there lies Russia’s determination to make the transition to plutonium-based civil nuclear technology, first employing MOX in existing light-water reactors and then moving to faster reactors based on more advanced designs.[67] Minatom further seeks to develop new reprocessing as well as MOX fuel fabrication capability. At present, however, Russia reprocesses only some 2.5 tonnes of civil plutonium annually, in part for foreign clients.[68] It also uses MOX only for experimental purposes at the Chelyabinsk-65 (Ozersk) and Kransoyarsk-26 (Zheleznogorsk) sites, these being only partially completed MOX fuel plants for breeder and pressurized-water reactors whose construction was cancelled in 1991 owing to lack of funds.[69]
The Russian Federation is therefore on a collision course with the United States over the plutonium fuel cycle. It stands at the threshold of a transformation in its civil nuclear affairs. If pursued, the transition will take many years to complete and will provide major business opportunities for those prepared to assist. Where the particular problem of excess weapons plutonium is concerned, reactor use and not immobilization is Russia’s first choice. Though it is not totally out of the question for the United States to purchase Moscow’s assent to an Immobilization-Only solution (Table 1, cells 1 and 2), it would require not only a vast outlay of funds but acceptance of Russian application of these funds to the acquisition of plutonium fuel-cycle technology from Europe.
Consistent with the principles that underlie the Immobilization-Only option, the United States recently offered to finance and assist in the construction of a MOX fuel plant in Russia, provided that it was employed exclusively for the disposition of surplus weapons plutonium and not for civil MOX fuel production as well.[70] This condition the Russians refused to accept. Now the United States is seeking Russian assent to the proposition that facilities built with Western assistance for weapons plutonium disposition would not be used for civil fuel fabrication and power generation until disposition was complete. At that time, final decisions would be taken on whether the spent fuel “should go directly to geologic disposal, as the U.S. prefers; or should eventually be reprocessed to recover separated plutonium, the current preference for Russia.”[71] While it is conceivable that Russian attitudes toward immobilization could change if the G-7 were united in support of the U.S. view, other members of the G-7 have ideas of their own on Russia’s transition to closed-cycle technology.
Whereas economic and non-proliferation considerations have moved the United States against the plutonium fuel cycle, MOX use is well established in Europe and in Japan. Roughly 24 tonnes of plutonium is separated annually in Europe from spent fuel of German, Japanese, and in lesser measure other origin (Belgium, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).[72] This is done at reprocessing plants in France (by Cogema, at La Hague), and the United Kingdom (by British Nuclear Fuels, at Sellafield).[73] What with the travails of the Siemens MOX fuel fabrication facility at Hanau in Germany, Belgium (Belgonucleaire at Desel) in conjunction with Siemens became for a while the European leader in making MOX for light-water, pressurized-water, and breeder reactors in Belgium, France, Germany, and Switzerland.[74] Significant capacity for MOX fuel manufacture is now held by France (the MELOX plant at Marcoule, and also at Caradache), and is planned in Britain (at Sellafield) with possible Siemens participation.[75] Spent fuel, reprocessed plutonium, and MOX fuel are also transported freely by road, ship, and air within Europe, and between Europe and Japan without exceptional security precautions or incidents save for repeated protests over Japanese shipments and the recent turmoil over rail transport of high-level vitrified waste and spent fuel to Gorleben in Germany.[76] Consistent with wider processes of European unification, the overall pattern is of one of increasing transnationalization of the European nuclear industry.
Though the use of plutonium is inevitably controversial, Europe has to be called uninhibited when it comes to the plutonium fuel cycle. For Russia, today’s Europe offers not only technology and know-how, but an alternative to reliance on the United States both in the disposition of its weapons plutonium and in the development of its civil nuclear industry. To Europe, Russia’s nuclear need offers a major market at a time when the civil use of plutonium is lagging relative to its accumulation. Seimens has thus been active in promoting a German role in the construction of a Russian MOX fuel fabrication plant for disposition of the Russian weapons plutonium surplus.[77] British Nuclear Fuels, with Belgonucleaire, has also offered MOX fuel fabrication assistance to Russia.[78] Now, France and Germany are actively discussing a proposal with Russia to build a pilot plant at Ozersk capable of producing 1.3 tonnes of weapons plutonium MOX annually, beginning in 2001 or not long thereafter. As opposed to the U.S. offer that was turned down, France and Germany are interested in providing a facility that is not constrained to manufacture weapons MOX alone. Key European G-7 members are thus working counter to the immobilization option, for reactor disposition in Russia, and for a role in Russia’s plutonium fuel-cycle development.
In view of the Russian, French, and German interest in closed-cycle technology, it has to be said that in mid-1997 the outlook is dim for G-7 agreement on Immobilization-Only as the preferred international means of disposition. Where then does Canada stand?
The answer is that in its support for Canadian-based reactor disposition, the government of Canada is lending its good offices to the forces arrayed against immobilization and plutonium fuel-cycle restraint. Indeed, the Canadian government all but favours the civil use of plutonium and sees no nuclear proliferation problem here that cannot be contained. The policy is stated as follows:
Canada’s nuclear non-proliferation position does not preclude the possibility of engaging in the commercial use of plutonium provided that effective technical, institutional and safeguard measures are in place to address proliferation risks. Canadian CANDU operators have taken commercial decisions not to use plutonium fuel cycles mainly because of the cost advantage of natural uranium fuels.[79]
The effect of this position is to foreclose official discussion of immobilization, even as an initial preference after which the CANDU MOX alternative might follow as a fall-back option. It is to obviate the thought of Canada doing whatever it might to underwrite the Immobilization-Only option in the U.S. public debate. On the contrary, it is consistent with the view that the United States is now solidly committed to a “two-track” policy of reactor use and immobilization,[80] when the U.S. debate has yet to be joined. The Canadian government position is furthermore to rely on international safeguards against proliferation, when safeguard requirements themselves would be radically reduced under conditions of immobilization relative to those attending the proliferation of civil plutonium use. Above all, the effect of the government view is to support preferences for reactor disposition in Russia, Europe, and within the United States. And how else might it be when Ottawa gives its qualified support to an initiative of the Canadian nuclear industry without first screening the proposition for its wider public interest?
In my view, Immobilization-Only should be Canada’s first preference for disposition unless and until it can be shown that it is definitely not workable internationally. Having pre-emptively chosen to favour what is an inferior position in terms of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the Canadian government ought now to reconsider its attachment to reactor use. Canadians, for their part, ought to seek a review of the commitment. Nor should the outcome of a review be seen as a foregone conclusion on behalf of immobilization. Depending on events, especially the course of U.S. debate over the next year and more, Canadians could well find that resistance to the spread of civil plutonium use is so heavily breached as to deny Immobilization-Only as a viable option. If so, they would need to ask whether the CANDU MOX option might be modified to make it more consistent with the underlying premises of immobilization. But before getting to this question, the value of an intervening alternative would have to be weighed.
NEXT: MOX Experience, Part 3
[ The Dangers of Encouraging Plutonium Use ]
[ Bomb Makers Speak Out Against Plutonium ][ Plutonium Sub-Directory ]
THE MOX EXPERIENCE:
THE DISPOSITION OF EXCESS RUSSIAN
AND U.S. WEAPONS PLUTONIUM IN CANADA
J u l y 1 9 9 7
Part 3
Franklyn Griffiths
George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies
University College, University of Toronto
15 King’s College Circle
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3H7
tel (416) 978-7417 fax (416) 971-2027
. . . back to Table of Contents
2.2. S-8 Hybrid
More likely as of mid-1997 than Immobilization-Only, the alternative here is one that seeks to avoid undue stress among the G-7, bridge differences between Russia, Europe and the United States on fuel-cycle issues, and give all major players a hand in shaping a solution they can live with. The current U.S. move toward hybrid disposition can be read as an over-hasty acceptance of writing on the wall in Russia and Europe where immobilization and resistance to plutonium fuel-cycle proliferation are concerned.[81] For their part, other G-7 members would be moved by broader geopolitical reasons to find common ground with the United States, and to reduce Russian opportunities to exploit dissention among the G-7 for political as well as economic gain. Differences among the G-7 who, aside from Japan, are leading members of NATO, do offer Moscow some opportunity to divide an Alliance that is expanding to Russia’s borders. Not merely compromise but obfuscation would therefore prevail. Fuel-cycle differences would be papered over in an asymmetrical arrangement that saw the United States dispose of its own surplus domestically as it preferred, and gave France and Germany a substantial role in helping Russia to a solution. While the United States would presumably continue to meet the major portion of the cost of Russian disposition, U.S. funding would be segregated as best it could from Russian activity directly related to plutonium fuel-cycle development, which would be covered by European members of the concert. Overall, Europe would play a central role in working out a deal with Russia that helped Moscow and Washington to get on with weapons plutonium disposition while offering a promising point of business entry into the Russian nuclear market. The deal would be heavily weighted to reactor disposition at the Russian end. But there is a problem.
If Russia is not far advanced in plutonium reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication as the supply side of the plutonium fuel cycle, it is because of a major deficiency on the demand side. Like the United States, Russia has no light-water reactors that currently use MOX fuel. Unlike the United States, Russia lacks civil power reactors that can readily be adapted to the task of safe disposition of excess weapons plutonium in MOX form. Minatom has therefore sought to use the opportunity provided by disposition to enter the plutonium fuel cycle with innovative reactors which would have had to be developed as well as built.[82] Under this procedure, many years would be added to the task of disposition, and much expense. Now, in an apparent breakthrough, Minatom seems prepared to rely on existing Russian capacity, namely the VVER-1000 light-water reactor.
Seven VVER-1000 reactors are currently in operation in the Russian Federation, two additional reactors are 70-90 percent completed, and one is only 40 percent built. There are also 11 VVER-1000 reactors in Ukraine.[83] All VVER-1000 reactors would have to be modified to accept MOX fuel charges. Significant safety and reliability considerations enter the picture here. Even if they can be met for the Russian VVER-1000s, seven of them functioning with one-third MOX fuel loading are incapable of completing the disposition of 50 tonnes of excess weapons plutonium within the 30-year lifetimes of these reactors. In order to complete a 50-tonne disposition mission — to say nothing of Russian disposition to equal levels of retained weapons plutonium — either the lives of the seven operational plants would have to be extended, they would have to take MOX charges greater than one-third of core, the three remaining plants would have to be completed at an estimated cost of $1-1.5-billion,[84] or Ukrainian VVER 1000 reactors would also have to be joined to Russia’s disposition effort.
If all ten Russian VVER-1000 were successfully adapted to MOX use with one-third MOX loading, and with conversion of the operational reactors completed by 2001–2003, they could accomplish a task of 50-tonnes weapons plutonium disposition by 2028,[85] provided that all went not only safely but well. Russia’s commitment to the plutonium fuel cycle would however make it difficult for the United States to fund the completion of the three remaining VVER-1000s. But industry and government in France and Germany have a more favourable view of the VVER-1000 and Russia’s capacity for safe disposition. Parallel to their cooperation with Russia on MOX fuel fabrication, Cogema and Siemens have launched a project to evaluate the potential for full-core loading of MOX fuel in the VVER-1000, the procedure to be confirmed by 2001.[86] The French and German governments, however, have remained reserved in their readiness to fund Russia’s acquisition of new reactor or MOX fuel manufacturing capacity.[87] As to whether Ukrainian VVER-1000s might also be brought to bear, Russian-Ukrainian relations are troubled but improving. In April 1997, the United States prevailed upon Ukraine not to provide turbines for the two nuclear reactors that Minatom is providing to Iran,[88] a potential nuclear-weapons state. In May, however, Russia and Ukraine opened the way to an enlargement of their cooperation with the signing of a friendship treaty. Ukrainian reactors could therefore form part of an S-8 Hybrid arrangement for the disposition of a total of 100 tonnes of excess Russian and U.S weapons plutonium (Table 1, cell 3). But major difficulties would still have to be resolved.
The United States is not going to lead willingly in financing and assisting in the construction of reactors that will form part of Russia’s transition to the plutonium fuel cycle once a 100-tonne disposition mission is achieved. The same applies to MOX fuel fabrication in Russia. For the parties to leave such matters to determination after disposition were done would be for the United States to surrender its position on the spread of closed-cycle technology. As to the Russian Federation, it is obviously not going to agree to purpose-built reactors that would be torn down on completion of weapons disposition, or to undertake never to reprocess spent weapons MOX fuel for civil use. Europe, for its part, is not going to take Russian or U.S. weapons MOX for burnup in Europe, assuming the two supplier states were willing, since there is a surplus of MOX on the continent and no room for new commercial competition.[89] Accordingly, if an S-8 Hybrid arrangement is to be worked out for the disposition of 100 tonnes, France and Germany could be faced with large outlays for the modification and possibly the construction of Russian reactors, based on a finding that the VVER-1000 can be made safe and efficient for weapons MOX disposition. Russia could of course be asked to share some of the cost in covering its safe reactor deficit, but then an S-8 Hybrid solution might lose some of its appeal in Moscow. All the while, the United States would retain the option to refuse to compromise on the plutonium fuel cycle, to proceed unilaterally with its own disposition, and to leave Russia’s problems primarily to Europe except for any portion Russia wished to immobilize.
Somewhere in all of this there may be grounds for agreement, but the closer one looks at an S-8 Hybrid arrangement, the murkier it becomes. Moreover, if the required amount for disposition by the Russian Federation on Russian soil is not 50 but 100 tonnes or more, in order to meet foreseeable U.S. congressional demands in appropriating the necessary funds, everything becomes substantially more difficult to manage. What with Minatom’s lack of reactor capacity, an S-8 Hybrid agreement providing for timely reduction to equal levels of retained weapons plutonium would almost certainly require that Ukrainian or, now, Canadian reactors be brought into play (Table 1, cell 4). If Ukraine were to participate with U.S. support, it would no doubt be solely to help draw down the Russian excess, and not to move on to the plutonium fuel cycle. Identical fuel would be made in Russia for Russian and Ukrainian VVER-1000 reactors. In the Canadian case, a trilateral Canadian-Russian-U.S. agreement allowing for U.S. as well as Russian disposition in Canada would form part of a larger S-8 Hybrid solution that somehow finessed the plutonium fuel-cycle issue to achieve retained weapons plutonium parity for Russia and the United States. Weapons MOX fuel would be manufactured in Russia both for Russian VVER-1000s that would proceed to civil plutonium use, and for CANDU reactors. Not surprisingly, given Canada’s laxity on the plutonium fuel cycle, DFAIT reports a finding that a French- or German-built MOX plant in Russia could be adapted to the manufacture of CANDU MOX fuel bundles “also.”[90]
Murkiness notwithstanding, a few things start to become clear about S-8 Hybrid disposition when it is viewed from a Canadian standpoint. Whatever the details of an arrangement to deal with only a total of 100 tonnes of excess Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium, if reliance on the VVER-1000 proves justified, disposition of the Russian 50-tonne surplus would be done in Russia, or in Russia and Ukraine (Table 1, cell 3). Canada and the Canadian nuclear industry would be excluded from a role, owing to the U.S. ruling that it will not consider Canadian-based disposition without a trilateral agreement with the Russian Federation. Canada could however be invited to participate if the use of the VVER-1000 does not work out. Canada could also decline any such invitation. Aside from the fact that a 100-tonne disposition mission is unlikely to be sustained by the U.S. Congress, Canada could seek the maximum possible reduction of weapons plutonium if it was going to participate. Indeed, if the CANDU MOX option were to be left on the table, Canada could state that it would have nothing to do with a reference mission of 100 tonnes, but would be willing to accept a portion of the excess required to achieve weapons plutonium parity. Among other reasons, it would take this position because the direct costs of Canadian-based disposition to Canadians could be such as to deny public support to for anything but a major Canadian role and the enhanced international standing and leverage that might be expected to come from it.
A trilateral agreement providing for Canadian-based reactor burnup could therefore figure in a larger S-8 Hybrid arrangement for the disposition of a 150-tonne excess with some degree of reliance on the VVER-1000: the less the latter were used, the larger the call would be on Canadian reactor capacity (Table 1, cell 4). As well, it now becomes clear that once the option of CANDU MOX disposition was placed on the table, the logic of the situation was such as to make Canada and Ukraine into potential competitors in handling the Russian excess. If Kiev proved willing to process a portion of the Russian surplus that might otherwise go to Canada, Ottawa could yield to their desire and not get in their way unless it were fully convinced it had a superior solution.
The task of weapons plutonium disposition being as convoluted as it is, the Canadian government should not be pursing a one-track policy on behalf of the CANDU MOX initiative. Rather, it should act on a two-track policy which treats immobilization as the prime Canadian preference and, if Canadian-based disposition can be made acceptable to Canadians, contributes to the realization of an S-8 Hybrid agreement that produces parity in Russian-U.S. retained weapons plutonium in short order. What then of CANDU MOX disposition as a stand-alone arrangement distinct from an agreement among the S-8?
