Canada’s Plutonium Contribution
to Britain’s Nuclear Weapons Programme

Britain’s Atomic Bomb Policy

The policy which was handed down for execution [ by the British Government in late 1945 ] was

the production of fissile material  [ both plutonium and highly enriched uranium ] at the earliest possible momentand, from January 1947,

the fabrication and testing of an atomic bomb, also at the earliest possible moment.

These commitments were presented, at the working level, as matters of supreme importance for the British nation.A subsidiary aim was the exploration of the potentialities of nuclear power: the shortage of fuel which bedeviled the whole economy emphasized the importance of this aim which could not, however, be achieved quickly….

… from Chapter 13: ”The Men”, page 3

The Men In Charge: Cockcroft, Penney, Hinton

Efficient execution of the atomic energy programme was regarded as essential to the nation…. In practice, [ it ] depended on the men running the establishments — on two scientists and an engineer. The scientists were

John Cockcroft, in charge of the research establishment at Harwell, and

William Penney, in charge of making and testing an atomic bomb.

The engineer was

Christopher Hinton, who was responsible for the design, construction and operation of plants to produce fissile material….

Cockcroft and Penney had both been in the wartime atomic energy teams, although they had scarcely known each other.

… from Chapter 13: ”The Men”, pages 4-5

John Cockcroft and the Canadian Connection

Cockcroft was already well known in the world of science….

In 1932 he and E.T.S. Watson had been the first scientists to split an atom by artificial means, an achievement marked by a Nobel prize in 1951….

In 1940 and 1941 … he had also been a member of the M.A.U.D. Committee which had proved the feasibility of an atomic bomb, and

at the end of 1943 Chadwick pressed him to take over the direction of the Anglo-Canadian-French atomic team at Montreal  [ which he did ] ….

Cockcroft had thus become the natural choice for a new research establishment at Harwell….

The translation of scientific research into engineering projects had also been a feature of Cockcroft’s period as director of the Canadian atomic energy project, for the famous NRX reactor  [ at Chalk River, Ontario ]  had been designed by his team and was being built by an industrial firm before Cockcroft left [ to return to England ] ….

His greatest achievement in Canada, however, had been to turn a bitter and divided multinational group  [ the Montreal heavy water research group ] , at a nadir of demoralisation, into a very happy, productive team, and to mend the badly torn relationships with the Canadians, who came to regard him as one of themselves….

… from Chapter 13: ”The Men”, pages 5-6

William Penney and the American Connection

Penney was the natural choice to head the research and development of atomic weapons….

In 1944 he had gone to Los Alamos as a member of the British team….

Few Americans knew more about the operational aspects of the use of the weapon;

he had been in a plane above Nagasaki when the atomic bomb was dropped and

had visited that town and Hiroshima soon afterwards to measure the bomb effects.

General Groves referred to him as a key member of the Los Alamos staff and

the Americans begged him to go as a member of their own team to the Bikini bomb tests in the summer of 1946….

When studying the effects of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Penney had noticed that empty petrol tins scattered about the towns were deformed to an extent clearly related to their distance from the explosion; he used this observation to good effect at the Bikini tests…. Penney decided to use several hundred Army petrol tins for recording the blast pressure at different points. When the bomb fell wide of its target, the sensitive American instruments could not record the blast properly, but with his petrol tins Penney could make a surprisingly accurate estimate of the bomb’s power….

… from Chapter 13: ”The Men”, pages 6-7

Christopher Hinton and the Plutonium Factories

Hinton, unlike Cockcroft and Penney, knew nothing at all about atomic energy when he was asked at the end of 1945 to design and build the [ plutonium production and separation ] plants. His credentials as an engineer and as an administrator were, however, already formidable … [ and ] had prepared him for the extraordinary complexities and requirements of his atomic energy post. For many years to come this new branch of engineering was to probe every weakness in an engineer’s training, and Hinton’s training had been as tough, thorough and wide-ranging as it could have been….

Thus in 1946, as Cockcroft, Penney and Hinton took up their posts, it seemed that the special qualities and past experience of all three had combined to produce a very rare situation: the right men all arriving in the right jobs at the right moment….

