{"id":824,"date":"2023-07-25T20:43:40","date_gmt":"2023-07-25T20:43:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/?page_id=824"},"modified":"2024-02-04T06:51:26","modified_gmt":"2024-02-04T06:51:26","slug":"a-chernobyl-in-canada-it-could-happen","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/fr\/a-chernobyl-in-canada-it-could-happen\/","title":{"rendered":"A Chernobyl in Canada? It could happen . . ."},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"backgroundxx: #FFDFFF; padding: 20px;\">\n<h2 style=\"text-align: center;\">A Chernobyl in Canada?<br \/>\nIt could happen . . .<\/h2>\n<hr \/>\n<h5 style=\"text-align: center;\">Globe and Mail Op-Ed Article,<\/h5>\n<h5 style=\"text-align: center;\">August 22, 1986.<\/h5>\n<hr \/>\n<h6 style=\"text-align: center;\">by Dr. Gordon Edwards<\/h6>\n<h6 style=\"text-align: center;\">Gordon Edwards is president of the<br \/>\nCanadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility.<\/h6>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: center;\">Table of Contents<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/a-chernobyl-in-canada-it-could-happen\/#dis\">Disastrous Nuclear Accidents<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/a-chernobyl-in-canada-it-could-happen\/#heat\">Heat and Radioactivity<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/a-chernobyl-in-canada-it-could-happen\/#fac\">Facing the Facts<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/a-chernobyl-in-canada-it-could-happen\/#poss\">Possible Containment Failures<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/a-chernobyl-in-canada-it-could-happen\/#lim\">Limited Protection<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/a-chernobyl-in-canada-it-could-happen\/#lack\">Lack of Independent Review<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2><a name=\"dis\"><\/a>Disastrous\u00a0Nuclear Accidents<\/h2>\n<p>Following the Chernobyl disaster, Canadian nuclear advocates were quick to assure us that &#8220;it can&#8217;t happen here.&#8221; Now, with Wednesday&#8217;s announcement [August 20, 1986] that Ontario plans to go ahead with its $11-billion Darlington nuclear plant, the assurances are certain to be renewed. They will tell us the \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 is such a superior reactor that it can&#8217;t possibly melt down and, even if it did, the elaborate \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 containment systems are so well-designed that the public would not be in danger.<\/p>\n<p>The official record shows otherwise. Three organizations have undertaken independent examinations of the dangers of \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 reactors: the Ontario Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning, the Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs and the Atomic Energy Control Board (<small>AECB<\/small>). All concluded that meltdowns are possible in \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 reactors and that the \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 containment system can fail.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h2><a name=\"heat\"><\/a>Heat\u00a0and Radioactivity<\/h2>\n<p>The fundamental problems are the same in all large nuclear power plants. All contain an enormous inventory of radioactive poisons, created inside the reactor as a result of the fission process. Because of this intense radioactivity, it is impossible to completely stop the heat generation in the event of an emergency. Even after shutdown, heat continues to be produced at about seven per cent of the full-power rate.<\/p>\n<p>Unless the residual heat is removed from the reactor core as fast as it is produced, the temperature will rise, and there is no theoretical limit as to how high it can get. Consequently, if all cooling systems fail, massive melting of the uranium fuel, the zirconium cladding and the stainless steel of the reactor vessel will occur, at temperatures in excess of \u00a0<small>5,000<\/small>\u00a0 degrees Fahrenheit. Vast quantities of radioactive poisons will be driven off in the form of toxic vapors, ashes and gases. It is exceedingly difficult to contain all this material, particularly since there is a strong likelihood of steam explosions, hydrogen gas explosions and other chemical explosions with the meltdown.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h2><a name=\"fac\"><\/a>Facing\u00a0the Facts<\/h2>\n<p>In its \u00a0<small>1978<\/small>\u00a0 report on nuclear power in Ontario, titled\u00a0<b>A Race Against Time<\/b>, the Ontario Royal Commission wrote:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>A major reactor accident would lead to the severe overheating, and subsequent melting, of the nuclear fuel, which would give rise to a substantial quantity of radioactive material escaping, after breaching several formidable barriers, into the environment &#8230;The radioactivity would collect in a &#8216;cloud&#8217; and would be carried downwind. At distances of two or three kilometres, depending on wind velocity, the cloud would begin to disperse (the dispersal zone could extend to distances of several hundred kilometres) and radioactive materials would be deposited on the ground.