2.3. Trilateral Hybrid
Viewed strictly in relation to alternative international means of disposition, and without reference to the question of whether the benefits and costs of the measure might make it acceptable to Canadians, free-standing CANDU MOX disposition turns out to be a viable proposition. First, with a significant change in the Canadian proposal, it would allow the G-7 and the Russian Federation a means of decoupling some or, in principle, all of the task of weapons plutonium disposition from the issue of fuel-cycle constraint. Decoupling would be achieved by means of a Canadian declaration that defined the CANDU MOX option as a unique use of Canadian reactors solely for purposes of weapons plutonium disposition and with no potential whatsoever for closed fuel-cycle use, which would be excluded in Canada and denied to the foreign operations of Canadian corporations. A declaration along these lines would terminate Canada’s permissive attitude to the use of plutonium fuel-cycle technology. More important for our present purposes, it would reduce the need for the United States to compromise in securing an agreement: whereas Washington would make concessions on MOX manufacture and the eventual use of MOX fuel in Russia, it would not be required to subsidize Russia’s acquisition of reactor capacity which could later be used with civil plutonium. Second, use of CANDU reactors at the Bruce nuclear generating station could provide an answer to Russia’s safe reactor deficit. Third, Trilateral Hybrid disposition offers comparative ease of negotiation and implementation in accomplishing a variety of disposition missions of up to 115 tonnes, and more if some 30 tonnes of separated but weapons-usable Russian civil plutonium were also brought into play. Taken together, these could be significant advantages, again if it is assumed that the benefits and costs to Canadians make Canadian-based reactor disposition worthwhile.
Preconditions for international acceptance of the CANDU MOX option could be relatively straightforward. The Immobilization-Only and S-8 Hybrid alternatives would run into difficulty. What with the ability of the United States to meet its own disposition requirements unaided, the U.S. choice would be to act unilaterally, or to accede to a Canadian-based disposition arrangement that brought the Russian Federation to disposition without any greater breach in plutonium fuel-cycle constraint than would currently be accepted by Washington in the case of reactor disposition in the United States. As to Russia, it would refuse to embrace immobilization, or to practice plutonium fuel-cycle restraint. At some point, however, Moscow would recognize that an S-8 Hybrid option was unlikely either to provide adequate support for reactor modernization in Russia, or to produce acceptable financial terms. In these circumstances, Moscow would turn to the CANDU MOX option, rather than risk U.S. unilateralism and loss of payment for its weapons plutonium surplus. The scene would be set for closure on a framework agreement that had been under discussion by the three governments. This agreement would provide for the transfer of approximately 15 tonnes that was not to be immobilized or irradiated from the U.S. 50-tonne excess, and for an amount from the Russian Federation. In principle, the Russian amount could range from 33 to 100 tonnes (Table 1, cells 5-8).
In practice, the need to dispose of a combined excess of 150 tonnes would eliminate 100-tonne trilateral options (Table 1, cells 5 and 7), unless agreement between the two supplier countries allowed for them to proceed in stages to 150 tonnes. If so, and if the first stage called for a combined reduction of 100 tonnes of which a portion went to immobilization and nuclear utilities in the United States, Canada would receive not more than about 30 tonnes under the option of symmetrical Russian and U.S. disposition (Table 1, cell 5), and 65 tonnes if Russia were persuaded to commit 50 tonnes in an asymmetrical arrangement (Table 1, cell 7). France and Germany, aside from having an initial or continuing role in the manufacture of CANDU MOX fuel for Russia and the United States under both of these options, and indeed for all variants of Trilateral Hybrid disposition, could be invited to take part in Russia’s reactor disposition of the 35-tonne remainder (Table 1, cell 5). They would however be excluded from the use of reactors in an asymmetrical Canadian-based disposition of 100 tonnes (Table 1, cell 7), which is more emphatically transatlantic in nature. Given Russian affinities with France and Germany on civil plutonium use, and also possible Russian reluctance to assign considerably more than the United States of only a 50-tonne excess to Canada, symmetrical Trilateral disposition of 30 tonnes seems more likely as an outcome than an asymmetrical disposition of 65 tonnes in arranging for the first stage of a reduction to retained weapons plutonium parity.
If the goal of a trilateral agreement were the disposition of a combined weapons plutonium excess of 150 tonnes in one go, ways would have to be found to process up to 100 tonnes of the disproportionate Russian surplus. Under a symmetrical arrangement aimed at a reduction of 150 tonnes (Table 1, cell 6), Russia and the United States would again commit some 15 tonnes each to Canada, the United States would immobilize roughly 17 tonnes, and the Russian Federation would retain about 85 tonnes for disposition as it saw fit. Again, the amount given over to immobilization would likely be very small because, “In Russia, nearly all residues and wastes containing significant quantities of plutonium are to be treated to separate the plutonium oxide forms… with disposal of the remaining wastes from which the plutonium has been removed.”[91] This option would therefore require substantial Western support for Russian reactor development, whether or not Ukrainian VVER-1000s were enlisted. As such, it would share the disabilities of S-8 Hybrid disposition of 150 tonnes (cell 4), with the difference that CANDU participation would now be held to 15 tonnes of the Russian excess.
Alternatively, under an asymmetrical Trilateral agreement aiming to achieve retained weapons plutonium parity rapidly, the Russian Federation would commit not much less than 100 tonnes to Canadian-based disposition (Table 1, cell 8). The Bruce nuclear generating station would therefore receive approximately 115 tonnes for disposition, Europe would be dealt out of the action, and Russian-U.S. differences over the plutonium fuel cycle would very largely be circumvented. Perhaps the most elegant of all solutions to the problem of excess weapons plutonium disposition, an asymmetrical Trilateral Hybrid arrangement to achieve prompt parity in retained weapons plutonium would entail heavy reliance on untried CANDU MOX technology, a willingness on the part of the United States to meet the Russian price, and a Russian decision to maximize income by transferring as much weapons plutonium to Canada as possible. “In for a penny, in for a pound” would be the motto for Canada and Russia alike. Given a 4.2-tonne annual rate of disposition and beginning around 2010, the task here would occupy the Bruce B reactors to about 2040.
How then might Canada rank its preferences for CANDU MOX disposition if the Canadian initiative were to be maintained? As a would-be recipient state, Canada currently has only one declared option, which is to take whatever the suppliers will allow. This will not do. Once again, Immobilization-Only and resistance to the spread of the plutonium fuel cycle should be Canada’s first preference. If immobilization could not be had and if the MOX initiative were agreed by Canadians not to expose them to substantial and unwarranted direct costs, Canada could consider making its reactor capacity available only for the disposition of roughly 115 tonnes of the total Russian and U.S. excess of 150 tonnes in a single-stage reduction (Table 1, cell 8). This it would do in order to maximize the Canadian contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and to maximize whatever leverage the Canadian contribution might yield on other international issues. Similarly, Canada could refuse to contribute its reactors to an S-8 Hybrid solution (Table 1, cell 4), or to symmetrical Trilateral Hybrid disposition (cells 5 and 6), all of which would have the effect of substantiating Russia’s transition to the plutonium fuel cycle. Nor would Canada be willing to entertain an asymmetrical Trilateral Hybrid reduction of only 100 tonnes (Table 1, cell 7). As to Ukraine, if it had a superior contribution to make, Canada would defer to it.
But all of this has been to stress quantities of weapons plutonium and how they might be reduced, as distinct from the qualities of the material to be processed and also retained. To this point, I have been emphasizing process at the expense of substance. Viewed in its entirety, the disposition of excess weapons plutonium does impress most in the immensity of the process that is now being set in motion to achieve an agreement. It should however be asked whether we are we not only at the beginning of a formidable procedure in which Canada might have a part, but on the way to finding authentic solutions to the international security problems that confront us. Would CANDU MOX disposition, in addition to furthering the process of reaching agreement on excess weapons plutonium reduction, make a real difference for nuclear non-proliferation and for nuclear disarmament?
3. International Security Benefits
CANDU MOX proponents and their backers in the government of Canada assert that Canadian-based reactor disposition offers substantial international benefits at no cost to Canadians. Potential costs we can consider shortly. My concern at this point is to gain a clear idea of the international security benefits that might be had. By benefits I mean not so much political reassurance that something useful will be done in due course, or that the productivity of perennial international security discussions will be increased. Rather, I mean primarily gains in physical security against threats of the spread and the use of nuclear weapons which stem from the availability of excess weapons plutonium in the Russian Federation and the United States. Let us therefore examine contributions that might be made by the CANDU MOX initiative in reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation, after which we will take a look at possible benefits for nuclear disarmament.
3.1. Nuclear Non-proliferation
Thus far, it has been the argument of this study that if nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are given equal standing as goals of a Canadian international security policy, both are equally well met when immobilization is the preferred means of disposition. Weapons material is taken out of circulation and made difficult for the disposing states, potential nuclear weapons states, and terrorist organizations to access. But when reactor disposition is the preferred means, non-proliferation suffers relative to nuclear disarmament. This is because reactor use keeps plutonium in circulation and serves to legitimize fuel-cycle technology, no matter what disclaimers are made. Immobilization ought therefore to be the preferred Canadian option for disposition. CANDU MOX proponents of course see the problem differently.
As they and others suggest in pointing to the dangers of Russian nuclear leakage, the proliferation threat inherent in excess weapons plutonium emanates primarily from the Russian Federation and the inadequacy of its nuclear materials custodial system. The best thing, in the proponents’ view, is to get the material out of Russia and into CANDU reactors in Canada. In truth, no one who considers the risks of proliferation which stem from surplus Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium can expect great danger of theft or illicit diversion from the United States. Nevertheless, an element of discrimination is needed in our assessment of Russia’s potential to supply proliferators or terrorist organizations, or to weaken the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Russian authorities are not uniformly incompetent in matters of nuclear materials control. And there is also a demand side to the proliferation equation. Taking it into account affects our view of the dangers of Russian supply.
Much is made of the proliferation perils in Russia these days. Horror stories are cited to suggest significant Russian smuggling into an emerging international nuclear black market.[92] Without doubt there is a proliferation threat here, and Minatom’s inability to account for and properly control its plutonium holdings is a part of it. The same can be said of Russia’s Ministry of Defence. Also worrying is the fact that a crude nuclear weapon can be made by a group of terrorists or, for that matter, students in a machine shop if fissile material of sufficient purity is available. But potential nuclear-weapons states are neither interested in crude nuclear weapons nor engaged in programmes at the machine-shop level. On the contrary, they will be committed to industrial-strength activity involving substantial commitments to basic science, applied research, and engineering in order to produce as sophisticated nuclear weapons as they are capable of. Intermittent and unreliable black-market supply from Russia may be of occasional use to them in obtaining materials and components, but it is unlikely to replace large-scale acquisition programmes as long as the Russian Federation maintains and is helped to strengthen its nuclear materials custodial system.[93] As to terrorist organizations, they too could benefit from the episodic leakage of Russian fissile material and know-how in a world in which up to 1,200 tonnes of civil plutonium are also in circulation. Still, the acquisition of non-nuclear means of devastation would seem to be the more attractive option, as evidenced most recently by the Aun Shinrikyo sect in Japan. Viewed in this light, the nuclear proliferation threat that is associated with the Russian Federation does not reside exclusively in the potential for theft and illicit diversion of weapons plutonium, but may also be found in the willingness of Minatom itself to provide quasi-legal international assistance to states such as Iran which would acquire nuclear weapons.[94] Under CANDU MOX disposition, however, Minatom would be Ontario Hydro’s partner in a long-term relationship aimed very substantially at nuclear non-proliferation.
The plutonium-related proliferation threats that arise within Russia stem from the following, in ascending order of magnitude: (1) weaponized strategic warheads on Russian land- and sea-based missiles and on strategic bombers under the authority of the Ministry of Defence; (2) strategic and tactical nuclear warheads and plutonium pits in various stages of dismantlement under the jurisdiction of Minatom; (3) Minatom’s readiness to risk nuclear technology transfer to potential nuclear-weapons states; and (4) the stock of deployed and stored tactical nuclear weapons held by the Ministry of Defence. To ease a complex discussion, let us begin by considering potential non-proliferation benefits of the CANDU MOX initiative as it might relate to the holdings of the Ministry of Defence. After this, we will turn to potential advantages of Canadian-based reactor disposition in coping with the domestic and international incontinence of Minatom.
Least urgent from the standpoint of nuclear proliferation is the plutonium deployed and stockpiled in intact strategic nuclear warheads under the control of the Ministry of Defence (MOD). These warheads are relatively large, unwieldy, and closely guarded in relatively few locations when not fitted to delivery systems. As of January 1997, there were roughly 6,700 of them in Russia.[95] Depending on the portion which the Russian Federation wishes to retain in an inoperative strategic reserve, MOD will be obliged to transfer a number of strategic nuclear warheads to Minatom for dismantlement and weapons plutonium disposition. This it will do as Russia meets its START II projected limit of some 3,100 deployed strategic warheads and, now coterminous with START II reductions, a START III limit down to 2,500 warheads which is to be achieved by December 31, 2007.[96] Given the state of Minatom’s custodial system, however, a case can be made for “strategic escrow.” This measure would see Russia’s treaty-governed strategic warheads subjected to intensified security by MOD and withheld from Minatom until its materials control problem had been contained.[97] In other words, today and for as long as it takes Minatom to get its act together, MOD is to be regarded as the preferred agency for Russian control over its weaponized strategic plutonium. This seems sensible to me. Canada, however, is proposing without condition that excess Russian strategic warheads be handed over to Minatom for dismantlement and the processing of plutonium pits into MOX fuel.
Implementation of the CANDU MOX initiative as presently formulated would produce a net loss of Russian control over its strategic weapons plutonium. Material which is comparatively secure from diversion and theft would be added to the stock that Minatom currently holds and may not be able to secure adequately for some time to come. Where strategic weapons plutonium is concerned, therefore, the effect of the Canadian initiative as it stands is actually to increase the risks of nuclear proliferation from Russia. If the initiative is to be maintained, Canada should stipulate in a trilateral agreement with Russia and the United States that Minatom’s materials control capabilities are to be enhanced according to agreed criteria before Canadian-based reactor disposition would begin. As well, looking ahead to the day when disposition might begin, Canada itself should now be making a direct technical contribution to the enhancement of Minatom’s ability to meet its materials control and nuclear non-proliferation responsibilities. But here we run into a contradiction in the CANDU MOX initiative which we shall encounter again: the more Minatom’s materials control capacity is improved prior to Canadian-based reactor disposition, the less the threat of nuclear proliferation which is a major justification for the initiative as it stands.
Whereas MOD is to be preferred over Minatom in the handling of excess plutonium associated with strategic nuclear warheads, the preference is reversed for Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons to the extent that otherwise intact warheads would at least be disassembled under Minatom’s authority. At issue here are artillery shells, land mines, surface-to-air missiles, naval missiles, gravity bombs, and other arms whose total number is estimated at between 6,000-13,000.[98] The warheads for these weapons, usually stored separately in special depots, are guarded by personnel who, not unlike those of Minatom, may be open to bribery and influence by Russian nationals acting on behalf of foreign clients. The difference is that the warheads are smaller, more moveable, widely dispersed, and not as well secured as strategic weapons. As such, they constitute the prime proliferation threat from within the Russian Federation today.
Although the United States and, at that time, the Soviet Union and then Russia pledged in parallel unilateral statements in late 1991 and early in 1992 to withdraw all sea-based and land-based tactical nuclear weapons from deployment, they remain exempt from disarmament agreement. Nor does the United States have a reliable understanding of how well Russia has implemented its unilateral commitment. Accordingly, Washington now seeks a discussion of tactical nuclear weapons with Moscow in the context of negotiations for a START III treaty.[99] Increasingly, however Russia’s military security is based on its tactical nuclear arms, this as a consequence of the collapse of its conventional forces and NATO‘s expansion to the east.[100] MOD, by its own account, may have transferred a significant portion of its tactical nuclear weapons to Minatom for disassembly and storage of recovered pits.[101] But until negotiations are begun and completed for a category of weapon that is of growing importance to the Russian Federation, not a lot more is likely to be handed over to Minatom. Similarly, until MOD is able to gain firmer control over its inventory, the proliferation threat inherent in Russian tactical nuclear weapons will persist.
Substantial improvement in MOD‘s capacity for tactical nuclear weapons control cannot wait. The U.S. government recognizes this, for example in the assistance being given by the Department of Defense to its Russian counterpart in developing an automated nuclear weapons inventory system.[102] To the extent that stronger control is achieved by MOD, the proliferation threat associated with the potential for diversion or theft of Russian tactical nuclear weapons will have abated, and another non-proliferation objective of the CANDU MOX initiative would have been met by alternative means by the time Canadian-based disposition began. And if there were no great improvement in MOD nuclear materials control, and no great progress towards a tactical nuclear weapons disarmament treaty, reactor disposition of excess weapons plutonium in Canada beginning around 2010 would continue to be very largely irrelevant to the dangers of proliferation associated with this category of weapon: MOD‘s tactical nuclear weapons plutonium would be withheld from Minatom.