… from Chapter 13: ”The Men”, pages 7-9

However, Hinton felt that Lord Portal, his Controller, neither trusted nor supported him adequately and yet was critical if things went wrong. The tone of some of Portal’s early letters to Hinton certainly had a peremptory, even nagging, tone which never appeared in letters to Cockcroft or Penney…. A note of deference to scientists can be detected which was not apparently appropriate to engineers….

… from Chapter 13: ”The Men”, page 20

Engineering Attitudes toward the Bomb Project

It seems that even though Hinton and Owen were clear that they were making fissile material for bombs, many of the staff were uncertain for some time about the purpose of their work and simply believed they were part of an industry which would produce new forms of energy. As the objects became clearer, engineers were neither attracted nor repelled by a realisation that their immediate aim was to produce the material for bombs….

… from Chapter 13: ”The Men”, page 35

Recruiting Scientists in Montreal

At the end of 1945 a two-man board from the Civil Service Commission … visited the atomic energy teams in North America on a recruiting expedition for the Scientific Civil Service in general and for Harwell  [ the new British nuclear research establishment ] in particular…. The board had to face the novel experience of being rejected by the interviewees, rather than the reverse, for the scientists were reluctant to go even to Harwell. Indeed no one forgot the meeting at Montreal (which Cockcroft chaired) and the storm which broke round the visitors’ hapless heads.

Because of their experiences, the scientists in Canada viewed the Government service with the greatest possible suspicion and distrust.

They disliked the inevitable red tape….

They resented the security arrangements, especially the American security officers on the Chalk River site….

The Montreal scientists set up a “shop stewards’ committee”, which demanded, and got, answers to a long list of questions, the most important of which were less concerned with pay, promotion, personal freedoms and travel than with the general philosophy of Harwell….

They had an uneasy feeling that if they entered Government service they were being bought….

Fears of policy restrictions for political or commercial reasons were equally strong — all research might be directed to making bombs, or some research might be discontinued because a commercial undertaking was doing it….

Cockcroft told them … that the considerable freedom of the Montreal Laboratory would continue at Harwell….It was largely because they knew Cockcroft that so many good scientists joined the establishment. Indeed the only answer that produced complete satisfaction in Montreal was the announcement that Cockcroft was to be director of Harwell…. The scientists were devoted to him and had great faith in him.

It is fair to conclude that although other scientists might have been competent to run the research establishment, no one else (except Chadwick) would have attracted the scientists from North America who were essential to its success….

… from Chapter 13: ”The Men”, pages 25-27

Plutonium Separation Work in Canada

The Americans, during the war, had used precipitation methods for separating plutonium … but there were all kinds of drawbacks to the large-scale use of such methods…. The section of the wartime Montreal chemistry team which was responsible for developing a plutonium separation process for the NRX pile, under its French leader, Bertrand Goldschmidt, had concentrated on a solvent extraction process because it had greater promise for the future….

The British chemistry team in Canada was asked at the end of 1946  [ by the British authorities ]  to develop by the following September a  [ plutonium ]  separation process suitable for application on an industrial scale. The team, headed by Robert Spence, consisted of twelve chemists and chemical engineers with five assistants [ in Canada ] . The only plutonium they had for their researches was embedded in four irradiated rods which had come [ to Montreal ] from one of the American piles a year earlier…. The team extracted from the rods 20 milligrams of plutonium — a quantity just about enough to cover a pinhead…. With so little knowledge of plutonium chemistry, it was extraordinarily difficult to produce the quantitative and precise data needed … for an efficient industrial plant. However, Spence’s team produced just that … [ and ] precisely to time….

In the autumn of 1947 Hinton went out to Canada … [ and ] went over the [ Spence ] report in great detail…. A continuous system of the kind contemplated was, unlike a batch system, inflexible. A very big volume of liquor would be moving through the plant, yet all parts of the plant were mutually interdependent, and if the calculations for one part were wrong the whole plant might fail. The possibility of failure was the more frightening because the plant would have to be remotely controlled from behind a thick wall of concrete and because it was believed that it would be impossible to enter it for repairs [ due to the intense radiation fields ] ….