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The Royal Commission Report discredited claims by \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 designers that the probability of a complete meltdown at Pickering is as low as one in a million (per reactor per year). Nuclear critics have made a &#8220;more realistic&#8221; estimate, says the report, which is about \u00a0<small>100<\/small>\u00a0 times higher &#8212; one in \u00a0<small>10,000<\/small>\u00a0 per reactor per year. The Soviets used the same figure &#8212; one in \u00a0<small>10,000<\/small>\u00a0 per reactor per year &#8212; as the probability of an uncontained core meltdown at Chernobyl.<\/p>\n<p>In its \u00a0<small>1980<\/small>\u00a0 report,\u00a0<b>The Safety Of Ontario&#8217;s Nuclear Reactors<\/b>, the Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs (an all-party committee of the Ontario Legislature) warned:<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>It is not right to say that a catastrophic accident (in a \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 reactor) is impossible &#8230; The worst possible accident could involve the spread of radioactive poisons over large areas, killing thousands immediately, killing others through increasing susceptibility to cancer, risking genetic defects that could affect future generations, and possibly contaminating, for further habitation, large land areas&#8230;Accidents, mistakes and malfunctions do occur in [<small>CANDU<\/small>] nuclear plants: equipment fails; instrumentation gives improper readings; operators and maintainers make errors and fail to follow instructions; designs are inadequate; events that are considered `incredible&#8217; happen&#8230;no matter how careful we are, we must anticipate the unexpected.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h2><a name=\"poss\"><\/a>Possible\u00a0Containment Failures<\/h2>\n<p>Following the Chernobyl accident, Zygmund Domaratsky of the Atomic Energy Control Board &#8212; the man in charge of licensing for all nuclear reactors in Canada &#8212; said no \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 reactor is designed to contain a meltdown, because it is such an improbable event.<\/p>\n<p><small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 containment systems are all elaborate, some more than others. Besides its own thick-walled containment structure, each power reactor in Ontario is also connected to a large vacuum building &#8212; a separate structure designed to suck up the radioactive gases in an accident. \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>s in Quebec and New Brunswick &#8212; as well as those in Korea, Argentina, India and Pakistan &#8212; do not share this feature.<\/p>\n<p>But the \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 containment system is not foolproof. It might be incapacitated by explosions like those that blew the roof off the Chernobyl plant or those that threw a four-ton gas-holder dome four feet through the air during a devastating nuclear accident at Chalk River, Ontario, in \u00a0<small>1952<\/small>. The \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 containment system also relies on ventilation dampers automatically closing in the event of an accident. During an accident in \u00a0<small>1958<\/small>\u00a0 at Chalk River, the ventilation system of the \u00a0<small>NRU<\/small>\u00a0 reactor was accidentally jammed open, allowing significant amounts of radioactivity to escape from the plant.<\/p>\n<p><small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 containment systems may be impaired even before an accident occurs. The \u00a0<small>1978<\/small>\u00a0 royal commission report cited one example where a significant leak (<small>20<\/small>\u00a0 square inches) was discovered in the wall of the Pickering Unit\u00a0<small>2<\/small>\u00a0reactor building; it had gone unnoticed for about \u00a0<small>1\u00a0<sup>1<\/sup>\/<sub>2<\/sub><\/small>\u00a0 years. On numerous other occasions, personnel airlock doors were found improperly closed, establishing a sizeable pathway to the atmosphere. In \u00a0<small>1979<\/small>, the containment structure of Ontario Hydro&#8217;s Douglas Point reactor was found to be so leaky that the plant was forced to operate at reduced power until it was finally mothballed in \u00a0<small>1984<\/small>. In \u00a0<small>1980<\/small>, the select committee report warned that almost none of the \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 containment systems was meeting the criteria.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h2><a name=\"lim\"><\/a>Limited\u00a0Protection<\/h2>\n<p>In the event of a meltdown, even if the ventilation dampers close, the vacuum building works perfectly, the containment has no leaks and the explosions are not too violent, the \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 system still only partially protects the public. As an Ontario Hydro spokesman recently indicated on national television, radioactivity would eventually have to be released to the environment &#8212; likely after about \u00a0<small>24<\/small>\u00a0 hours &#8212; because the vacuum building could no longer retain it.<\/p>\n<p>Canadians have taken much comfort in the fact that a \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 reactor cannot experience a graphite fire like the one that raged in the Chernobyl reactor, because the \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 uses heavy water rather than graphite as a moderator. But a fierce fire is nevertheless possible. Some \u00a0<small>U.S.