If CANDU MOX disposition is really to produce physical security against risks of nuclear proliferation which arise from Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, MOD‘s materials control effort has to fail and tactical nuclear disarmament has to succeed. Otherwise, Canada would lumber on for up to 25 years after 2010 consuming plutonium from weapons that constituted a diminished proliferation threat, or it would be denied this plutonium and the opportunity to make it secure against diversion and use. Similar considerations apply to the non-proliferation potential of Canadian dealings with Minatom, and with the weapons plutonium that is now under its authority and may be transferred to it in future.
Both for the weaponized plutonium that may in future be handed over to Minatom and for intact weapons awaiting dismantlement and separated pits already in Minatom’s custody, the proliferation problem is essentially a problem in nuclear materials control, not reactor disposition. The accounting and control procedures of a ministry with very many underemployed, underpaid, and unpaid employees in an archipelago of locations do leave a great deal to be desired. To assist Minatom (and also MOD), the United States has been engaged in a programme of cooperative threat reduction with the Russian Federation. The programme is showing some signs of success, principally in assisting Minatom to design and build a central storage facility for dismantled nuclear weapons.[103] The U.S. effort has however been endangered by congressional budget cuts, and by Russian unilateralism and resistance to measures that would ensure transparency in their nuclear materials accounting and storage procedures. Cooperative threat reduction is nevertheless the top priority for those who would address the threat of nuclear proliferation connected with the indeterminate number of tonnes of weapons plutonium in Minatom’s hands.
Canada may not be in a position to offer materials control assistance to Russia’s Ministry of Defence, but the opportunity is surely quite different when it comes to a ministry with which a long-term working relationship is to be established. If the Canadian and Ontario governments, along with the proponents of the CANDU MOX initiative, are to be in earnest about nuclear non-proliferation, they should strive to make a vigorous contribution to Minatom’s materials control and accounting capacity now. This they are not doing. Instead, they dwell on the anti-proliferation benefits of Canadian-based reactor disposition, which would begin at the end of the next decade (earlier, they say), as a means of dealing with an urgent problem of Russian nuclear leakage which is presumably not going to go away. The emphasis is misplaced. Time and money should go first to cooperative threat reduction.
As of about 2010, Canada could start to make a physical security contribution by removing excess weapons plutonium from Russia and whatever dangers of diversion and theft Minatom continued to pose to as late as 2035, depending on the CANDU MOX disposition mission. The extent of the contribution is difficult to estimate. If Minatom’s materials control capacity remained as it is today, the non-proliferation benefit could be considerable. If, on the other hand, the Russian nuclear leakage threat had been substantially contained by 2010, CANDU MOX disposition would become something of a non-proliferation solution in search of a problem. All the while, however, another form of benefit could have been achieved in the signing of a trilateral agreement, in receiving the first MOX shipment, and in carrying through with disposition. We are back to process.
Canadian actions in following through on the MOX initiative would serve to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime not so much by resolving or greatly reducing the nuclear leakage problem, but by assisting the two leading nuclear-weapons states to meet their obligation to non-nuclear states to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. Whatever the physical security benefits it might produce, CANDU MOX disposition would likely have its principal non-proliferation effects on the political plane. Intangible and therefore hard to assess, they could still be substantial. They could also be offset by foreseeable political costs of a protracted working relationship with Minatom.
No one can foresee what Minatom will venture in its international transactions to the ‘twenty-thirties. Today it is an unreconstructed ministry at the heart of Russia’s national security apparatus. Russia’s future may lie ultimately with the westernizing impulse in the nation, in which case Minatom will find its way into an increasingly dense web of collaboration with Western countries, the United States and Canada included. This surely is the preferable course of events. It would help to deepen Minatom’s culture of nuclear responsibility in domestic as well as international affairs. Right now, however, Minatom prefers to cooperate with France and Germany for fuel-cycle and possibly larger geopolitical reasons. As well, both to survive and to prosper in the depressed circumstances of the Russian economy, it endeavours to sell reactors to whoever will buy them, claiming that all safeguards mandated by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty will be honoured. Minatom’s reactor sale to Iran is the principal example of what might be called roguishness in Russia’s international nuclear behaviour thus far. Although NATO enlargement is now received with outward good grace on Moscow’s part, the resentment that is felt throughout the Russian establishment has yet to be expressed. When it is, it will likely involve strategic moves that run counter to Western interests, particularly those of the United States, even as Moscow seeks continued cooperation. Further quasi-legal nuclear transfers to “rogue” states could well form part of Russia’s pursuit of a distinct Eurasian future. If not, no problem. If so, Canada and Ontario would have to think through what might be involved in relying very substantially upon Minatom to achieve international non-proliferation goals.
There is no easy answer here. Nor is there any indication that the Canadian and Ontario governments and the CANDU MOX proponents have given the matter serious consideration. A few things do however seem clear. First, a Western and therefore Canadian endeavour to foster a culture of nuclear responsibility and legality in Russia can only be realized by engaging Minatom in collaborative action, whatever one’s judgment on the plutonium fuel cycle and specific transactions between Minatom and potential nuclear-weapons states. To leave Russia and Minatom to their own nuclear devices would be irresponsible. Second, as already made clear, nuclear materials control and not nuclear materials disposition should be the first order of business in engaging Minatom. Measures to this effect should be built into an S-8 Hybrid or Trilateral agreement as a precondition for disposition. Third, if the government of a smaller country such as Canada is not to be burned but to make the most of a disposition relationship with Russia, it should be multilateral and designed to help modernize Minatom’s commercial and well as materials control norms and practices. Accordingly, if the CANDU MOX initiative is to be proceeded with, there is much to be said for joining with the United States and assigning a lead role to private industry in working with Minatom. Fourth, if Canadians were to persist in a long-term effort to integrate the Russian Federation into the international scheme of things in commercial as well as non-proliferation terms, they would have to be fully prepared to accept setbacks and embarrassments arising from Minatom’s international operations.
In the foregoing we have the elements of a rationale for Canadian-based reactor disposition that is surely more viable than one keyed to physical security dangers of Russian nuclear leakage, against which the CANDU MOX initiative proves to be ineffectual when it is not counterproductive. Whether such a rationale and its implicit endorsement of permissiveness on fuel-cycle issues is to be judged acceptable will depend on further assessment of the costs as well as benefits of the initiative. But before turning to nuclear disarmament benefits, we should be aware of some additional costs to nuclear non-proliferation. They all pertain to the plutonium fuel cycle.
In acting on the CANDU MOX initiative, Canada and also the United States would in all likelihood have to accept Russia’s use of MOX fuel fabrication facilities for the manufacture of civil fuel as well as MOX derived from excess weapons plutonium. Similarly, they would have to accept Russian reprocessing of spent weapons MOX fuel for civil purposes if Russia agreed only to symmetrical disposition in Canada, and disposed of its disproportionate remainder domestically in reactors destined to use civil plutonium. Although both procedures could be delayed until the termination of weapons plutonium disposition, by acquiescing in them Canada and the United States would by force of example contribute indirectly to nuclear proliferation. Where Canada in particular is concerned, there is an additional reason here to prefer asymmetrical Canadian-based disposition of up to 115 tonnes which would eliminate the potential for Russia to reprocess spent MOX fuel by removing nearly all of the weapons plutonium excess from Russia.
Finally, as the U.S. Department of Energy points out, not only has the use of MOX fuel in CANDU reactors never been attempted but, if successful in Canada, it would represent a commercial demonstration of the use of plutonium in CANDU reactors possessed by other countries in “regions of proliferation concern.”[104] Canadian-based disposition of excess weapons plutonium could indeed erode barriers to the use of plutonium in civil reactors, beginning with Argentina, Romania, South Korea, and Taiwan who possess CANDUs. As matters stand, AECL is seeking to support its bid to construct six CANDU-6 reactors in South Korea with “the so-called Dupic research program, funded by the U.S. and Canada, to devise a closed fuel cycle in the ROK without reprocessing, allowing recycling of spent PWR [pressurized-water reactor] fuel in CANDUs.”[105] China, for its part, could seek to adapt the CANDU reactors which it has purchased, to the use of reprocessed plutonium. As well, there is the question of what Minatom might do with a capacity of its own to manufacture CANDU MOX fuel once weapons plutonium disposition were done. Beyond all this, it is fair to say that no matter what Ottawa’s contention about the uniqueness of a Canadian weapons disposition effort, about the dangers of plutonium fuel-cycle spread, or the cost of MOX relative to standard CANDU fuel, Canadian use of plutonium in civil reactors would add to the risks of proliferation by virtue of Canada’s capacity to set an example of responsible behaviour in civil nuclear affairs. Present levels of physical security against nuclear proliferation would be reduced if the CANDU MOX initiative were to be implemented. Costs incurred through commercial demonstration and example-setting could largely if not wholly negate whatever benefit the initiative’s implementation might produce for the international process of nuclear non-proliferation.
[ The Dangers of Encouraging Plutonium Use ]
[ Bomb Makers Speak Out Against Plutonium ]
[ Plutonium Sub-Directory ]
THE MOX EXPERIENCE:
THE DISPOSITION OF EXCESS RUSSIAN
AND U.S. WEAPONS PLUTONIUM IN CANADA
J u l y 1 9 9 7
Part 4
Franklyn Griffiths
George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies
University College, University of Toronto
15 King’s College Circle
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3H7
tel (416) 978-7417 fax (416) 971-2027
. . . back to Table of Contents
3.2. Nuclear Disarmament
Having focused on the Russian side of things in examining the non-proliferation potential of the CANDU MOX initiative, I now turn to the United States in assessing possible benefits and costs for nuclear disarmament. Although less is known about the quantities and qualities of the Russian weapons plutonium that might be transferred to Canada, I assume its characteristics to be similar as between the two countries, although their preferences in disposing of the excess may differ. As before, the primary criterion is the potential of the CANDU MOX initiative to produce physical security benefits, and only secondarily any gains it may yield for the Russian-U.S. nuclear disarmament process. According to the Canadian government, “The initiative is designed to reduce the stockpiles of weapons plutonium, a major threat to world peace and security. Canada’s view is that any initiative which might promote nuclear disarmament and reduce the world’s inventory of weapons-grade plutonium to an acceptably inaccessible, secure and safe condition, merits consideration.”[106]
The questions to be asked here are the following. What is likely to be the origin of the plutonium that might be transferred to Canada in MOX form, and what physical security benefits might be had from its disposition in CANDU reactors? What forms and amounts of plutonium would probably be retained by the United States and the Russian Federation, and with what implications? To what degree might Canada find itself assisting not so much in nuclear disarmament, as in the rationalization of Russian and U.S. nuclear forces in an altered security environment? To what extent might Canada receive not weapons plutonium rendered excess to defence needs by strategic nuclear disarmament treaty or parallel unilateral commitments to disarm, but obsolete and degraded pits, weapons plutonium residues, and process waste generated by the two states in two generations of Cold War? To what degree might CANDU reactor disposition “lock in” the benefits of nuclear disarmament, and to what degree might it add up to nuclear waste disposal? Indeed, when the surrender of Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium is concerned, what is the difference between disarmament and waste disposal?
Taking the United States as our example, we begin by attempting to determine what weapons plutonium is held by the Department of Defense and DOE, what of these holdings might be in excess of defence needs, and what therefore might be committed to Canada. Very quickly it becomes apparent that in proposing the CANDU MOX initiative, Canada has offered to enter something like a shell game with the United States whose intricacy is likely to be exceeded only in arrangements for the disposition of the Russian excess. And if it isn’t exactly a shell game, because Canada doesn’t get to choose what it takes, it certainly is a numbers game, as seen in Table 2.
U.S. weapons-related plutonium holdings are estimated at 99.5 tonnes.[107] Of this amount, the Department of Defense (DOD) holds 30.5 tonnes in weapons, and DOE holds the remaining 69.0 tonnes in a variety of forms. Of the 69 tonnes under DOE’s authority, 27.5 tonnes is in pits, 8.0 tonnes in warheads awaiting dismantlement, 21.6 tonnes in separated weapons-grade and fuel-grade plutonium, and 11.7 tonnes in reactor fuel. Note that the combined inventory of DOD and DOE contain roughly 66 tonnes of stockpiled weapons, separated pits, and warheads scheduled for dismantlement. Some 33 tonnes of “weapons plutonium” under DOE’s control consists of weapons-grade, fuel-grade, and reactor-grade plutonium, the differences being a matter of the purity of the material. Weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) is about 93 percent Pu-239; plutonium containing between 80 and 93 percent Pu-239 is referred to as fuel-grade (FGPu); and Pu-239 concentrations of less than 80 percent are characteristic of reactor-grade plutonium (RGPu). All three grades of plutonium can be employed to make nuclear weapons. The entire U.S. inventory of 99.5 tonnes is estimated to contain 85.1 tonnes of WGPu, 13.2 tonnes of FGPu,
| Holdings99.5 tonnes | This figure can be expressed in several ways:(1) 85.1 t weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu), 13 t fuel-grade (FGPu), and 1.2 t reactor-grade (RGPu);(2) 30.5 t held by DOD, and 69.0 t by DOE; and(3) 66.5 t in stockpiled weapons, separated pits, and warheads slated for dismantlement, all held by DOD and DOE, and 33 t WGPu, FGPu, and RGPu separated from weapons and pits and held by DOE. Of this last 33 t, 11.6 t is in unirradiated WGPu and FGPu, and irradiated WGPu, FGPu, and RGPu in spent fuel. |
| Reductions52.4 tonnes | This figure can also be stated in different ways:(1) 38.2 t WGPu, and 14.2 t FGPu and RGPu;
(2) 31.6 t WGPu in metals and oxides, 5.7 t separated WGPu and FGPu, 7.3 t separated low-purity Pu, 0.7 t reactor fuel, and 7.3 t irradiated reactor fuel; and (3) 16.9 t in scrap and residues unsuited to reactor disposition, and 35.5 t suited to reactor disposition consisting of 14.2 t FGPu and RGPu, and 21.3 t other. |
| Retained WPu47.1 tonnes | Retained weapons Pu could consist of:(1) 46.9 t WGPu, down 38.2 t from 85.1 t; nil FGPu, down 13.2 t from 13.2 t; nil RGPu, down 1.2 t from 1.2 t;
(2) 45.2 DOD and DOE stockpiled warheads, warheads slated for dismantlement, and pits, down 21.3 t from 66.5 t; nil DOE FGPu and RGPu, down 14.2 t from 14.2 t; and nil scraps and residues, down 16.9 t from 16.9 t. |
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and 1.2 tonnes of RGPu. All three grades can however take a variety of forms — metal, oxide, reactor fuel, irradiated fuel, and residues — depending on how they have been processed. Total plutonium outside of weapons and pits consists, again, of some 33 tonnes. Of this, 21.6 tonnes is in separated form, and the remainder of 11.6 tonnes is accounted for by unirradiated WGPu and FGPu, and irradiated WGPu, FGPu, and RGPu in spent fuel.The United States has declared 38.2 tonnes of its 85.1-tonne WGPu inventory to be in excess of defence needs.[108] It has also stated that all 14.2 tonnes of its FGPu and RGPu will not be employed to make nuclear weapons. The total declared U.S. weapons plutonium excess available in principle for CANDU MOX disposition is therefore about 52.4 tonnes. This amount is comprised as follows: 31.6 tonnes WGPu in metals and oxides, 5.7 tonnes separated FGPu and WGPu, 7.3 tonnes separated low-purity plutonium, 0.7 tons reactor fuel, and 7.3 tonnes irradiated reactor fuel. Of the 52.4 tonnes, however, 16.9 is in the form of scraps and residues, which are unsuited to reactor disposition without purification. They will therefore be immobilized. We are down to about 35.5 tonnes and a rough reference figure of 33 tonnes for the amount that could be consigned to Canada if a quantity did not also go to U.S. nuclear utilities. Let us now hold to the figure of 35.5 tonnes. What might enter into 35.5 tonnes of U.S. “weapons plutonium” that would be made into MOX fuel and might be transported to the Bruce nuclear generating station for disposition? Also, what might be retained by the U.S. defence establishment?
Of the 35.5 tonnes available for reactor disposition, 14.2 will be FGPu and RGPu (13.2 and 1.2 tonnes, respectively). Funnily enough, this “weapons plutonium” was actually used in research for peaceful purposes — among them the testing of breeder-reactor fuel and studies of plutonium criticality or pre-ignition — at Hanford, the Argonne National Laboratory, and elsewhere.[109] More than one-third of the U.S. plutonium that could come to Canada, and perhaps all of it if some 18 tonnes were sent for disposition in U.S. reactors, would therefore have little or nothing to do with nuclear disarmament. Now we are down to a remainder of 21.3 tonnes. What might be included in a CANDU MOX disposition of 21.3 tonnes of U.S. weapons plutonium? The answer is implied in what the United States would retain.