… from Chapter 22: ”Individual Factories”, pages 404-407

Plutonium from the Canadian NRX Reactor

The only source of plutonium for  [ further British ]  research was the NRX pile in Canada, and irradiated rods were not available there until well into 1948….

Chalk River was the siteof an experimental  [ plutonium separation ]  plant which was to be fed with irradiated  [ uranium ]  slugs from the NRX pile, in order to prove the process and provide experience of radioactive operation. The confirmation most needed was about the behaviour of plutonium in the columns….

Meanwhile, the hot laboratory [ for handling plutonium ] at Harwell was still not finished, while difficulties with the NRX pile delayed the final active run  [ i.e. separating plutonium from highly radioactive spent fuel ]  on the Chalk River pilot plant….

… from Chapter 22: ”Individual Factories”, page 409-411

Crisis of Confidence in Britain

The crisis came in the summer of 1949…. This was Hinton’s darkest hour, when everything seemed to be going wrong…. His most serious doubt was over the plant which was the most complicated of all — the chemical separation plant at Windscale which was to … extract the plutonium and make it into a metal….

The research and development work on which the engineers were basing their designs were being done by three sets of people: Robert Spence, with his chemical team first at Chalk River and then at Harwell, was the kingpin, while ICI chemists at Widnes and Springfields, and Harwell chemical engineers at Chalk River, were also doing vital work. Hinton feared that … he would be unable to produce plutonium by the target date, that is, the end of March 1952….

The primary [ plutonium ] separation process was based on work Spence had done two years earlier in test-tubes with only milligram quantities of plutonium. It was absolutely essential to get confirmation of the process from the pilot  [ plutonium extraction ]  columns that were to operate … at Chalk River. These were now a year late, and in any case they could only operate when sufficient highly irradiated uranium was made available by the Canadians. Overall, research information … was six to twelve months behind Hinton’s schedule. This schedule might now be unrealistic because its assumptions about the arrival of plutonium from Canada … were unfulfilled.

“I realise”, Hinton wrote, “that the urgency with which fissile material is required demands that we take risks which are quite abnormal….” Portal tried to soothe Hinton by saying that the urgency of producing atomic weapons was such that … “even a million” spent on wide margins for unforeseen contingencies would be well spent…. This reply simply showed Hinton how little Portal understood his problems, which went far deeper than the sums of money involved.

Portal called a meeting in June 1949 with all the chief people concerned….

… from Chapter 18: ”Harwell’s Role”, pages 239-241

Pilot Plutonium Plant in Canada Succeeds

News of the first active run on the Chalk River plant had arrived on the very morning of Portal’s meeting, to which it was announced; although one run was not conclusive and provided only part of the information which was lacking, it suggested that in principle Spence’s process would work perfectly….

In the summer of 1949, too, a part of the Harwell hot laboratories was at last ready. Hitherto it had been extremely difficult to work satisfactorily even with the traces of plutonium which were all the Harwell chemists had. Plutonium is an extremely dangerous material, so much so that more than one scientist was known to say that if he thought he had touched it with a cut finger he would immediately cut his finger off…. Nevertheless … plutonium was not available from Canada in more than trace quantities before the laboratory was ready.

… from Chapter 18: ”Harwell’s Role”, page 241

Canadian Plutonium Sent to Britain

The early research for plutonium metal production had been done with microgram quantities at Chalk River, gradually working up through milligrams to grams at Harwell…. A full-scale pilot run with Canadian plutonium was done at Harwell, and the first plutonium metal billet, bright and clean with a yield better than 98 percent, was produced there on a Saturday evening in December 1951….

… from Chapter 22: ”Individual Factories”, page 421

British Windscale Plant Begins Operations

Although the Harwell process for plutonium purification and finishing had worked very well, a process devised for operation by scientists in laboratory conditions could not necessarily be adopted in its entirety for a plant to be operated by industrial workers….

Windscale had … no facilities for stirring and precipitating…. The plutonium fluoride which emerged … was a dirty greenish-brown instead of the delicate pink produced by Harwell…. It was nevertheless “cooked” … [ and ] when the cylinder was opened and the slug broken down, a small billet of plutonium metal was there, about the size and shape of a ten penny piece with round blobs of metal on top. It was neither very big nor very beautiful, but it was [ metallic ] plutonium, the end-product of six years’ effort. Nor was the plutonium metal pure enough for a bomb….