<\/small>\u00a0 nuclear experts have said that a \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 reactor will probably burn up before it will melt down. This is because every \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 contains zirconium metal in its core, which burns with a very intense heat. The cladding of the \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 fuel, the metallic structure of the fuel bundles and the hundreds of pressure tubes inside the core are all made of zirconium. Being separated from the heavy-water moderator by zirconium alloy calandria tubes, these components are in a perfect position to sustain a raging zirconium fire that could release enormous quantities of radioactive smoke.<\/p>\n<p>If a catastrophic accident occurs in a \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 reactor and the containment fails, what protection does the public have? Very little. All property insurance policies in Canada contain a &#8220;nuclear exclusion clause&#8221; that voids coverage in the event of radioactive contamination. The liability of the owner of a \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 nuclear plant is limited to \u00a0<small>$75<\/small>-million by an act of Parliament. (At Pickering, this works out to about \u00a0<small>$25<\/small>\u00a0 for every man, woman and child in the Toronto area.) By the same act, no compensation can be sought for cancers or other health effects occurring more than \u00a0<small>10<\/small>\u00a0 years after the accident. Extraordinary precautions for an accident considered so improbable that it isn&#8217;t worth spending money on engineered safeguards!<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h2><a name=\"lack\"><\/a>Lack\u00a0of Independent Review<\/h2>\n<p>In its \u00a0<small>1980<\/small>\u00a0 report, the Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs made several recommendations regarding \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 safety which have been largely ignored by all levels of government in Canada. The most important of these is Recommendation \u00a0<small>VII<\/small>\u00a0:<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The \u00a0<small>AECB<\/small>\u00a0 should commission a study to analyze the likelihood and consequences of a catastrophic accident in a \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 reactor. The study should be conducted by recognized experts outside the \u00a0<small>AECB<\/small>\u00a0 [Atomic Energy Conrol Board], \u00a0<small>AECL<\/small>\u00a0 [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited] and Ontario Hydro&#8230;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This recommendation was resurrected in the July 1986 Report of the Select Committee.<\/p>\n<p>When the Darlington go-ahead was announced Wednesday, Ontario&#8217;s Liberal Government promised it would launch a special study of \u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0 safety by &#8220;internationally recognized experts.&#8221; How independent these experts are, and whether this study will meet the recommendations, remains to be seen.<\/p>\n<p>However, one thing is certain &#8212; if Canadians do not wish to repeat the ghastly experience of the people of Ukraine, they must insist that their governments do the necessary studies, take the necessary measures and resist being lulled by a powerful technological lobby group &#8212; the Canadian nuclear establishment.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">[<a href=\"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/accident-possibilities-at-gentilly-2-and-other-candus\/\">\u00a0Accident Possibilities at Gentilly-2 and other\u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>s<\/a>\u00a0]<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">[<a href=\"http:\/\/ccnr.org\/CANDU_Safety.html\">\u00a0Findings on\u00a0<small>CANDU<\/small>\u00a0Safety<\/a>\u00a0] [<a href=\"http:\/\/ccnr.org\/rasmussen.html\">\u00a0All About Meltdowns<\/a>\u00a0]<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">[\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/ccnr.org\/index_accidents.html#dir\">Reactor Accidents Sub-Directory<\/a>\u00a0] [\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/ccnr.org\/index.html#dir\">COMPLETE DIRECTORY<\/a>\u00a0]<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>A Chernobyl in Canada? It could happen . . . Globe and Mail Op-Ed Article, August 22, 1986. by Dr. Gordon Edwards Gordon Edwards is president of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility. Table of Contents Disastrous Nuclear Accidents Heat and Radioactivity Facing the Facts Possible Containment Failures Limited Protection Lack of Independent Review Disastrous\u00a0Nuclear &hellip;<\/p>\n<p class=\"read-more\"> <a class=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/fr\/a-chernobyl-in-canada-it-could-happen\/\"> <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">A Chernobyl in Canada? It could happen . . .<\/span> Lire la suite\u00a0\u00bb<\/a><\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"disabled","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"disabled","footer-sml-layout":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"default","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-824","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/824","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=824"}],"version-history":[{"count":12,"href":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/824\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2912,"href":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/824\/revisions\/2912"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=824"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=824"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=824"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}