Taken together, the numbers indicate that of 66 tonnes of weapons plutonium in warheads, warheads scheduled for dismantlement, and separated plutonium held by DOD and DOE, 44.7 tonnes are to be retained and 21.3 handed over for disposition. A weapons plutonium reduction of 52.4 tonnes out of 99.5 is to leave about 66 percent of U.S. warheads and pits untouched. The retained plutonium that is not already weaponized in warheads will almost certainly be material that is isotopically and otherwise suited to U.S. nuclear weapons of recent and latest design. A 33 percent U.S. cut in weapons plutonium will, as it were, clear out the stables and spare the horses. More significant, while START II reductions could take the United States down to 3,500 deployed warheads and START III to 2,000–2,500, the U.S. government will retain up to 2,500 nuclear warheads in an inactive reserve or hedging force, plus an additional 5,000 intact pits to be held by DOE for possible replacement in a force of some 2,500 deployed and 2,500 inactive reserve warheads.[110] These 7,500 reserve warheads and pits will be of advanced design for use on land- and sea-based intercontinental missiles, strategic bombers, and cruise missiles.
The 21.3 tonnes of U.S. weapons plutonium that might come to Canada for disposition under the CANDU MOX initiative would contain excess plutonium that had been accumulated from older warhead types and would no longer be required for replacement purposes. This weapons plutonium will have been rendered excess more by the effects of obsolescence and of an altered strategic environment, than by disarmament agreement. A part of it may have been generated in response to parallel unilateral Russian and U.S. commitments of 1991 on tactical nuclear weapons. But it would owe not a lot to strategic nuclear disarmament treaties which govern nuclear warheads of latest design and whose plutonium will in large measure be retained.
If the Russian Federation’s decisions on what to dispose of and what to retain were similar to those of the United States, the plutonium transferred to Canada under the MOX initiative would have been generated primarily by parallel processes of nuclear force rationalization within the two supplier countries. These processes are as yet only partially constrained by bilateral negotiations for nuclear disarmament. Canada would receive degraded plutonium, plutonium formulated for now-elderly warheads, reactor plutonium in unused and in irradiated form, and even plutonium used for peaceful purposes including possibly for peaceful nuclear explosions in the Russian Federation. Plutonium fabricated according to advanced weapons designs would very largely be retained, as would plutonium held in large inactive reserve forces and even larger stockpiles of intact pits.
Compelling physical security benefits that might flow from CANDU MOX disposition are hard to find in these circumstances. Surely, it will be said, relieving Russia and the United States of plutonium that is in excess of defence requirements, even plutonium fabricated for obsolescent weapons, should go some way to making the world a safer place. But it is difficult to see how when both states are determined to maintain substantial deployed and even more substantial reserve forces, and when they contrive to retain disproportionate amounts of high-quality plutonium in dispositions that maximize the surrender of inferior material. Would CANDU MOX disposition under these conditions reduce the destructiveness of nuclear war if it came to pass? Not much. Would it exempt any region of the world that had been living with the threat of nuclear war? The answer is no. Would it reduce the likelihood of nuclear war owing to the accidental release of nuclear weapons, or to the vulnerability of nuclear forces to surprise attack? Again, the answer is no. By making excess weapons plutonium inaccessible to military use, would CANDU MOX disposition physically “lock in” and make irreversible the nuclear arms reductions of the Russian Federation and the United States in recent years? Here the reply is affirmative.
In the “lock-in” potential of Canadian-based reactor disposition we have what appears to be the sole direct physical security benefit of the MOX initiative for nuclear disarmament. But what might the size of it be when the two supplier states are divesting themselves of weapons plutonium that is excess of military needs which remain large, when they arrange to unload quantities of weapons plutonium that are of lessened use? The purpose of making irreversible the reduction of plutonium that Moscow and Washington no longer wish to retain is to prevent them from changing their minds and reclaiming it for weapons purposes. The purpose is largely but not wholly vitiated when both parties are determined to withhold large quantities of quality weapons plutonium from lock-in. The sole direct disarmament-related physical security benefit that could come from the CANDU MOX initiative is therefore not what it should be. It could become more substantial if the determination of the Russian Federation and the United States to maintain large inactive strategic reserves and stockpiles of replacement pits were overcome either before or during a disposition that would begin around 2010. But if Moscow and Washington persisted, implementation of the Canadian initiative would render little tangible benefit in securing the world against the dangers of nuclear war. “Lock-in” would proceed in the knowledge that overmuch was locked out in the first place.
What then of intangible benefits in keeping the process of nuclear disarmament on track? In posing this question, we are once again being forced back from physical security to a consideration of process gains from the Canadian initiative. There are some benefits here, but they are not what we might expect.
Keeping everyone moving in broadly the right direction, even though the immediate results are not what they should be, is of the essence for those who would encourage disarmament. For those subjected to it, the name of the game is to let go of what is not needed and to retain required forces. The process, by its nature, is bound to be unsatisfying to all concerned. At any given moment in the reduction of weapons plutonium, say now or in 2012, Russia and the United States may seem only to be getting rid of waste, assuming of course that disposition takes place. In the long haul, however, the two states will have reduced their forces by acting on an enlarged definition of waste. What transpires is very largely in the eye of the beholder. Hardened suppliers will strive to cut their losses. Hopeful recipients, in this case Canadians, will believe they are making a contribution to disarmament by locking in the suppliers’ excess. We should therefore not be too harsh in our judgments when Russian and U.S. conduct makes it difficult to meet seemingly reasonable expectations of improved physical security through CANDU MOX disposition. This is the way it is. Still, from the standpoint of a weapons plutonium recipient, the evolution of the Russian-U.S. strategic relationship and what the two states are prepared to surrender leaves too much to be desired.
Despite summitry, arms agreements, and cooperation in civil affairs, political-military interaction between the Russian Federation and the United States remains decidedly adversarial and will continue to be so, if in diminishing degree. Where weapons plutonium disposition is concerned, both sides are going to be unloading waste while they maintain their guard. In offering its services for reactor disposition, therefore, Canada is bound to accept waste material, whatever the hopes for incremental progress towards disarmament.
The Canadian government has stated that, “The plutonium to be used in making MOX was originally designed to be used in nuclear weapons. It would not be sourced in nuclear waste.”[111] This is at best partially true. Some 14 tonnes of a 35-tonne U.S. weapons plutonium disposition will be made up by no-longer-needed material originally used by DOE for peaceful purposes. Under a symmetrical Russian-U.S. CANDU disposition of 30 tonnes in total (Table 1, cell 5), some or all of this material could be transferred to Canada from the United States. If all of it came, Canada’s nuclear disarmament contribution, where the United States was concerned, would be to “lock in” waste material previously used for peaceful purposes. Who can say how much analogous stuff will or will not be folded into CANDU MOX fuel made from excess Russian plutonium in Minatom’s custody? As to the 21.5-tonne U.S. remainder, even if it were sourced from DOD holdings only, it would constitute waste in the eyes of the supplier. The same will apply, but probably less so, to Russian material originating with MOD, even if the Russian Federation agrees to disproportionate reduction to equal levels of retained weapons plutonium.
The Canadian government also affirms that, “The purpose of using MOX fuel in a CANDU reactor is not to provide a disposal site for American plutonium but to use the energy source (plutonium) in a safe, productive and economic manner.”[112] This may be a fair rendition of the intent of a government that would behave responsibly for nuclear disarmament. Certainly it represents a view that has more in common with prevailing Russian than U.S. conceptions of plutonium as a valuable economic resource, marketplace realities notwithstanding. It is also the case that waste is an economic asset for the waste disposer. But from an international military perspective, Canada would be offering itself as a disposal site for excess Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium containing substantial admixtures of non-weapons waste material. There is no way around it. Reactor-based weapons plutonium disposition aims to waste the destructive potential of excess plutonium accumulated in many years of nuclear weapons acquisition, and to dispose of the residue in such a way that it cannot readily be retrieved for military purposes. Whatever the electricity to be generated along the way, implementation of the CANDU MOX initiative would be an exercise in waste disposal or, given the nature of plutonium, waste retention.
In principle, there is nothing wrong with Canada entering the nuclear-waste business by providing lock-in benefits for the nuclear disarmament process, if that is what Canadians are agreed upon. The same could be said for making Canada into an international repository for civil as well as weapons plutonium waste. In practice, Canadians should be clear about what they could be getting themselves into by endorsing a proposal framed as an effective commitment to nuclear disarmament.
3.3. Net Worth
All said and done, the international security worth of the CANDU MOX initiative is not what it might seem to be. Certainly it is not what it should be. The initiative is capable of generating process benefits which, by their nature, are intangible, substantially compromised, and subject to the vagaries of domestic and international politics. If there were no significant direct costs to Canada and to Canadians in the proposal, it could be supported with modifications. But if costs prove substantial and if, as now seems the case, the initiative yields no substantial gains and some losses for physical security, process benefits alone will have to provide sufficient justification for the Canadian government to leave the proposal on the table.
Potential process benefits lie in four areas. These are (1) assistance to the G-7 and Russia in reaching international agreement on disposition, by providing them with minor irradiation and waste retention services or with an out if other options start to fail; (2) support to the enduring process of Russian-U.S. nuclear disarmament by helping to make it irreversible; (3) aid to the perennial international negotiation that constitutes the nuclear non-proliferation regime by helping the pre-eminent nuclear-weapons states to show good faith in their commitment to nuclear disarmament; and (4) prolonged engagement of Minatom in a process of acculturation to Western norms of nuclear responsibility, legality, and business practice. Taken together, the process benefits here could be considerable. In each case, however, there is a down side. With Minatom, it is the risk of direct Canadian association with the activity of a ministry that cuts corners on nuclear non-proliferation in quasi-legal fashion. Potential gains in support of the non-proliferation regime are offset by the initiative’s international demonstration effect for commercial use of plutonium in CANDU reactors. Irreversibility benefits to the disarmament process, for their part, are subverted by Russian and U.S. preferences to maintain substantial strategic reserves, irrespective of continuing cuts in deployed forces. As to assisting the G-7 and Russia to an agreement on disposition, the underlying impetus for agreement — to secure excess weapons plutonium against future use by either the Russian Federation or the United States — is in itself testimony to the limits of what can be expected from an arrangement for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. If there is any real Canadian contribution to be made here, it would be more to the smooth workings of the S-8 as an institution, than to international peace and security as such. International security benefits could however arise if the CANDU MOX initiative were to figure in a disproportionate Russian reduction to retained Russian-U.S. weapons plutonium parity, although we now see that a great deal will remain to be done once equal levels of retained weapons plutonium are achieved. All said, we are contemplating an initiative whose contribution to international security on the political plane alone cannot be called compelling.
In terms of making the world demonstrably a safer place while international security processes do their work, the CANDU MOX initiative is ineffectual when it is not counterproductive. Where the nuclear non-proliferation account is concerned, the initiative makes for a net loss of Russian control over its strategic weapons plutonium by requiring its transfer from MOD to Minatom without first ensuring that the latter’s custodial capacity is much improved. It is very largely irrelevant to Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons inventory which now and for some time to come will constitute the most pointed of Russian-related proliferation threats. The underlying reality here is that the potential for diversion and theft of Russian weapons plutonium represents a problem in nuclear materials control in Russia, not reactor-based disposition in Canada. To the extent that programmes of cooperative threat reduction strengthen the custodial capacity of MOD and Minatom over the next decade and more, the nuclear non-proliferation rationale for the Canadian initiative will evaporate. Otherwise, the MOX initiative would have Canada enter into a protracted and close working relationship, in the name of nuclear non-proliferation, with Minatom, itself a proliferation threat, without prescribing associated measures to assist Minatom in the prime job of nuclear materials accounting and control. Meanwhile, and as distinct from the immobilization alternative, fuel-cycle implications of the CANDU MOX initiative would favour proliferation by requiring Canada to acquiesce in Russia’s pursuit of dual-purpose MOX fuel fabrication facilities and, later, reprocessing of spent weapons MOX fuel for civil use if Canada irradiated only part of the Russian excess. To cap it all, commercial demonstration of the use of plutonium in Canadian-based CANDU reactors could do no good and possibly some harm to barriers against proliferation. This it would accomplish by making Canada appear increasingly permissive on plutonium fuel-cycle issues, substantiating permissiveness elsewhere, legitimizing new plutonium fuel applications, and possibly prompting others to follow Canada’s lead if circumstance allowed.
As to locking in the benefits of Russian-U.S. nuclear disarmament by making them irreversible, the CANDU MOX initiative is virtually devoid of gains for physical security. Striving to make their country and the world a safer place, Canada would accept and process nuclear waste sloughed off by the Russian Federation and the United States while they held on to what might be termed the “sweet stuff.” To be sure, some in both national security establishments may wish to retain portions of the plutonium declared excess to military needs. But ultimately it would be just that: excess, surplus, no-longer-needed, in a word, waste. Both sides would have crafted their dispositions, without reference to Canada, in order to ensure that the percentage of retained warheads and separated pits was greater than the overall percentage of weapons plutonium to be given up (in the U.S. case the ratio will be 66:53). Both sides would release more tonnage from their defence industrial agencies (DOE and Minatom) than from their defence ministries (here the U.S. ratio seems to be 59:41). And whereas the United States would retain a portion for immobilization that was not suited to reactor use, the Russian Federation would presumably purify all but lean scraps and residues for MOX manufacture and shipment to the Bruce nuclear generating station. In short, all manner of nuclear refuse, along with some material coming from dismantled warheads, would be sent to Canada for disposition in the name of irreversibility. Meanwhile, not only would both sides withhold quality plutonium in deployed warheads, but they would also retain warhead and pit reserves in numbers greatly in excess of those allowed for deployment under the START treaties. For the United States, the ratio is 3:1 (7,500 deployed warheads, inactive reserve, and replacement pits versus a ceiling of 2,500 or less under a START III agreement).
Surveying the CANDU MOX initiative as a contribution to nuclear disarmament, we find that it is a sorry piece of work unless we are prepared to leave most everything to the workings of international process. In fact, it is so sorry a piece that we should pause for a reality check. If the net worth of Canadian-based reactor disposition is so slight, why should any of the S-8 be greatly seized by the need for reactor disposition or, for that matter, immobilization of excess weapons plutonium in furthering nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament? What really is going on here? Part of the answer lies in the fact that reactor disposition in Canada is a particularly inept solution to a Russian nuclear materials control problem as it concerns nuclear non-proliferation. In this and other ways, the poverty of the CANDU MOX initiative may not be a good indicator of the physical security and process benefits of disposition as may be anticipated by others. But there is more to the gathering momentum for disposition than a concern with nuclear proliferation and disarmament.
To be sure, in all the S-8 countries there is a greater or lesser commitment to move things forward for disarmament and non-proliferation on the political plane. It is also the case that weapons plutonium disposition is inherently a compromised endeavour in which those seeking to do their best for physical security have to settle for the possible. Further, there is a growing environmental awareness that something must be done about the nuclear waste generated by Russian and U.S. military-industrial activity in the course of the Cold War. Beyond all this, there is a shared need to maintain and improve the institutional health of the G-7 and now the S-8.
This said, in the name of irreversibility and the elimination of Russian nuclear leakage, the United States also seeks to defang the Russian empire while circumstances allow, and is broadly perceived to be acting this way even by sensible Russians.[113] For Russia’s part, disposition offers opportunities to make good on a national resource and to further the country’s transition to the plutonium fuel cycle. Excess weapons plutonium is viewed in Washington as a threat to be blunted, whereas in Moscow it is an asset to be capitalized upon. Americans prefer to take the excess out of circulation, step by step. Russians would rather keep it circulating. Both will retain plenty of insurance in deployed and reserve nuclear forces. As to Europe, there are international security and commercial imperatives that require a response to growing stockpiles of excess Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium, and to the maintenance of the G-7 and S-8 as institutions. Where Canada is concerned, boy-scoutishness is allied with a desire to profit from U.S. fear and Russian want, and with the high-mindedness of both, in the name of peace. Mixed motives among the S-8 therefore impart momentum to the effort for weapons plutonium disposition, despite its inability to make a major difference for physical security any time soon. Imperfection abounds. The outlook for disposition as an exercise in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is very troubled. Might Canada nevertheless decline to accept such a large measure of imperfection in its own proposal and attempt to improve its worth?
Let us suppose that S-8 Hybrid disposition failed to work out and the two principals and other G-7 members took Canada up on its offer to provide services. Other alternatives having dropped by the wayside, Canada would find itself in a position to ask and to do more for international security than may now seem feasible. In preparation for something like this, a Canadian government that was determined to press on with the initiative could seek to strengthen it by attaching provisions to a framework agreement for Trilateral Hybrid disposition. Among them might be: (1) a Canadian undertaking to dispose only of an amount required to produce equal levels of retained Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium, whether or not disposition was done in separate stages; (2) a commitment from the principals to negotiate limits on inactive strategic warhead and replacement pit reserves; (3) a commitment from the principals to negotiate tactical nuclear weapons reductions; (4) a further commitment from the principals that the Russian side would meet agreed criteria for nuclear materials control before Canadian-based reactor disposition began; (5) a unilateral Canadian undertaking to provide assistance to Minatom in strengthening its nuclear materials control capacity; (6) a further unilateral Canadian undertaking never to allow plutonium reprocessing, MOX fuel fabrication, or the civil use of plutonium in Canada once weapons disposition were done, nor to permit Canadian firms to participate in any such activity outside of Canada including adaptation of CANDU reactors to MOX use; and (7) a commitment from the principals not to manufacture CANDU MOX fuel for use in other countries possessing CANDU reactors. Presented to Moscow and Washington, a set of provisions such as these would be seen as a presumptuous interference in their strategic nuclear affairs. The CANDU MOX initiative would also become significantly less negotiable than it now is when, aside from breaking even financially, no strings are attached.