The first plutonium purification and finishing plants were undoubtedly very difficult to operate in terms of safety and output. In both plants there was a constant struggle in the first months against contamination, with the staff wearing full protective clothing and masks. Courage and resolution were required….

The first, admittedly impure, billet of plutonium [ from Windscale ] was made on 31 March, 1952, as Hinton had promised, and Penney received the amount of plutonium to the required purity which he needed for the bomb trials….

… from Chapter 22: ”Individual Factories”, pages 421-422

British Nuclear Weapons Requirements

The decision to make an atomic bomb was taken by  [ British ]  Ministers … at the beginning of 1947…. as a result of prompting by Dr. Penney, who had been appointed as Chief Superintendent of Armaments Research … 1 January 1946….

Penney had hitherto played no part at all in the post-war British atomic project. He knew that preparations were being made to produce plutonium, but it is doubtful whether he knew at the outset the size of the programmed output … the amount needed for the manufacture of 15 bombs a year….

During 1948 the Chiefs of Staff tabled their requirements for 200 bombs by 1957; there was now a firm production order for the future. Then the relentless momentum of research became apparent; having embarked on a nuclear weapon, Britain could not stop at the obsolescent Nagasaki bomb….

It was Klaus Fuchs, formerly of Los Alamos and now at Harwell, who emphasized from an early date the need for long-term work….

… from Chapter 23: ”The Weapon”, pages 442-443

When, in 1950, the date of October 1952 was fixed for the “Hurricane” trial  [ the first British A-bomb test ] , tighter planning began….

… from Chapter 23: ”The Weapon”, page 459

Canadian Plutonium Essential to Bomb Test

The plutonium metal for the core of the weapons was to be supplied by Risley, but … Risley supplies would not be forthcoming until the spring of 1952, only six months or so before “Hurricane”. Harwell was able to produce by the end of 1951 the first plutonium  [ metal ]  billet from the plutonium nitrate solutions sent from Chalk River…. From late 1951 … metallurgists worked with the Harwell plutonium metal and with the further supplies of Canadian plutonium. Throughout 1951 they tried to do as much advance work as possible….

Only when the first Harwell billet was available at the end of 1951 was it possible to be sure that the alloy chosen  [ for the plutonium core of the bomb ]  was a practicable proposition. After the first Harwell billet [ using Chalk River plutonium ] had been ‘knocking about’ for a fortnight, it was becoming somewhat oxidised and had to be cleaned before work could begin….

… from Chapter 23: ”The Weapon”, pages 466-467

Searching for a Test Site

The need to test was implicit in the decision to make a bomb…. In terms of economy of effort and resources, there was a clear case for cooperation with the Americans…. An official request was therefore made to them [ in November 1949 ] , but it posed difficult political and practical problems for the Americans and an official reply was long delayed.

The British decided they must consider other possibilities, while keeping their options open; in September 1950 the Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Prime Minister an Australian site suggested by the Admiralty — the Monte Bello Islands. A message from Mr. Atlee was soon handed to Mr. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister….

… from Chapter 24: ”Monte Bello”, page 476

An A-Bomb Test Site in Canada?

Meanwhile, Penney had been in Canada looking for  [ bomb test ]  sites; this visit, arranged with Dr. Solandt (chairman of the Canadian Defence Research Board) was a feasibility study only…. Penney was seeking more than a site for the first test, and the joint report which he and his Canadian colleagues produced looked forward for some years.

It defined three types of trials:

to test the functioning of a weapon;

given a weapon of known power, to discover certain physical effects (for instance, the effect of an explosion in shallow water); and

to prove the functioning and ballistics of an operational weapon.

