{"id":3033,"date":"2024-02-29T04:06:46","date_gmt":"2024-02-29T04:06:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/?page_id=3033"},"modified":"2024-03-20T21:42:44","modified_gmt":"2024-03-20T21:42:44","slug":"for-nuclear-explosions-all-plutonium-is-good-plutonium","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/wp.ccnr.org\/fr\/for-nuclear-explosions-all-plutonium-is-good-plutonium\/","title":{"rendered":"For nuclear explosions, “All Plutonium is Good Plutonium”"},"content":{"rendered":"

 <\/p>\n

For nuclear explosions,<\/span><\/h3>\n

“All Plutonium
\nis Good Plutonium”<\/big><\/span><\/h2>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

verbatim excerpts from
\nthe Sandia National Laboratories Publication<\/h4>\n

Proliferation Vulnerability
\nRed Team Report<\/span><\/h2>\n

SAND 97-8203<\/h4>\n

Printed October 1996<\/h6>\n
\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 <\/p>\n

The Authors:<\/h2>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n
Sandia National Laboratory:<\/big><\/b><\/h6>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nJ.P. Hinton,<\/td>\nG.A. Harms,<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nR.W. Barnard,<\/td>\nL.W. Kruse,<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nD.E. Bennett,<\/td>\nJ.A. Milloy,<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nR.W. Crocker,<\/td>\nW.A. Swansiger,<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nM.J. Davis,<\/td>\nK.J. Ystesund.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n
Savannah River Site:<\/big><\/b><\/h6>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nH.J. Groh<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n
Los Alamos National Laboratory:<\/big><\/b><\/h6>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nE.A. Hakkila,<\/td>\nW.L. Hawkins<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory:<\/big><\/b><\/h6>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nE.E. Hill<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/blockquote>\n
\n

TABLE OF CONTENTS<\/span><\/big><\/h3>\n

Introduction: Security Risks<\/a><\/p>\n

Stealing Plutonium for Bombs<\/a><\/p>\n

How Difficult Would It Be?<\/a><\/p>\n

Conclusions<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n
\n

<\/a><\/a><\/p>\n

Introduction:<\/h2>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Sandia was chartered by DOE’s Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE\/MD) to lead a four-month independent technical assessment of potential\u00a0proliferation resistance issues<\/span><\/b>\u00a0associated with the plutonium disposition alternatives under evaluation within the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP).<\/p>\n

Proliferation vulnerabilities are features of lower proliferation resistance that provide the\u00a0greatest opportunities for illicit removal and recovery of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons<\/span><\/b>, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the disposition process.<\/big><\/p>\n

The objective of the Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team (PVRT) assessment was to identify such features of greatest significance. This report summarizes the assessments and findings….<\/a><\/p>\n

4.1.2 Utility of Reactor Grade Plutonium
\nin Nuclear Explosive Devices<\/h2>\n

 <\/p>\n

The single summary statement about the utility of plutonium from the disposition program and its potential for use in nuclear explosive devices is: “All plutonium is good plutonium; some is better than other.”<\/span><\/b><\/big><\/p>\n

The weapons grade materials, and materials with isotopic composition not much different from weapons grade, are clearly directly weapons-usable once processed into the right chemical and physical forms.\u00a0 [\u00a0This includes any fresh MOX fuel made from weapons-grade plutonium<\/span><\/b>.\u00a0]<\/p>\n

The remaining question involves “reactor-grade” plutonium. The isotopic composition of these materials can range from 8 to 10 percent plutonium-240 up to more than 40 percent plutonium-240, 241, et cetera.\u00a0 [\u00a0This includes any irradiated MOX fuel<\/span><\/b>.\u00a0]<\/p>\n

The Department of Energy has issued a\u00a0press release<\/a><\/b>\u00a0acknowledging that\u00a0the United States has successfully tested a nuclear device using reactor grade plutonium<\/span><\/b>, and that the device produced a yield of less than 20 kilotons….<\/p>\n

In response to a question of why weapons-grade plutonium is better than reactor-grade plutonium, the release states: “Reactor-grade plutonium is significantly more radioactive, which complicates its use in nuclear weapons.”<\/p>\n

The principal complications arising from plutonium isotopes other than plutonium-239 are<\/p>\n