Still, in this scenario Moscow and Washington would be turning to Ottawa because Trilateral Hybrid disposition was now their preferred option, or because the others were near to being exhausted. From the perspective of a Canadian government that would press ahead with the initiative, powerful but not overwhelming domestic opposition in Canada to the use of Bruce reactors would further improve its bargaining position vis-a-vis Russia and the United States. Canada could thus be in a position to set a price for its services. It could field a proposal with stronger process benefits in the form of commitments to negotiate. It could strive to reduce the physical security disability of the initiative as it stands.
Beyond this, both in the expectation of increased bargaining leverage and further to offset the inadequacies of the CANDU MOX initiative as a stand-alone contribution to international security, the government of Canada could resolve to become more active on behalf of a nuclear-free world. It would recognize that the initiative could be improved only so far by tinkering with it as an isolated international security venture. Rather, if Canada were to make good on the initiative’s promise, it would be done as part of a watershed decision to renew the country’s international peace and security effort. Specifically, Canada would offer new leadership for (1) the abolition of nuclear weapons; (2) acceptance of a determination that nuclear weapons are illegitimate in international law; (3) no first use of nuclear weapons; (4) a complete ban on the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; and (5) measures to contain the proliferation of plutonium fuel-cycle technology. The aim here would be to accompany the CANDU MOX initiative with an array of offsetting and supporting measures which credibly confirmed it as a singularity with no implied endorsement of the plutonium fuel cycle, and strengthened Canada’s determination to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Whether the present Canadian government would take to heart its own disposition proposal, much less the cause of nuclear abolition, is an open question. I am inclined to think not. More likely is a “rock-no-boats” approach which prefers a small but valued role in a disposition arrangement that everyone can live with.
4. Direct Benefits and Costs to Canada
The less the international security benefits attributed to the CANDU MOX initiative, the greater the force of domestic health, safety, environmental, and economic costs to Canadians in any decision to go ahead. At this early stage in the proceedings, it is difficult to specify these costs, much less to determine their magnitude. Nor can we judge how they might be weighed by Canadians whose attitudes are certain to vary nationally, in the province of Ontario, and in the community surrounding the Bruce nuclear generating station (NGS). We can however predict that perceived costs within Canada will be connected with (1) transportation of MOX fuel to the Bruce station, (2) storage of fresh fuel there, (3) reactor use and possibly reactor renewal, (4) spent fuel storage, and (5) permanent nuclear waste disposal — all of which could extend beyond 2025-2035 in the event of START III and subsequent nuclear disarmament agreements, and to 2040 if Canada accepted a major role (115 tonnes) in a single-stage disposition to retained weapons plutonium parity. Potential benefits and costs of the CANDU MOX initiative to Canadians in Canada can be grouped under three broad headings: safety, finance, and governance.[114]
4.1. Security and Safety
It can and no doubt will be argued that CANDU MOX disposition constitutes a displacement of many of the vulnerabilities of the Russian weapons custodial system from Russia to Canada. Given the risk of nuclear accident that can be attached to Ontario Hydro’s poor safety record,[115] it could also be asked whether Canadians would be that much safer irradiating weapons plutonium in Ontario than they would be if the material were left in the Russian custodial system. On both accounts, CANDU MOX proponents are in a position to reply that disposition in Canada can done in a way that effectively safeguards Canadians against seizure, diversion, and accident involving plutonium in MOX form.
To enlarge on the contra side of a public debate on security and safety that is yet to be opened, we may note that nuclear explosive devices can readily be made with plutonium extracted from spent as well as fresh MOX fuel. So also can dissemination weapons designed to release plutonium into the air. Once fresh MOX fuel is present in Canada, the country can expect to become of greater interest to potential nuclear-weapons states and terrorist organizations than is currently the case with use of conventional CANDU fuel. In part, this would be due to the fact that separated weapons-grade plutonium would now for the first time be thought to be present in bulk in Ontario. CANDU fuel bundles are small and portable, not wholly unlike small tactical nuclear weapons. Fresh CANDU MOX bundles would furthermore be moved about regularly in the course of on-line refuelling, as distinct from being heavily secured until the reactor was shut down and refuelling accomplished in one interval of intensified security. Fresh CANDU MOX fuel could therefore become a target for diversion, for example through the substitution of dummy bundles with appropriate serial numbers but containing uranium.[116] This is not a problem that exists today. Dealing with it could require continuous inspection of the Bruce nuclear generating station (NGS) by the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as Canadian security precautions over and above those that already in effect there.
Beyond intensified surveillance over routine operations within the plant, fresh fuel conveyed to and stored at the site would have to be guarded with armed force equal to that employed in securing intact nuclear weapons. As the U.S. Department of Energy put it in stating the U.S. disposition options, “Transportation of all plutonium-bearing materials under this program, including the transportation of prepared MOX fuel to reactors, would be accomplished using the DOT Transport Safeguards Division’s “Safe Secure Transports” (SSTs), which affords these materials the same level of transportation safety, security, and safeguards as is used for nuclear weapons.”[117] As well, the necessity to deploy and maintain new military force in Ontario would apply to MOX fuel transportation from Russia and the United States. Where the United States was concerned, MOX fuel would be trucked to the Canadian border at Sarnia under armed guard, and then handed over to the custody of Ontario Hydro for the remainder to the trip to the Bruce NGS. This could be done at a rate of one convoy of three trucks every month from the United States for the duration of the enterprise.[118] As to Russian MOX , it would be shipped or flown to a port in Canada yet to be determined, after which it would continue by road in armed convoy to the NGS. Those bent on obtaining fresh or spent MOX fuel by diversion or attack could be expected to emplace agents in the NGS workforce and to develop a supporting infrastructure elsewhere in Ontario. The scenario could be elaborated, but a contra view of the internal security implications of CANDU MOX burnup can be held to the point that the armed force and counter-intelligence measures required to safeguard CANDU disposition could be such as to threaten democratic freedoms and the quality of life in Ontario.
As to irradiated MOX , in common with all spent reactor fuel its radioactivity decreases substantially to make it safer for human handling as time passes. Within as little as ten years, radiation would decline to the point where spent MOX would no longer be fully self-protecting,[119] although it would still persist for thousands of years. The risk of seizure and diversion actually increases with the passage of time, as long as the material is stored above ground. It is also the case that spent MOX fuel, being radiologically and thermally hotter than regular CANDU waste, would have to remain on the surface longer. It, too, would require additional safeguards.
Where accident is concerned, the theory of normal accidents,[120] could be adduced to predict that any technology is liable eventually to express itself in catastrophic breakdown. Sooner or later, it would be suggested, Ontario Hydro and Ontarians will experience a disaster as long as Ontario Hydro remains in the business of nuclear power generation when safe alternative energy sources are available. For example, as distinct from natural uranium, plutonium presents a danger of criticality or spontaneous fission when handled improperly. As well there would be the risk of accident involving the release of plutonium during transport of MOX fuel by road, sea, or air. Might Russian MOX be carried in Russian vessels up the St. Lawrence waterway to Toronto? Might it be flown in on Russian aircraft over a period of 25 years? Whatever the transportation means and route, the potential for accident, combined with the vastly greater toxicity of plutonium as compared to uranium, could substantially raise the health risk to large numbers of Canadians. Similar considerations, it could legitimately be suggested, apply to Bruce NGS employees, to the surrounding community and those along the access routes, and to the long-term risk of imperceptible dosage as well as alerted release of plutonium.
To all of this there are countervailing views which could be summed up as a plea for reason and better knowledge of the facts. Three percent plutonium mixed with depleted uranium in closely guarded containers does not represent a particularly alluring target for seizure or diversion by the agents of a would-be nuclear-weapons state. Nor can fresh or spent MOX fuel be greatly attractive to terrorist organizations: they are able to achieve their purposes more readily with chemical and bacteriological weapons than by attempting first to penetrate the security arrangements that would surround CANDU MOX disposition, and then rendering the material obtained into a bomb or bombs. As for spent MOX fuel, its plutonium content is estimated to be about one percent, whereas spent uranium fuel, generated in Ontario for years, contains 0.3 percent by weight.[121] Accordingly, it can be argued that there would be no qualitative change in the availability of plutonium in spent fuel form in Ontario, or in Canada, under a MOX disposition regime. Risks of attack and diversion would attend the process, but they can be held to tolerable proportions. Further, it would be pointed out that safeguarded plutonium has been circulating for two decades in Europe without effective challenge to safety and security. If MOX can be and has been secured in Europe, why should potential sponsors of an attack or diversionary operation be expected to believe they had superior chances of success in Ontario when full safeguards were in place?
With regard to accident, the pro argument might continue, criticality is not a problem when simple and well understood procedures are there to be followed. Ontario Hydro’s safety record should be understood to be among the best despite shortcomings which are inevitably revealed in scrupulous peer reviews customary to the industry, and which are being addressed. Bruce NGS employees, for their part, are fully familiar with safety issues and see no danger in a transition to MOX fuel. Further, it could be argued, the fact of the matter is that they and the surrounding community are by a large majority in favour of the CANDU MOX initiative, as are representatives of communities along the route from Sarnia to the NGS. If those most immediately affected are in support, it could be asked, shouldn’t others agree that CANDU MOX reactor burnup presents risks no greater than those encountered and handled with success in the use of uranium fuel in Ontario?
Summed up, the safety case for the initiative would rest on Canadian experience with CANDU technology, on European experience in providing for secure MOX use, and also on the existing body of Canadian laws and regulations in order to ensure MOX utilization against attack, diversion, and accident. If accepted, the effect of the case is all but to deny the existence of internal safety and security costs to Ontarians and Canadians, and to require that the CANDU MOX initiative be judged on its international security benefit.
A Canadian government that would decide whether and if so how to commit actively to the initiative will not find it easy to deny the existence of internal safety costs, or to separate them from a consideration of international security benefits. Security neither begins nor stops at the water’s edge. Nor is safety within to be understood in terms of internal affairs alone. In authorizing the import of weapons MOX from the Russian Federation and the United States, the Canadian government and its regulatory agencies would inevitably introduce into Canada some of the internal security and safety threats of those countries to attack, diversion, and accident involving plutonium. Canada does not now face these threats. They would be new and would have to be borne as costs of the initiative. Second, Canada would be accepting new risks of contributing directly to nuclear proliferation or nuclear terrorism in the event its CANDU MOX security regime were breached. These, too, would be new risks and potentially very significant costs which Canada and Canadians do not now carry. Finally, barring an intentional breach, Ontarians in particular would still be required to live with the MOX security regime itself. None of these costs would need to be accepted if conventional CANDU fuel continued to be used at the Bruce NGS, if the Immobilization-Only or even the S-8 Hybrid option were to prevail internationally.
NEXT: MOX Experience, Part 5
[ The Dangers of Encouraging Plutonium Use ]
[ Bomb Makers Speak Out Against Plutonium ]
[ Plutonium Sub-Directory ]
THE MOX EXPERIENCE:
THE DISPOSITION OF EXCESS RUSSIAN
AND U.S. WEAPONS PLUTONIUM IN CANADA
J u l y 1 9 9 7
Part 5
Franklyn Griffiths
George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies
University College, University of Toronto
15 King’s College Circle
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3H7tel (416) 978-7417 fax (416) 971-2027
. . . back to Table of Contents
4.2. Financial
The CANDU MOX initiative would be implemented by Ontario Hydro, or by a reconstituted entry in the event the utility were privatized. Ultimately it would be done on the basis of technical arrangements with the two fuel supplier countries. These arrangements would be made following ratification and regulatory assessment of a multi-billion dollar trilateral arrangement that might or might not enjoy the financial support of other G-7 members. As of today, we are again dealing with generalities rather than specifics when it comes to CANDU MOX money matters. Nevertheless, there are questions that need to be addressed now.Ottawa has stated that an agreement to implement the initiative will impose no new burden on the Canadian Government and the Canadian taxpayer. Ontario Hydro, in claiming MOX fuel will be purchased at rates comparable to those incurred for conventional CANDU fuel, also implies no cost should be expected in the implementation of the initiative. Are these realistic assessments? Might the Canadian taxpayer and the Ontario taxpayer and electricity ratepayer reasonably expect to emerge from a CANDU MOX experience without absorbing financial costs over and above those currently being met?
The CANDU MOX proponents expect the United States to come up with most of the dollars required to finance the project. If other G-7 members were to provide financial assistance, it would be applied to Russian-related expenses only, namely (1) in setting up CANDU MOX fuel fabrication facilities, and (2) in contributing to the purchase of Russian weapons plutonium. Aside from these large items and counterpart U.S. expenses for U.S. MOX fuel manufacture, a trilateral agreement would provide a framework for financing and technical arrangements on (3) transportation of Russian and U.S. MOX fuel including provision of security to the Bruce NGS, (4) accommodation as well as security for fresh fuel at the site, (5) CANDU reactor modifications, (6) accommodation and security for spent fuel, and (7) added radiological protection for workers. None of these items should cost Canadians anything much if current Ontario Hydro and Canadian government stipulations are upheld. Modification of the Bruce B reactors to handle MOX fuel would be covered. Ontario Hydro could also pocket an irradiation services fee from the U.S. government. All things considered, it is fair to say that the CANDU MOX initiative will be an assured cost-free proposition for Canadians, and for Ontarians in particular, when the deal is struck.
The calculation changes, however, when liability to downstream costs is taken into account. A conspiracy theory comes into view here. It is not without plausibility. It could find favour among Canadians when those opposed had their say in public debate. It holds that the CANDU MOX proposal is an industrial initiative in international security disguise. The argument is worth considering because it is keyed to downstream benefits and costs. It runs roughly as follows.
AECL is the driving force behind the entire venture. It has captured the Ministry, Natural Resources Canada, through which it reports to Parliament. It has the ear of the Prime Minister. Its growth and indeed its institutional survival are at stake in a Canadian commercial and public spending environment that holds little prospect of sales and technological development required of a corporation that would come abreast of the international competition. AECL‘s unstated strategy is to enter the nuclear fuel cycle at midstream with the use of U.S. subsidies for reactor disposition of surplus Russian and U.S. weapons plutonium. Its pursuit of this strategy is multifaceted, flexible, patient, and not overly concerned to concentrate activity within Canada.
Specifically, the argument would go, the first step in the transition is to commit Canada to MOX fuel use, and to create conditions favouring downstream demand in Canada for increasingly advanced plutonium-based reactors. Simultaneously, opportunities would be explored for plutonium reprocessing and MOX fuel manufacture outside Canada or in the country in association with U.S., European, or Russian commercial partners. Efforts would also be made to secure Canadian regulatory approval for the construction in Canada of a repository for geological disposition of civil nuclear waste from Canadian and, in due course, foreign reactors. The effect of success in only some of these areas would be to make AECL or a reconstituted entity into a more significant player in North American and international plutonium fuel-cycle development.
The key to the transition, in this account, is MOX fuel use in Canada. Without it, AECL‘s prospects are greatly reduced. Yet neither the Canadian public nor the Canadian Government can be expected to favour the commitment of substantial new funds required for MOX fuel purchase and reactor modification for MOX fuel use. The outlook changes markedly, however, when the necessity for weapons plutonium disposition creates an opportunity to present MOX use in Canada as a valuable contribution to international security that can be made at no cost. Hence the CANDU MOX initiative as a swords-into-ploughshares venture, as a means of converting megatons of nuclear explosive potential into megawatts of socially productive electricity.
Though it is unrealistic to attribute to policy processes in Canada the coherence and rationality suggested by the notion that AECL calls the shots on the CANDU MOX initiative, conspiracy theory does have an appeal, particularly to those who feel powerless in the face of big industry and big government. Many Canadians feel this way about nuclear issues. A federal government that would gain the confidence of the Canadian people in promoting and implementing the CANDU MOX initiative will not find it easy, especially when downstream benefits are indeed to be had for the nuclear industry.
A long-term contractual commitment to irradiate MOX fuel at the Bruce NGS cannot but contribute to a business environment more favourable to a revival of the Canadian nuclear industry’s fortunes. If past history is any guide, some of the industry’s fortune will come from the public purse, whether or not the federal government comes out clearly against the spread of plutonium fuel-cycle technology. Should Ottawa fail to do so, AECL would be better placed to seek out international partners in MOX -related commercial projects. Should Ottawa do so, prospects could still open up for the renewal of reactors at the Bruce site.
Meanwhile, a long-term commitment to consume MOX fuel could end up costing Ontarians in the event that insufficient electricity demand or a strategic decision in favour of alternative energy sources made it desirable for Ontario Hydro or a successor entity to shut reactors down. Prospects for the deregulation of the North American electricity market already make reactor shutdown increasingly likely. But once they were launched into the business of disposition, Canada and Ontario would likely accept more business as it came along, rather than closing up shop on completion of a mission set in 1998 or 1999.