If a tripartite agreement were reached on a common proving ground in Canada, the report continued, there might be one or two trials a year for several years; the site would have to be generously staffed and equipped with instruments. Assuming complete Anglo-Canadian integration but no tripartite agreement, the staff required for the first trial would be 200 scientists, 50 technicians and 100 industrial workers. Most of the scientists would be provided by Britain, with help from the Canadians in chemical analysis and radiological safety, and most of the industrial workers by Canada; Canada would undertake the construction work; costs would be shared on an agreed basis.If the first British test were to be a ground burst, the  [ Canadian ]  site would have to be ready by the summer of 1952. It might, however, be an explosion in a ship, since one “base surge” trial seemed necessary to investigate the effects of an explosion in shallow water, such as a ship-borne atomic bomb might produce in a major port…. Failing a suitable site  [ for such a ship-board test ]  in Canada, it would have to be carried out by means of an expedition in the Pacific; a Canadian  [ land-based ]  site would then be used only for subsequent trials and would not have to be ready until the summer of 1953.

The report set out the requirements for a site: a detonation area; a temporary camp at least 10 miles upwind; a base camp, with laboratories, workshops and signals office, at least 25 miles away upwind. It would have to be isolated, with no human habitation within 100 miles downwind in a wide sector; prevailing winds should blow contamination over the sea but clear of shipping. It should be large enough to accommodate the detonation of about a dozen weapons over several years; since each explosion would cause severe contamination over an area of about 500 yards radius which could not be used again, each detonation would have to be at least 3 miles from the previous trial. Of the seven Canadian sites investigated, one near Churchill, Manitoba, on the west coast of Hudson Bay, seemed ideal, except that the sea was too shallow for ships to be used near the shore….

… from Chapter 24: ”Monte Bello”, pages 477-478

Australia Volunteers

The Australian Government formally agreed  [ to the use of the Monte Bello Islands ]  in May 1951 and provisional preparations began….

… from Chapter 24: ”Monte Bello”, page 479

The Monte Bello bomb was terrifyingly real and could be measured in terms of blast and radioactivity by the monitoring machines spread about the islands. Yet it was also curiously unreal. The initial product of the huge industrial effort was just two lumps of an ordinary-looking heavy grey metal  [ plutonium ] , no more than one man could carry by hand on the journey to Monte Bello. One of these lumps, encapsulated in its shapes of high explosive, had produced, in a microsecond of activity, a soaring plume and mushroom cloud laden with lethal contents, and a blast equal to that of 20,000 tons of TNT.

The whole and acknowledged point of the bomb and its successors was that they should not be used except in tests. If they were used, they had failed in their purpose, which was deterrence. If two sides used them in warfare, any victory was bound to be pyrrhic….

… from Chapter 25: ”Epilogue”, page 497

Parting Thoughts

Because of the discovery of atomic energy, radioactive materials which had lain useless but harmless in the earth had been extracted and concentrated into effective but dangerous forms, and were becoming widely used. A new element of devastating power and fearful toxicity — plutonium — which did not exist on earth (except perhaps in minute traces) was being created in quantity; as plutonium-239, with a half-life of 24,000 years, it would remain active and dangerous for millennia, since there were no means of rendering it harmless. The plants where the reactor fuel rods were processed were potentially very hazardous…. The really massive increase in radioactive material on the earth’s surface was taking place in the nuclear reactors themselves, where the contained fission products and induced radioactivity were enormous in quantity.

Such novel threats to the health and safety of workers and the population, so little understood by politicians or the public, imposed a heavy responsibility on the scientists and engineers. They were remarkably successful in coping with the problems in this [ early ] period…. Could the cautious confidence induced by success so far be projected into an era of a large-scale nuclear power programme and its multiplied hazards? This question goes beyond the scope of the present volume.

… from Chapter 25: ”Epilogue”, page 503

“Pile” is a British term for “nuclear reactor” — used especially in the early years.