More business could come along if START II and III were followed by further measures of nuclear disarmament or, depending on how we regard it, nuclear weapons waste disposal. We are looking far ahead now, but the CANDU MOX initiative already takes us out to as late as 2040, depending on the size of the mission and when it begins. By 2040, all major nuclear powers could be moving down the road to reduced dependence on weapons of mass destruction and greater reliance on more useable force. Some will want to dispose of their weapons plutonium excess themselves. But Canadian-based disposition would offer an unparalleled advantage, which is to retain the spent fuel of others. This is something that is permitted only in one place, not in Europe, not in the Russian Federation, but in North Korea.
Canada’s preparedness to retain the nuclear waste of others could make the country of continued interest as a site for the disposition of weapons plutonium after the START missions were concluded. Beyond that, there is downstream potential for the retention of the high-level civil nuclear waste of others. Today, proponents of the CANDU MOX initiative promise eventual geological burial of spent weapons MOX fuel.[122] An undertaking promoted by AECL for the burial of Canada’s high-level nuclear waste[123] is now being assessed by a panel under the authority of Canada’s Atomic Energy Board. Civil and military high-level nuclear waste are starting to be linked in Canada. If geological burial were now to go forward in tandem with weapons plutonium disposition, key preconditions would be in place for Canada to become, in due course, an international repository for nuclear waste. Income would surely be generated from this activity. Equally surely, it would come at a cost to the taxpayer and ratepayer. If the MOX initiative alone were to proceed, jobs would be sustained and created in the Bruce community and others. But otherwise I can discern no financial benefit, and only large potential costs, to Canada and Canadians in the CANDU MOX initiative as it stands. The assessment would however change if Canada required Russia and the United States to take back their nuclear waste.
If spent MOX fuel were to be returned to the country of origin, Bruce reactors, which in the ordinary course of events would generate spent uranium fuel which Ontario Hydro would retain forever, would be freed of waste until the end of their expected lifetimes (around 2028) or until the end of the disposition mission, whichever came first. Amidst all its disadvantages, there would be an advantage for Ontarians and Canadians in the CANDU MOX proposal. Correspondingly, its negotiability would suffer owing to the desire of the principals to make it as difficult as possible to recover excess weapons plutonium for renewed weapons use. Add the trouble and expense of transporting spent fuel back to Russia and the United States, and this could be perceived as a killer amendment. Nevertheless, the United States as well as the Russian Federation is giving serious consideration to disposition in domestic reactors. Washington and Moscow are clearly prepared to live with a disposition regime in which each retains its own waste. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Energy originally asked Canada to consider the alternatives of retaining spent U.S. MOX fuel in Canada, or returning it to the United States after a period of ten years.[124]
Accordingly, if Canada were determined to persist with the MOX initiative, it should see to it that a framework trilateral agreement provided for return of spent fuel to the country of origin. Further, to avert the expense of reactor renewal, Canada could stipulate2028as the date for the end of Canadian-based disposition and accept only a quantity of weapons MOX that could be processed by that date, and no more. This would rule out a prominent Canadian role in bringing the Russian Federation and the United States to retained weapons plutonium parity (Table 1, cell 8). In fact, it would move Canada towards a minimum, time -limited contribution (Table 1, cells 4 or 5) in which some of the initiative’s internal security and safety costs to Canadians might be contained.
Everything we know about the nuclear industry in Canada tells us that commercial benefits come at substantial cost to the public. They are subsidized by the Canadian taxpayer and the Ontario electricity ratepayer. Implementation of the CANDU MOX initiative as currently formulated would likely come at no immediate cost to Canadians. But it would not come as an exception to the rule. It would abet a publicly-funded nuclear industry in mounting new ventures later, whether or not privatization occurred. It would create conditions favouring new outlays of public money on nuclear undertakings, international nuclear waste disposal among them. And it would constrain public choice to reduce, much less to eliminate, expenditure on nuclear energy.
4.3. Governance
The Canadian and Ontario governments will no doubt think twice before coming out as proponents of a scheme that is certain to evoke a measure of public dread, no matter what its international security benefits. And yet the cost here is not so much to the public standing of governments which in any case are accustomed to overriding substantial minorities when it is thought necessary. Rather, the cost is to governance itself. State and society alike will suffer if the CANDU MOX initiative is pursued without due regard for public sentiment, first as Ottawa decides whether or not to commit, and then as Ottawa and Queen’s Park address wholly foreseeable problems of maintaining public trust in a regulatory process that is uniquely ill-equipped to deal with an international security project such as the CANDU MOX venture.
Handled poorly — that is, as a done deal — a CANDU MOX initiative that made it all the way to implementation would risk real damage to the integrity of government and the quality of public life in Canada. We are talking about a highly visible and indeed momentous public issue, one that could be fused with the assessment of permanent geological burial of nuclear waste in Canada. To avoid unnecessary costs to governance, public hearings will be indispensable. The governance question comes down to what constitutes a full and proper hearing for this extraordinary project.
An authentic hearing will have interrelated substantive and procedural requirements.[125] Substantively, it will need to address not only the validity of a proposed engineering solution to a physical and technical problem, but the merits of an ethical and moral appreciation of nuclear risk. Procedurally, a hearing will have to engage the public in a two-way interaction in which government listens as well as provides a flow of technical information to a populace in need of facts. A two-way discourse will consider not only the procedure for CANDU MOX reactor disposition of weapons plutonium, but public feeling and intuition on the larger business of nuclear power generation including its reverberations with “wartime holocaust, reactor accident, and mistrust of mysterious highly technical science.”[126] The substance of the issues to be processed need not pit pro- against anti-nuclear feeling. Somewhere there is a more fruitful middle ground if the appropriate conditions can be created. Middle ground lies between Canadians’ faith in technology and a rational-technical mode of choice, and their moral and spiritual questioning of the very need for technology that demands such severe safeguards. My guess is that on such a basis the unamended CANDU MOX proposal would fail, what with its marginal contribution to international security, its considerable internal social costs, and its lack of offsetting benefits. An amended proposal might fare better. But either way, this would be a hearing likely to produce a greater measure of consensus than can be achieved when one-way rational-technical discourse prevails.
Government acceptance of the legitimacy of contending world views is therefore essential if the CANDU MOX project is to have not only the hearing it deserves, but one that engenders public confidence and avoids inevitable costs to governance when substantial bodies of opinion are disenfranchised. This is obviously a very tall order, and not one that can soon be met. We are taking about the need for a new beginning in the way Canadians handle nuclear risk. We are talking about the CANDU MOX proposal as an opportunity to make a new beginning. Consider for example the aboriginal dimension of the CANDU MOX initiative. Things are so far gone here that it is difficult to see how even to start a beginning to greater legitimacy of alternative world views.
While the community in the region of the Bruce NGS would seem to favour the initiative strongly, the Chippewa of Saugeen are dead set against it. A band of some 2,500 persons who reside in the Bruce area, they are sufficiently alienated from Canada and Ontario to have declared exclusive jurisdiction over what they claim to be their offshore waters.[127] These extend out to 10 miles from a point near Goderich northwards around the Bruce Peninsula and down to the base of Georgian Bay. Without asserting the full bundle of jurisdictions over land, water, and superjacent airspace that would constitute an outright claim to sovereignty, the Saugeen nevertheless assert an unextinguished right to treat with Canada as one state to another on matters of offshore waters which, it happens, are employed by the Bruce NGS for intake and effluent. The Saugeen have not asserted a full bundle of jurisdictions, but they are wholly opposed to the appearance of MOX fuel bundles at the Bruce NGS on cultural, environmental, and international peace grounds.
As matters stand, the Saugeen would move out of the realm of Canadian governance altogether. Theirs is doubtless the most extreme case of a more widespread lack of public trust, of a sense of exclusion from the way governments do business on nuclear issues in Canada and Ontario. Environmental and nuclear watchdog non-governmental organizations (NGOs) already share a similar sense of exclusion and disbelief in the readiness of governments to allow a proper hearing of the questions that surround the CANDU MOX initiative. There is no need to consider what the media, aboriginal peoples, and NGOs might do with the initiative if it were to move forward in these circumstances. Rather, the challenge for government is to move forward itself towards a better way of taking public policy decisions on nuclear risk assessment and acceptance. Again, full-scope hearings will be of the essence in reducing costs to governance in the decision on whether to commit to the CANDU MOX initiative or not.
Beyond this, further costs lie waiting in the Canadian regulatory process, should it be called upon to assess the initiative as (1) embodied in a trilateral framework agreement, (2) translated into implementing agreements, and (3) formulated in a manner consistent with the terms of reference of the relevant federal and provincial regulatory bodies. Let us assume that Ontario and Canada as two levels of government agreed on a unified regulatory procedure, rather than having separate reviews. Let us also all but exclude current circumstantial evidence that could be construed to suggest that reviews would not be on the level — for example, the federal Environment Minister’s strong statement of approval of the initiative when the U.S. government announced it was among U.S. disposition options, or Canada’s exemption of the recent CANDU sale to China from environmental review.[128] We are still left with a regulatory process that is all but certain to deny Canadians the confidence that all the significant issues were heard. This is in no way to suggest governments would not act within the law. The Atomic Energy Control Act, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA), the Transport of Dangerous Goods Act, the Ontario Environmental Assessment Act, and other legislation would apply. But to what?
The way the process is now set up, an Ontario Hydro request for a license amendment from the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) would trigger an impact assessment procedure under the CEAA. The latter Act allows Cabinet, on urgency grounds, to exempt a proposal from full environmental assessment including public hearings. Indeed, the situation could be one of some urgency if the Russian Federation and the United States had turned to Canada to deliver on its offer with the whole world watching. Let us nevertheless assume that public hearings would be held, that no steps would have been taken to set CANDU MOX fuel manufacture in motion in Russia or the United States, and that no work had been done to modify the Bruce B reactors for MOX use. Under current procedure, the question to the AECB would be the specific one of whether CANDU reactors at the Bruce NGS could be licensed for MOX fuel use without posing undue physical risk to public health, safety, or to the environment. The issues would revolve around a change of fuel for CANDU reactors. To ask whether Canada should in the first place be accepting weapons MOX from the Russian Federation and the United States would be out of order. So also would discussion of possible international alternatives to the proposal despite its being framed by governments as an international security measure. What might or might not be done to resolve the disposition problem in other jurisdictions would be ruled out. Ethical and spiritual considerations related to the use of MOX fuel in Bruce reactors could be adduced, but they would not go to the heart of issues defined in rational-technical terms. The discussion would centre on whether or not Canada and Ontario could be made safe for MOX use. Given the apparently modest technical modifications required for CANDU adaptation to MOX fuel and the Canadian capacity to conform to IAEA and other safeguards, the outcome of AECB hearings would almost certainly be perceived as a foregone conclusion. Governance would suffer.
As to the CEAA, in the normal course of events it would call for the establishment of a panel to assess the environmental effects, including possible adverse effects outside of Canada, and the alternatives to a major economic development project. Canadian-based reactor disposition of excess Russian and U.S. strategic plutonium is not an economic development project unless one were to hold to the conspiratorial view. It is an international security undertaking with far-reaching implications for Canadian policy on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The CEAA is by definition unable to provide terms of reference for an assessment that would address these issues. Nor would it permit discussion of alternatives to the CANDU MOX proposal. As a practical matter, moreover, there might be no alternative to the proposal, since it could have been the only disposition means on which the G-7 and Russia were able to agree. Nor is it easy to see how the project could be turned down when plutonium is already an integral element in the workings of the CANDU reactor, and when safeguards would again be applied. As to possible environmental effects outside of Canada, would the review panel be mandated to assess the circumstances of MOX fuel fabrication in Russia and the United States, MOX fuel supply being a critical element of the project? My guess is that it would not.
The CEAA thus seems incapable of providing a full assessment of the CANDU MOX proposal except as project-related economic activity in Canada which bears on the physical environment and the well-being of humans in this country. Framed this way, a review process will be unable to say either yes or no to a far-reaching international security project. It is however more likely to say yes, or yes with provisos to a proposed economic development project in Canada. This is clearly a sign of bad governance in the making. The alternative would be to use implementation of the CANDU MOX initiative as a point of departure in designing a regulatory process that ensures authentic two-way interaction between society and state on the full range of issues at play in nuclear risk assessment. Given the abysmal record of ministerial interference and arbitrariness in Canadian environmental impact assessment over the years,[129] the capacity of the present federal government to break free of the past and rise to the challenge of the MOX initiative has to be doubted. The proponents could be proven correct in their sales claim that regulatory approval would be swift in Canada, an opinion which finds some acceptance within the U.S. Department of Energy.[130] Indeed, the proponents could have their way in obtaining a regulatory process that ran “in parallel with” the construction of CANDU MOX fuel fabrication plants in Russia and the United States.[131]
Viewed in its entirety, the CANDU MOX initiative offers no direct benefits to Canadians and Ontarians aside from locally valued employment and larger business opportunities for a nuclear industry that cannot survive without public subsidy. Not only would there be no substantial benefits, but considerable direct costs would have to be accepted. Canadians would sacrifice if the initiative were implemented. Taxpayers and ratepayers would be exposed to potential new levies for downstream activity on the part of AECL and Ontario Hydro. Canadians’ and Ontarians’ capacity to constrain public reliance on nuclear energy would be diminished irrespective of whether electricity demand continued to decline or whether electricity became less attractive relative to alternative energy sources. Public confidence in the ability to obtain a full hearing on the issues, and in the regulatory process as it is presently constituted, would both be sorely tested by a hearings procedure perceived to be capable only of affirming the project with or without modifications. As to the varied internal security and safety costs to Canadians, they are such as to make it clear that the swords-into-ploughshares argument for Canadian-based reactor disposition is not sustainable.
When plutonium is concerned, swords cannot be transmuted into ploughshares serving beneficial purposes alone or even effectively. Swords made of metallic plutonium can only be blunted when they are subjected to even the most burning economic purpose. They can still be picked up, sharpened, and used again. Canadians would have to live with this new reality for the duration. As to the ploughshares produced, one might as well plough water as try to show that plutonium in MOX fuel can be consumed in Ontario at overall cost no greater to Canadians than is presently being met with the use of uranium fuel.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
This study finds that the CANDU MOX initiative is beyond redemption. It is certain to deliver substantial direct costs to Canadians. It is all but bereft of benefits for them. It is grossly inadequate in its capacity to achieve its stated international security purposes. It is unlikely to be much improved. It could nevertheless be taken up by the S-8. Before any such thing happens, the CANDU MOX initiative should be withdrawn by the Canadian government. If it is not withdrawn but formally approved, it should first be thoroughly reworked and bolstered with a score of corrective measures designed to make the best of a bad thing.
Foreseeable costs to Canadians are many and varied. None of them have as yet been publicly acknowledged by the Canadian government or by the proponents of the initiative. The reader’s patience is sought as we march through a lengthy series of points that summarize these costs:
- new health risks of accident involving plutonium would be accepted in the transportation of weapons MOX fuel from the United States by land, and from the Russian Federation by air or sea and by land within Ontario;
- fresh MOX fuel made in the two supplier countries would be guarded and transported in Canada with the same armed security measures that are used to protect intact nuclear weapons;
- having the near-equivalent of nuclear weapons on its soil, Canada would become a partial nuclear-weapons state as it assisted the Russian Federation and the United States to divest themselves of their excess weapons plutonium;
- CANDU fuel bundles being small, moveable, and handled continuously in on-line refuelling, the presence of fresh MOX fuel in Canada poses risks of diversion and attack which are not a threat when standard CANDU fuel is used;
- within ten years, spent MOX fuel, which could also be used in the construction of nuclear weapons, would become vulnerable to human handling and would require additional safeguards over and above those already in place;
- Canada and Ontario would become effectively, for the first time, of interest to potential nuclear-weapons states, if not equally to terrorist organizations, as a source of plutonium;
- together with armed guard and other new physical security arrangements, Ontarians would have to live with new counter-intelligence and internal security activity required to protect fresh MOX fuel, when no such measures would be needed under an immobilization regime or other disposition option;
- Canadians would have to accept and live with the risk of contributing directly to nuclear proliferation or terrorist use of plutonium in the event their security measures were breached, a risk that scarcely applies when conventional uranium fuel is used in Ontario reactors;
- while the initiative entails no immediate direct financial cost to the Canadian or Ontarian taxpayer or to the Ontario Hydro ratepayer, public funding for downstream reactor retubing and prolongation of life would have to be accepted;
- in retaining spent MOX fuel of Russian and U.S. origin for ever, Canada and Ontario would not only be doing the two supplier countries a favour that is not permitted in most jurisdictions, but they would be increasing the potential for the development of an international civil nuclear waste repository in Canada;
- once embarked on a disposition mission providing for the retention of spent weapons MOX fuel, CANDU reactors could continue to be in demand in the event of a START III agreement and possible nuclear reductions by other countries later in the coming century, thereby generating an open-ended commitment to reactor use for weapons plutonium disposition in Canada;
- Ontarians’ ability to constrain or terminate reliance on civil nuclear power would be constricted irrespective of electricity demand or increased cost-effectiveness of alternative energy sources;
- the integrity of the Canadian and Ontario regulatory process would be sorely stressed in providing for credible public assessment of the CANDU MOX initiative as an international security venture, or as an economic development project with due regard for its social, political, and environmental consequences in Canada and in other jurisdictions, and not as a proposal to alter the fuel for Bruce B reactors; and
- if regulatory approval were sought, as the proponents wish, concurrently with the construction of plants for CANDU MOX fuel fabrication in Russia and the United States, and with engineering and other modifications for MOX use at the Bruce station, still larger costs in public confidence and approval would be incurred.
As to direct benefits to Canadians and Ontarians, they are hard to find beyond employment in the region of the Bruce NGS and possibly others, a possible irradiation services fee to be paid by the United States to Ontario Hydro, and support for a nuclear industry that cannot survive without continued reliance on public monies.
If direct costs are significant and benefits slight or negligible, the case for CANDU MOX disposition comes down to its likely international security effects and the opportunity for Canadians to make a valued contribution to peace in carrying through with the initiative. Benefits to international security from Canadian-based reactor disposition of excess weapons plutonium prove to be marginal when the effects are not actually counterproductive in terms of physical security. Even when the benefits of the initiative are viewed in terms of its potential to contribute to perennial international political processes of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the CANDU MOX initiative turns out to be very largely ineffectual:
- where nuclear non-proliferation is concerned, Canadian-based reactor disposition would not touch the most urgent threat which lies with the inventory of tactical nuclear weapons that are under the authority of Russia’s Ministry of Defence, that are not subject to disarmament agreement, and that are in urgent need of improved materials control which could in some measure be achieved before the Bruce reactors began their work for nuclear non-proliferation around 2010;
- as to the proliferation threat posed by Russia’s deployed and stockpiled strategic nuclear warheads, the CANDU MOX initiative stands to increase the proliferation risk by warranting the transfer of warheads from the Ministry of Defence, which is the preferred agency for strategic warhead control, to the stockpile that Minatom holds, may not be able to secure for some time to come, and may become a lessened proliferation threat as Minatom’s materials control capacity is improved;
- for Russia’s stock of intact strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, where the proliferation threat is best addressed by improved materials controls now, the CANDU MOX initiative proves to be highly inept in proposing to move weapons plutonium to Canada as of about 2010, by which time improved nuclear materials controls in Russia may deprive the initiative of much of its non-proliferation rationale that constitutes its justification today;
- the initiative proposes to support the cause of non-proliferation by relying on a working relationship with Minatom, itself a proliferation threat in its quasi-legal transfers of nuclear technology with which Canada and Ontario will in some measure be associated, and which are not offset either by a vigorous Canadian commitment to help Minatom develop its materials control capabilities or by any sign of Canadian interest in fostering a corporate culture of nuclear responsibility and legality within the ministry;
- by acquiescing in Russia’s acquisition of MOX fuel fabrication facilities for eventual use in the manufacture of civil as well as weapons MOX reactor fuel, and in Russia’s reprocessing of spent MOX fuel when the job of weapons plutonium disposition is done, Canada would by force of example contribute however slightly to the global spread of plutonium fuel-cycle technology and therefore to nuclear proliferation;
- use of MOX fuel in the Bruce B reactors would contribute directly to nuclear proliferation by offering a commercial demonstration for the use of plutonium in countries already possessing CANDU reactors, and indirectly by setting an example of responsible behaviour for countries contemplating the use of plutonium for civil power generation;
- the CANDU MOX initiative as it stands says nothing about what Minatom might do with a CANDU MOX fuel fabrication capability once weapons plutonium disposition were done, and thus risks contributing to the spread of the plutonium fuel cycle and therefore nuclear proliferation;
- where the potential of the CANDU MOX initiative to further nuclear disarmament is concerned, little will be accomplished owing to the predictable interest of the Russian Federation and the United States in the use of Canadian-based reactor disposition to unload degraded plutonium, plutonium fabricated for obsolescent warheads, reactor plutonium in unused and in irradiated form, residues and scraps, and even plutonium originally employed for peaceful purposes, all the while retaining quality weapons plutonium in abundance;
- the initiative’s capacity to make irreversible the benefits of nuclear disarmament is further subverted by the intention of the Russian Federation and the United States to retain inactive strategic warhead and replacement pit reserves greatly in excess of anticipated START III limits on deployed weapons;
- in receiving the excess weapons plutonium of Russia and the United States, Canada would therefore very largely be in the business of processing the nuclear waste of the two supplier countries whose nuclear forces will remain very substantial, disarmament treaties notwithstanding, in an altered strategic environment.
Overall, there is no avoiding the conclusion that implementation of the CANDU MOX initiative would do little to make the world a safer place. Where nuclear non-proliferation is concerned, it promises actually to make the world more dangerous by making Canada appear increasingly permissive on fuel-cycle issues, substantiating permissiveness elsewhere, and possibly prompting others to follow Canada’s lead if circumstance allowed. Nor can we see any substantial gain for nuclear disarmament by endeavouring to lock in the benefits of arms reductions when the principals have locked so much out in the first place. Nor does the assessment greatly improve when we turn to the initiative’s promise in producing benefits for international processes of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament:
- while Canada may hope in some small way to help acculturate Minatom to Western norms of nuclear responsibility, legality, and business practice, the potential is offset by the risk of close association with a Ministry inclined to play fast with nuclear technology transfer to potential nuclear-weapons states;
- potential support to the nuclear non-proliferation regime would be offset by the initiative’s demonstration effects for commercial use of plutonium in CANDU reactors;
- possible contributions to the irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament process would very largely be undone by Russian and U.S. preferences to retain excessively large nuclear forces and to contrive to dispose of inferior grades of weapons plutonium through disposition;
- in the light of everything said here, a Canadian-based reactor contribution to the process of excess weapons plutonium disposition itself would at best be a highly compromised endeavour requiring much time, ingenuity, and the promotion of more demanding standards particularly for the nuclear disarmament policies of the United States as the leading power in the international system today.
Unable to accomplish much for either the substance or the process of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, the CANDU MOX initiative has to be called a sorry piece of work. It is wrong-headed on the problem of Russian nuclear leakage, blind to plutonium fuel-cycle effects on nuclear proliferation, driven by reactor mania, naive on the potential to assist in Russian-U.S. nuclear disarmament, careless of internal safety and financial costs to Canadians, and unconcerned about the dangers of doing damage to governance in Canada. The CANDU MOX initiative is so deeply flawed that it is impossible to see how it might adequately be safeguarded against its own deficiencies.
Though suggestions could be made for improvement, their acceptance in any substantial measure would constitute an abrupt turnabout in the stance of a government that has seen fit to give a very unwise offer its informal backing. Proposals for far-reaching change in the initiative, I conclude, are unlikely to be acted upon. The CANDU MOX initiative should therefore be withdrawn forthwith.
Should the Canadian government nevertheless decide to commit formally to the initiative, this study suggests an array of changes that ought to be required by Canadians and made both to the initiative itself and to the way it is handled by the government. Although it is difficult to marshal any great confidence that they would be enacted, they can be itemized as follows. If the federal government is inclined to endorse the CANDU MOX initiative, it should:
- hold public hearings on the proposal and on whether and how to proceed with it, before any decision on commitment;
- consider whether and how to support the immobilization option in internal U.S. policy debate over disposition;
- decisively terminate Canada’s permissive policy on the use of plutonium fuel-cycle technology and prohibit Canadian corporations from all international activity that might contribute to closed fuel-cycle proliferation;
- depict CANDU MOX disposition as a complete and utter singularity, as a unique and time-limited use of Canadian reactors for purposes of weapons plutonium disposition only;
- come forth with a unique licensing and environmental impact assessment procedure that is capable of convincing Canadians that their views are being taken into account in the evaluation of an international security undertaking without precedent for Canada;
- require in a trilateral disposition agreement that the Russian Federation and the United States take back their spent MOX fuel, beginning ten years after irradiation of the first batch;
- require in a trilateral agreement that the Russian Federation and the United States undertake to negotiate limits on inactive strategic warhead and replacement pit reserves;
- require in a trilateral agreement that Russia and the United States undertake to commence negotiations for tactical nuclear weapons disarmament by a specified date;
- require in a trilateral agreement that the Russian side meet agreed criteria for nuclear materials control before Canadian-based reactor disposition would begin;
- commit in a trilateral agreement to provide Minatom with vigorous assistance in strengthening its nuclear materials accounting and control capabilities;
- require in a trilateral agreement a commitment from the supplier states not to manufacture CANDU MOX fuel for use in other countries possessing CANDU reactors;
- require in a trilateral agreement that no steps be taken to construct CANDU MOX fuel fabrication facilities in Russia or the United States until after all Canadian international security, licensing, and environmental impact assessment procedures have been completed;
- eliminate by announcement all possibility of Canada becoming a site for an international repository for nuclear waste;
- commit forcefully to nuclear abolition;
- lead in securing international acceptance of the illegitimacy of nuclear weapons;
- pursue a complete ban on the production of fissionable materials for military purposes;
- seek support for international agreement against first use of nuclear weapons; and
- offer international leadership against the global spread of plutonium fuel-cycle technology.
[ continuation of list ] Finally, Canadians ought to recognize that whether or not the CANDU MOX initiative is greatly altered, it could be taken up by the S-8. It could be taken up as early as the end of 1998, or some 18 months from now, if Washington were to hold to its decision to select from among its disposition options by that date. Depending on the course of negotiations for an S-8 hybrid arrangement, the use of Canadian reactors could find favour. This is principally because of the ability of Canadian-based disposition to provide an answer to Russia’s lack of safe reactor capacity, and to help the Eight to bridge their fuel-cycle disagreements.In the ordinary course of events, we might expect an invitation for Canada to accept a modest role, something in the order of 30 tonnes from the Russian Federation and the United States. Canada could however be asked to process considerably more if Russia were to start reducing to retained weapons plutonium parity with the United States. There is a potential for surprise here. The question is how large a mission Canadians should be prepared to accept if the CANDU MOX initiative were to be sustained by the Canadian government and then taken up by the principals.
The answer involves a trade-off between potential benefits in enhanced international influence for Canada, and direct internal costs to Canadians. Costs we now know about. But the benefits here are to be understood in terms of enhanced international standing and leverage that would come directly to Canada for performing a singular and unappealing task of nuclear waste disposal for the S-8. They would not be benefits to international security. As we now also know, there is no real gain to be had for security in plutonium disposition as long as Russia and the United States retain the capacity to rebuild their Cold War nuclear arsenals and as long as the Russian custodial system is unreformed.
How much direct cost should Canadians accept for how much international influence among the S-8 and in the world at large if the CANDU MOX initiative were to be implemented? Simply put, how large a mission should be accepted for the Bruce reactors if it came to that?
The larger the mission is, the greater the international influence that could be expected, and the greater and more prolonged the direct cost of disposition to Canadians. The larger the mission asked of Canada, the more exacting Ottawa could be in making conditions for Canadian acceptance of a trilateral agreement. If, for example, Ottawa specified that it would take not less than half of a total Russian and U.S. excess of 150 tonnes on terms that committed Russia to retained weapons plutonium parity, and if it turned out there was a need for this degree of participation from Canada, the gain in influence could be quite substantial and Ottawa would be in a position to exact commitments from Moscow and Washington in a trilateral agreement. The effect would also be to prolong and enlarge direct security, safety, financial, and also governance costs to Canadians who would have to live with an open-ended commitment to CANDU MOX disposition.
On the other hand, the smaller the mission, the less the influence gained, the less Ottawa’s ability to shape a trilateral agreement, and the shorter the aggravation of the CANDU MOX experience. If Canada were to accept some 30 tonnes, the whole thing might be gotten over with relatively quickly as long as Ottawa made it very clear to all concerned that further missions would not be accepted. Ottawa would not however be able to ask for some of the provisions suggested here for a trilateral agreement.
In my view, the realities of the situation come down to the fact that while international influence tends to be ephemeral, the costs of disposition to Canadians promise to be tangible. Accordingly, Canada should also:
- make clear in negotiation for a trilateral agreement that a disposition mission of not more than 30 tonnnes would be accepted;
- specify that once this mission were completed, there would be no more Canadian-based reactor disposition of excess weapons plutonium; and
- defer to and certainly do not compete with Ukraine if VVER-1000 reactors are judged to be safe for weapons plutonium disposition, and if Ukraine sought a role.
So there we have it: 21 suggestions which, if adopted by Canada and incorporated in a trilateral agreement, might go some way to improve an inept CANDU MOX initiative which is best rejected without further ado.
NEXT: MOX Experience, Part 6 : Notes
[ The Dangers of Encouraging Plutonium Use ]
[ Bomb Makers Speak Out Against Plutonium ]
[ Plutonium Sub-Directory ]
THE MOX EXPERIENCE:
THE DISPOSITION OF EXCESS RUSSIAN
AND U.S. WEAPONS PLUTONIUM IN CANADAJ u l y 1 9 9 7
Part 6 — Notes
Franklyn Griffiths
George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies
University College, University of Toronto
15 King’s College Circle
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3H7tel (416) 978-7417 fax (416) 971-2027
Notes
- Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
“Plutonium MOX Fuel Initiative,” May 1996;
“CANDU MOX : A Canadian Perspective,” September 13, 1996;
and, with Natural Resources Canada,
“MOX — Questions and Answers,” December 12, 1996, esp. 2-3 on cost.
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is hereafter cited as
DFAIT
, Natural Resources Canada as
NRCAN
.
- As quoted in a letter, December 16, 1996,
from Anne McLellan, Minister of Natural Resources Canada,
to Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
on CANDU MOX disposition.- DFAIT, “Plutonium MOX Fuel Initiative,” May 1966, 2;
DFAIT and NRCAN, “MOX — Questions and Answers,” 2 and 5;
DFAIT, “Plutonium MOX Fuel Initiative,” December 16, 1996, 2;
and DFAIT, “MOX Fuel Press Lines,” no date, 1.
Further references to “Plutonium
MOX
Fuel Initiative” are to the December
16, 1996
version.
- DFAIT, “MOX Fuel Press Lines,” 1;
DFAIT and NRCAN, “MOX — Questions and Answers,” 1; and
DFAIT, “Plutonium MOX Fuel Initiative,” 1 and 5-6.- Ontario Ministry of Environment and Energy,
Advisory Committee on Competition in Ontario’s Electricity System,
A Framework for Competition
(Toronto: Ministry of Environment and Energy, May 1996), 11.- DFAIT and NRCAN, “MOX — Questions and Answers,” 1.
- Although figures for the size of the Russian stockpile of weapons plutonium differ significantly, this study uses 150 tonnes as a reference amount.Thomas Cochran cites 150-170 tonnes, of which some 115-130 was fabricated into weapons components, the remainder being in the form of process waste. Thomas B. Cochran, “Progress in U.S./Russian Transparency and Fissile Material Disposition,” paper presented at the 5th ISADARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, 12-15 November 1996 (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defence Council, 1996), 6.Cochran favours the upper limit and also notes that Russia possesses some 30 tonnes of weapons-usable separated civil plutonium, which would bring the Russian Federation to 200 tonnes of separated plutonium. Matthew Bunn also cites the amount of 200 tonnes (including 30 tonnes of separated reactor-grade plutonium). Matthew Bunn, “The Case for a Dual-Track Approach — And How to Move Forward from Here,” unpublished paper, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 11, 1997, 8-9.A lower estimate of 150 tonnes is to be had in Anatoli S. Diakov, “Disposition of Separated Plutonium: An Overview of the Russian Program,” paper presented at the Fifth International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management and Environmental Remediation, September 3-8, Berlin, Germany, cited in Cochran, “Progress,” 6.David Albright and his colleagues estimate an amount of 131 tonnes, plus or minus 25 tonnes, for weapons-grade plutonium in the former Soviet states as of the end of 1993; they also identify 26.5 tonnes of separated civil plutonium in Russia as of that date. David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (Oxford: SIPRI and Oxford University Press, 1997), l58 and 445.The figure of 150 tonnes weapons plutonium is used as a reference amount in this study in the expectation that the Russian Federation will prefer to withhold its 30 tonnes of separated reactor-grade plutonium for civil power use, and that it will retain a further quantity of weapons plutonium scraps and residues for purification for civil use. A maximum of 200 tonnes of Russian weapons-usable plutonium is therefore reduced to 150 tonnes, of which 100 tonnes could be subject to disposition to reach equal levels of Russian-U.S. retained WPu.
- Joint United States/Russian Plutonium Disposition Study, September 1996 (Washington, D. C.: Department of Energy, 1996), ExSum-2.
This source is hereafter cited as
Joint Study
.
- United States General Accounting Office,
Department of Energy Plutonium Needs,
Costs and Management Programs
(Washington, D.C.: GAO, April 1997), 6.
The
U.S.
General Accounting Office is hereafter cited as
GAO
.