[ Canadian role in various Bomb programs ] [ Canada’s Nuclear History ]

Chapter 3

Argentina, India, Pakistan, Taiwan

written by David Martin
of Nuclear Awareness Project
for the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout

November 1996

For a copy of the complete report ($10 + shipping) write
Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout
1 Nicholas Street Suite 412
Ottawa Ontario
K1N 7B7 Canada

. . . back to [ Table of Contents ]

3. Past CANDU Sales

3.1. Argentina

. . . back to [ Table of Contents ~ Argentina ]

3.1.1. The Cordoba CANDU

In 1972, AECL submitted a bid to Argentina’s Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica (CNEA), in partnership with the Italian company Italimpianti, for a 600 MW CANDU. Italimpianti handled marketing and the plant’s conventional equipment, and AECL was responsible for the nuclear side. The bid was selected in early 1973, and despite a change of government with the election of Isabel Peron, the contract was signed in December 1973. The total estimated cost of the reactor was $420 million. Of this, about $270 million went to Italimpianti, and $150 million to AECL. Of the $150 million, $61 million was for Canadian goods and services, $56 million was for Argentinean goods and services, $30 million was for heavy water; and $3 million was for Canadian uranium (if Argentina decided to buy it). [267] Canada provided a $129.45 million concessionary loan from the Export Development Corporation, payable over 25 years, with repayment starting only when the reactor entered service. [268] A further $25 million loan was made by the EDC in 1978. The original contract also apparently had a 25% ceiling on inflation, and with the 1973 OPEC oil embargo and a period of high inflation, it became apparent by 1975 that AECL was heading for a $200 million loss.

Subsequent attempts to renegotiate the contract were interrupted in March 1976 by a bloody military coup led by General Videla. By May 1977, AECL had made provision for a loss of $130 million on the deal. [269] , [270] The Cordoba deal was not just complicated by inflation and underpricing – defective boilers costing $15 million were also supplied by Babcock & Wilcox Canada. [271] Repairs delayed the project for over a year.

The sale of the Cordoba reactor was also controversial because bribes were paid to secure the contract. As part of the deal, AECL and Italimpianti agreed to split an “agent fee”, which was used as a bribe. In April 1974, AECL President Lorne Gray approved the deposit of $2.4 million in a Swiss bank account. [272] An Argentinean investigation in 1985 revealed that José Ber Galbard, then Argentine Minister of Economic Affairs, was the recipient of the $2.4 million, plus another $1.1 million in May 1974, and an additional $300,000 two years later. [273]

. . . back to [ Table of Contents ~ Argentina ]

3.2. India

. . . back to [ Table of Contents ~ India ]

3.2.1. CANDUs for India3.2.1.1. The CIRUS Research Reactor:

The first Canadian reactor export took place in 1956. It was a “research” and plutonium production reactor modelled on the 40 MW NRX (National Research X-metal or X-perimental) reactor that began operation at Chalk River in 1947. The NRX was a heavy water moderated reactor that was built to produce plutonium for the American nuclear weapons program. It was well known that heavy water moderation results in very efficient plutonium production.

The Indian reactor was part of an aid program organized under the Colombo Plan Administration. The total cost of the reactor was about $17 million, of which the Canadian government provided $9.5 million as foreign aid under the Colombo Plan. [274] The reactor was known as CIRUS (Canada-India-Reactor-United States). The “US” was added because the United States supplied the heavy water for the reactor. The reactor went critical in July 1960, and became infamous as the source of plutonium used by India to manufacture the nuclear bomb it exploded in May 1974. It was still in operation in 1996.

. . . back to [ Table of Contents ~ India ]

3.2.1.2. The RAPP-1 Power Reactor:After the start-up of the CIRUS reactor in 1960, AECL negotiated another reactor export to India. In 1963 an agreement was signed for export of a 200 MWe power reactor modelled on the Douglas Point reactor at the Bruce site in Ontario, even though Douglas Point was not in service until January 7, 1967. The Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP) was built at Rawatbata, 64 km southwest of Kota in the northwestern Indian state of Rajasthan.

The total estimated cost of RAPP-1   [ now known as RAPS-1, for “Rajasthan Atomic Power Station Number 1″ ]   was $79 million, of which $35 million was to be spent in Canada, [275] financed by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation (ECIC – predecessor of the Export Development Corporation). The plant began operation in 1972. It should be noted that AECL also gave India, free of charge, the technical and design information for construction of the 200 MW reactor. [276]

A serious problem with cracking of the reactor’s end shield led to the reactor being shut down for long periods, and the reactor was finally downrated to 100 MW. [277]

. . . back to [ Table of Contents ~ India ]

3.2.1.3. The RAPP-2 Power Reactor:In 1966, another agreement was signed by Canada and India for construction of a second 200 MW reactor RAPP-2   [ now known as RAPS-2, for “Rajasthan Atomic Power Station Number 2″ ]   with some improvements, at the same site as RAPP-1. The ECIC provided $38.5 million financing for the project’s Canadian services and equipment. [278] Perhaps because of concessionary financing terms, or because of the earlier provision of the CIRUS reactor, the contract was signed (like the first reactor) without international tenders.

The reactor was still under construction in 1974, when India exploded a nuclear bomb, and Canadian personnel stopped work on the project. The lack of Canadian support delayed start-up of RAPP-2 until 1981. Canadian government financing for RAPP-1 and RAPP-2 totalled at least $140 million, payable over fifteen years with about six years’ grace at 6%. [279] The Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was involved with construction and commissioning of the two RAPP reactors, and also fabricated some fuel. Indian content in RAPP-1 was 55% and 75% of RAPP 2. [280]

Canada’s nuclear non-proliferation safeguards were strengthened following India’s 1974 explosion of a nuclear bomb fuelled with plutonium made in the CIRUS reactor. Following the explosion of the weapon, and the failure of subsequent negotiations, Canada ended nuclear assistance to India.

RAPP-2 (now known as RAPS-2 for Rajasthan Atomic Power Station) was shut down in August 1994, and RAPS-1 was shut down in February 1994, both for maintenance and for detailed examination of pressure tubes. [281] By May 1995, it was announced that RAPS-2 would be shut down for at least three years to conduct a full retubing, after hydrogen blisters and elongation were found in several pressure tubes. [282] It has been reported that RAPS-1 may restart in January 1997, following repairs to the pressure relief system, although a total retubing for that reactor is also apparently planned. [283]

At issue is the fact that pressure tubes in the RAPS reactors are made of Zircalloy-2, a zirconium-steel alloy used only at early CANDU reactors. This alloy is a problem because of its susceptibility to embrittlement and elongation. Embrittlement in 1983 of a pressure tube in Ontario Hydro’s Pickering reactor-2 led to a metre-long rupture and a major loss of coolant accident. All of India’s PHWRs prior to Kakrapar-2 have used Zircalloy tubes. Kakrapar-2 has used the zirconium-niobium alloy that has been used in later CANDU reactors. [284]

. . . back to [ Table of Contents ~ India ]

3.2.2. The Indian Nuclear Program3.2.2.1. Current Status

Nuclear power and nuclear R&D in India are under direct control of the Prime Minister through the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), below which is the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). In an inappropriate linkage, the nuclear regulatory agency, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), also reports to the AEC. The DAE has a number of subdivisions and companies.

The Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) was created in 1986, and given responsibility for design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants (with the exception of RAPS-1 [285] , which because of serious problems was left separate as a “non commercial” plant). The NPC was intended to operate as a private company, however, as one industry commentator said, because of “NPC’s low level of profitability . . . investors could have earned more return on their investment in a standard deposit account”. [286]

In addition to   [ the Canadian-supplied CANDUs ]   RAPS-1 and RAPS-2, India now has six Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) [287] in operation, all 200 MW reactors modelled on the   [ Canadian-built CANDU ]   Douglas Point and  [ the Canadian-supplied ]   RAPS reactors. They are (in-service dates noted):

Kakrapar-1 (KAPS-1), 05/93;

Kakrapar-2 (KAPS-2), 01/95;

Kalpakkam-1 (MAPS-1), 01/84;

Kalpakkam-2 (MAPS-2), 03/86;

Narora-1 (NAPS-1), 01/91; and

Narora-2 (NAPS-2), 07/92.