- International Experts Meeting on
Safe and Effective Management of Fissile Materials
Designated as No Longer Required for Defence Purposes,
Paris, October 28-31, 1996, “Conclusions,” no source or date, 1-2.- Jack Mendelsohn and Craig Cerniello,
“The Arms Control Agenda at the Helsinki Summit,”
Arms Control Today 27: 1 (March 1997), 16-18.- DFAIT, “CANDU MOX : A Canadian Perspective,” 6; and
Joint Study, WR-6.As of July 1997, DFAIT‘s estimate is that the Bruce B reactors are each capable of irradiating 1.5 tonnes of weapons MOX annually, making for a potential throughput of 6 tonnes per year if sufficient CANDU MOX fuel fabricating capacity were available.
Telephone conversation with A. Ian Smith of
DFAIT
, July
7, 1997
.
- Joint Study, WR-6.
- DFAIT and NRCAN, “MOX — Questions and Answers,” 3;
and DFAIT, “CANDU MOX : A Canadian Perspective,” 6.- DFAIT, “Plutonium MOX Fuel Initiative,” 4.
- DFAIT, “Plutonium MOX Fuel Initiative,” 2.See also United States Department of Energy,
Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,
Technical Summary Report for
Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition,
July 17, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 1996), ES-1.
The
U.S.
Department of Energy is hereafter cited as
DOE
.
- DFAIT, “CANDU MOX : A Canadian Perspective,” 1. See also
DFAIT and NRCAN, “MOX — Questions and Answers,” 4; and
Joint Study, WR-8.- United States Department of Energy,
Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,
Record of Decision for the
Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials
Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,
January 14, 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 1997), 19-21.- Ibid., 20.
- John P. Holdren, “Work with Russia,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 53: 2 (March/April 1997), 43.
- Joint Study, Sum-2.The Russian Federation is also leery of immobilization of the U.S. excess on grounds that the United States would be able to recover it more rapidly for weapons use than from weapons plutonium degraded by irradiation. Bunn, “The Case for a Dual-Track Approach,” 2.It is also the case that the United States has thus far been able to structure the START treaties to give it a substantial advantage over the Russian Federation in the event that Cold War nuclear arsenals were quickly to be reconstituted.On “uploading,” see Frank von Hippel, “Paring Down the Arsenal,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 53: 3 (May/June 1997), 34.
- Edwin S. Lyman and Paul Leventhal, “Bury the Stuff,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 53: 2 (March/April 1997), 48.
- DOE, Record of Decision, 19.
- John P. Holdren et al.,
“Excess Weapons Plutonium:
How to Reduce a Clear and Present Danger,”
Arms Control Today 26: 9 (November/December 1996), 6.The greater estimate is from William F. Naughton,
“Disposition of Weapons-Grade Plutonium in
Commercial Light-Water Reactors,”
Nuclear News 39: 9 (August 1996), 26.
- Joint Study, WR-4.
- DFAIT and NRCAN, “MOX — Questions and Answers,” 1.
- DFAIT, “Plutonium MOX Fuel Initiative,” 2.
- DFAIT, “CANDU MOX : A Canadian Perspective,” 2.
- Letter, August 30, 1996, from R.L. Gadsby of AECL to the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, U.S. Department of Energy, 3.
- Ibid., 2.
- Ibid., 3; and DFAIT, “CANDU MOX : A Canadian Perspective,” 9.
- DFAIT and NRCAN, “MOX — Questions and Answers,” 3.
- DFAIT, “CANDU MOX : A Canadian Perspective,” 9.
- DFAIT and NRCAN, “MOX — Questions and Answers,” 4.
- DFAIT, “MOX Fuel Press Line,” 2.
- DFAIT and NRCAN, “MOX — Questions and Answers,” 3.
- Ibid., 1.
- DFAIT, “MOX Plutonium Fuel Initiative,” 6.
- DFAIT, “CANDU MOX : A Canadian Perspective,” 4.
- DFAIT, “Plutonium MOX Fuel Initiative,” 2-3.
- AECL Technologies Inc., “Team CANDU Submission” to the U.S. Department of Energy, response to expression of interest number 3508652, no date.
- Mark Hibbs, “Influence-Buying Concern Delays Bonggil Vendor Choice Until June,” Nucleonics Week 38: 16 (April 17, 1997), 15.In the past, South Korea has expressed interest in providing weapons plutonium disposition services to the Russian Federation, using CANDU reactors. Hibbs, “South Korea Could Provide Vessel for Pakistan’s PWR,” ibid., 36: 38 (September 21, 1995), 2.
- “BNFL, Inc. Group to Lead Whiteshell Privatization,” Nuclear News 40: 7 (June 1997), 51.
- The remarks were made on CTV, January 15, 1955 by David Bock.Asked, “Storing waste from other countries?” he replied, “Well, possibly. We sell uranium to other countries. And if you use the argument that we have an obligation to look after that, then it would follow that you could do that.” Then asked, “So it would be closing the loop — you sell the uranium and you take the waste back at the end?” Bock replied, “That’s precisely it.”This is an excerpt from “Requirement for Additional Information on Matters Related to Atomic Energy of Canada’s Environmental Impact Statement on the Concept for Disposal of Canada’s Nuclear Fuel Waste,” submitted by the Saskatchewan Environmental Society to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency’s Panel reviewing the concept for disposal of nuclear fuel wastes, August 8, 1995.
- Stephen Strauss, “Nuclear Fusion Project May Fizzle,” Globe and Mail, December 6, 1996.
- Nuclear Budget Watch 1997 (Ottawa: Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, 1997), 1.
- George Lermer, “The Dismal Economics of CANDU,” Policy Options 17: 3 (April 1996), 18.
- By way of comparison, nuclear power stations account for 12 percent of Russian electricity generation and 22 percent in the United States. Robert E. Ebel, “Energy Futures,” Washington Quarterly 19: 4 (Autumn 1996), 84 and 85.Comparative figures for reactors in operation and reactors under construction for selected countries are as follows:
Canada 21:0,
France 57:3,
Germany 20:0,
India 10:4,
Japan 53:2,
Russia 29:4,
S. Korea 11:5,
UK 35:0,
USA 110:1.
“Status of World Nuclear Generation,” Nuclear News 40: 7 (June 1997), 52.The U.S. Department of Energy anticipates 0.2 percent annual growth in global nuclear power generation 1990-2010, most of it in non-OECD countries. U.S. Department of Energy, “International Energy Outlook,” Washington Quarterly 19: 4 (Autumn 1996), 79.
- Martin Mittlestaedt, “Ontario Hydro’s Atomic problem Child,” Globe and Mail, July 20,1996;
James Rusk, “Ontario Hydro’s Nuclear Division Blasted on Safety,’ ibid., September 7, 1996;
Mittlestaedt, “Report Cites Accident Risk at Nuclear Stations, ” ibid., February 26, 1997;
Mittlestaedt, ” Nuclear Plants Will Close If Problems Can’t Be Fixed,” ibid., February 27, 1996; and
Mittlestaedt, “Spread of Contamination Found at Pickering,” ibid., March 1, 1997.- Ontario Ministry of Environment and Energy, Framework for Competition, 11.
- Terence Corcoran, “Hydro Titanic Still Sinking,” Globe and Mail, December 13, 1996; and
Martin Mittlestaedt, “Ontario Hydro May Have to Cut Debt by Half,” ibid., February 20, 1997.- Martin Mittlestaedt, “Ontario Hydro Hires U.S. Nuclear Experts,” ibid., January 10, 1997.
- Martin Mittlestaedt, “Ontario Hydro Enlists Help of U.S. Experts,” ibid., January 15, 1997.
- Martin Mittlestaedt, “Ontario Hydro Writes Off 2.5-Billion, ” ibid., January 15, 1997.
- Barrie McKenna, “Rust Problems Plague Reactors,” ibid., January 11, 1997.
- Ray Silver, “With Nine Nuclear Units Down Ontario Hydro Hoping Others Can Meet Load,” Nucleonics Week 38: 20 (May 15, 1997).
- David Albright et al., Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996, 396; and Arjun Makhijani, “Plutonium as an Energy Source,” Energy and Security, No. 1, 1996, 5.Energy and Security is the newsletter of the Institute for Energy and Environmental research, Takoma Park MD.
- Letter, November 1, 1996, from John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Hazel O’Leary, Secretary of Energy, on excess U.S. weapons plutonium disposition; and
Edwin S. Lyman, “Weapons Plutonium: Just Can It,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52: 6 (November/December 1996), 48-52.- Barnaby J. Feder, “The Nuclear Power Puzzle,” New York Times, January 3, 1997.
- Matthew L. Wald, “Agency to Pursue Two Plans to Shrink Plutonium Supply,” ibid., December 10, 1996.
- DOE, Technical Summary Report, ES-9.
- Dave Airozo, “Troubled Commonwealth Unfit for MOX Mission, Opponents Say,” Nucleonics Week 38: 21 (May 22, 1997),1; and
Airozo, “With Decision Announced, Real Work on U.S./Russian Pu Disposal Begins,” ibid., December 12, 1996, 7.- Lyman, “Weapons Plutonium,” 50; and
Lyman and Leventhal, “Bury the Stuff,” 47.- Holdren “Work with Russia,” 42.
- DOE, Record of Decision, 19.
- Graham T. Allison et al.,
Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy:
Containing the Threat of
Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material,
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996),
esp. Appendix A, “The Russian Nuclear Archipelago,” by Owen R. Cote.- Ibid., 108, 187; Joint Study, ExSum-1 and WR-9; Holdren, “Work with Russia,” 43-44; and Holdren et al., “Excess Weapons Plutonium,” 7.
- Christian Kuppers and Michael Sailer,
The MOX Industry or the Civilian Use of Plutonium:
Risks and Health Effects Associated
with the Production and Use of MOX
(Darmstadt: International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War, 1994), 23.- Ibid., 36.
- Holdren et al., “Excess Weapons Plutonium,” 5-6; and Lyman and Leventhal, “Bury the Stuff,”, 48.
- Joint Study, ExSum-2.
- Kuppers and Sailer, The MOX Industry, 24.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., 32-33.
- Ibid., 33 and 35.
- “Spent Fuel Waste Transport Arrives at Gorleben,” Nuclear News 40: 5 (April 1997), 47. Previous clashes occurred in May and November 1996.
- Kuppers and Sailer, The MOX Industry, 36.
- “Pu Disposition: Options Discussed at Paris Meeting,” Nuclear News 39: 13 (December 1996), 36.On the French and German proposal, see International Experts’ Meeting, “Conclusions,” 14.The plutonium separation plant at Ozersk ( previously referred to as Chelyabinsk-65) produces some 2 tonnes of plutonium annually, which is not far off the 1.3 tonnes of weapons MOX that would be manufactured by the proposed new facility which would be located nearby. Thus, while weapons plutonium would be converted into MOX fuel at a new plant, several miles away an older Minatom facility would continue to separate larger amounts of weapons-usable plutonium.Some call this absurd, and rightly so.Marvin Miller and Frank von Hippel, “Let’s Reprocess the MOX Plan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53: 5 (July/August 1997), 16.
- DFAIT and NRCAN, “MOX — Questions and Answers,” 2.
- Ibid., 5.
- Lyman and Leventhal, “Bury the Stuff.”
- Joint Study, ExSum-1; and Holdren, “Work with Russia,” 43-44.
- Joint Study, Sum-11.
- Ibid., Sum-12 and WR-10.
- Ibid., WR-12.
- International Experts Meeting, “Conclusions,” 14.
- Lyman and Leventhal, “Bury the Stuff,” 48.Cogema and Siemens are however said to be discussing with Minatom a procedure whereby they would assist in MOX fuel fabrication in Russia in return for Russian payment in the form of “low-cost uranium and enrichment services, which they would sell on the international market.” Bunn, “Case for a Dual Track Approach,” 7.
- Alex Brall, “Ukraine Refuses to Participate in Russia-Iran Nuclear Project,” Nucleonics Week 38: 18 (May 1, 1997), 7.
- Kuppers and Sailer, The MOX Industry, 6-7; and Joint Study, WR-8.
- DFAIT and NRCAN, “MOX — Questions and Answers,” 6.
- Joint Study, CS-1.
- Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, 23-48. For a contrary view, see Mark Hibbs, “Plutonium, Politics, and Panic,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50: 6 (November/December 1994), 25-31.The likelihood of nuclear terrorism is questioned in Karl-Heinz Kamp, “An Overrated Nightmare,” ibid., 52:4 (July/August 1996), 30-34.
- Rose Gottemoeller, “Preventing a Nuclear Nightmare,” Survival 38:2 (Summer 1996), 170-174.
- Ibid., 173. On Iran, see David Albright, “A Iranian Bomb?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51: 4 (July/August 1995), 21-26.
- “Factfile: U.S. and Soviet/Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Arms Control Today 27: 1 (March 1997), 30.
- “Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces,” ibid., 19.
- Alton Frye, “Banning Ballistic Missiles,” Foreign Affairs 75: 6 (November/December 1996), 103-105.
- “Estimated Russian Stockpile, September 1996,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52: 5 (September/October 1996), 63; andNuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union;
Nuclear Weapon and Sensitive Export Status Report, Number 4
(Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 1996), 17.
- “Joint Statement on Parameters,” 19; and
“Arms Control and the Helsinki Summit:
Issues and Obstacles in the Second Clinton Term,”
Arms Control Today 27: 1 (March 1997), 12.- Geoffrey York, “Russia Reserves First Use of Nuclear Arms,”
Globe and Mail, February 12, 1997;and the remarks by John Steinbruner in
“Arms Control and the Helsinki Summit,” 14-15.
- “Estimated Russian Stockpile, September 1996,” 63.
- United States General Accounting Office,
“Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Status of Cooperative Threat Reduction Program”
(Washington, D.C., USGAO, September 1996), 7-12.- Ibid.
- United States Department of Energy, Office of Fissile Materials,
Final Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of
Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and
Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, January 1997), 105.- Hibbs, “Influence-Buying,” 15.
- DFAIT and NRCAN, “MOX — Questions and Answers,” 1.
- Cochran, “Progress in U.S./ Russian Transparency,” 2.
All figures that follow are estimates from this source. Rounding of numbers accounts very largely for any numerical inconsistencies.- GAO, Department of Energy Plutonium Needs, Costs and Management Programs, 6.
- Cochran, “Progress in U.S./Russian Transparency,” 2.
- Ibid., 2-3; andRobert S. Norris and William M. Arkin,
“U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, July 1995,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51: 4 (July/August 1995), 77-79, and
“U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, July 1997,” Ibid. 53: 4 (July/August 1997), 62-63.
- DFAIT and NRCAN, “MOX — Questions and Answers,” 5.
- Ibid.
- G. Trofimenko, “U.S. National Interests and Russia,” International Affairs (Moscow) 42: 5/6 (1996), 49-68.
- The commentary in this section owes much to my participation in the CANDU MOX stakeholders’ retreat which took place outside of Toronto, October 17-18, 1996. A summary of the proceedings is available in Peter Gizewski, “The CANDU MOX Initiative: Report on a Stakeholders’ Debate,” which is available from the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, in Ottawa.
- Martin Mittlestaedt, “Report Cites Accident Risk at Nuclear Stations,” Globe and Mail, February 20, 1997.
- DOE, Final Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment, 102.
- DOE, Record of Decision, 21.
- Letter to the author from A. Ian Smith, DFAIT, June 25, 1997.
- DOE, Final Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment, 102.
- Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
- DFAIT, “Plutonium MOX Fuel Initiative,” 5.
- DFAIT, “CANDU MOX : A Canadian Perspective,” 1.
- For the proposal, see Summary of the Environmental Impact Statement on the Concept for Disposal of Canada’s Nuclear Fuel Waste (Toronto: AECL, September 1994).
- Ray Silver, “Ontario Hydro Nuclear Eyes Pu Burning as a Way to Save Bruce-2,” Nucleonics Week 35:51, December 22, 1994, 3-4.
- Fred Roots,
“Radioactive Waste Disposal
— Ethical and Environmental Considerations —
A Canadian Perspective,”
in Nuclear Energy Agency,
Environmental and Ethical Aspects of
Long-Lived Radioactive Waste Disposal
(Paris: OECD Documents, 1994), 71-93.- Ibid., 78.
- Government of Saugeen, “The Duluth Declaration,” September 23, 1995.
- “Canada May Take Plutonium,” Globe and Mail, December 11, 1996; and
Anne McIlroy, “CANDU Sale Must Be Reviewed, Environmental Group Says in Suit,” ibid., January 22, 1997.- Andrew Nikiforuk, ‘The Nasty Game’: The Failure of Environmental Assessment in Canada, a report commissioned by the Walter and Duncan Gordon Charitable Foundation, Toronto, January 1997
- DFAIT, “CANDU MOX : A Canadian Perspective,” 9.DOE sees “better cooperation between Canadian facilities and licensing authorities and less public resistance to new missions for existing reactors than in the United States.” DOE, Final Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment, 105.
- Letter, August 30, 1996, of R.L. Gadsby of AECL to the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, DOE, 3.
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