In addition, India has two 160 MWe Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) known as Tarapur (TAPS) 1 & 2, that went in service in 1969. Other than RAPS 1 & 2, these are India’s only foreign-supplied reactors. They were turn-key projects built by General Electric. [288] Four more 200 MW PHWRs – Kaiga-1 & 2, and Rajasthan-3 & 4 – are expected to start up in the 1998-99 fiscal year.India has five research/production reactors:

Apsara (1 MWt pool type);

CIRUS (40 MWt, heavy water);

Dhruva (100 MWt, heavy water);

Kamini (30 kWt, U-233 fuelled); and the

FBTR (40 MW Fast Breeder Test Reactor). [289]

India’s PHWRs have suffered from a number of problems that have resulted in very poor performance. For example MAPS 1 & 2 (the Madras Atomic Power Station in the state of Tamil Nadu) were ordered in 1967 and 1971, and took 17 and 15 years to bring into service. Problems with their heat transport systems have resulted in their downrating to 175 MWe.

In a potentially disastrous accident, NAPS-1 was shut down in 1993 after turbine blades broke, igniting a hydrogen fire in the turbine coolant that destroyed the turbine hall, and blacked out the station. With safety systems out of action, reactor cooling was maintained only by diverting an emergency source. [290]

In a stinging rebuke for the Indian nuclear industry, the outgoing Chairperson of India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), A. Gopalakrishnan, stated,

“Many of our nuclear installations have aged with time and have serious problems which are characteristic of the early vintage designs. Our own efforts to find indigenous solutions to these problems are not well organised or focused. The country had an inherent capability to tackle these problems, but the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has uniquely failed in bringing together these national strengths and coordinating them for the benefit of the nuclear sector.” [291]

Gopalakrishnan noted that the AERB is only a “subordinate body” of the DAE, although he had strived for independence. He also noted that safety concerns are increasing, with more than 130 safety problems at various sites that need urgent action. [292]

The Indian nuclear industry is subsidized by the state. The NPC alone received a subsidy of 9.7524 billion rupees (about US $282.678) for the 1996-97 fiscal year. However, this represented a cutback of about Rs 1.5 billion (about US $43 million) from the previous year. [293] Attempts by the NPC to attract investment have also remained unsuccessful, and despite artificially low electricity rates, State Electricity Boards have remained delinquent in their payments, being in arrears a total of Rs 2.5 billion in March 1996. [294]

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3.2.2.2. Fuel Cycle Activities (Plutonium et al.)India is committed to several advanced fuel cycles, notably a thorium fuel cycle, and thorium fuel bundles have been produced and used in Kakrapar-1. The Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facility at Tarapur has also produced MOX fuel bundles [ a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides ] for PHWRs and is working on bundles for BWRs. The Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) is located at the Indira Ghandi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) on the MAPS site at Kalpakkam near Madras. Ten years after start-up in October 1985, the FBTR is still operating only at low power levels. Design work is also taking place on a 500 MWe fast breeder prototype.

March 1996 saw the start-up of India’s third reprocessing facility at IGCAR (the other two are at Tarapur and Trombay). The BARC site at Trombay was built between 1961 and 1964, and has capacity of about 30 tonnes per year. It uses the Purex process with solvent extraction columns [ to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel ] , and reprocesses fuel from the Dhruva and CIRUS reactors. India’s main reprocessing facility at Tarapur started up in 1969. Although it has a nominal capacity of 100 tonnes per year, it has not functioned at full capacity. It reprocesses the spent fuel from the Tarapur, Rajasthan and Madras reactors. [295]

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3.2.3. India and the BombOn May 18, 1974, India exploded a 12 kiloton fission weapon at the Pokhran site in the Rajasthan desert. The land for the test had been acquired in 1966, when 200,000 people had been forcibly displaced. [296]

The weapon was made with plutonium from the CIRUS reactor. Canada had transferred the CIRUS to India on the condition that it be used for peaceful purposes, but did not require external inspections. Although Canada advised India that plutonium from the reactor could not be used for nuclear explosives, India claimed that the agreement did not exclude nuclear explosions “for peaceful purposes”. Following the 1974 explosion, India stuck to its story that the test was a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE). [297] Technically, Canada considers the agreement to be still in effect, although it is not clear if India does. For the last twenty years, India has denied having nuclear weapons, but it has admitted the capability of making them.

The Indian nuclear test was a crippling blow to the myth of the peaceful Canadian nuclear program. Canada had received many warnings that India was moving towards nuclear weapons production, but had done little about it. Pierre Trudeau had even visited India in 1971 to discuss the matter personally with Indira Ghandi. However, in the wake of the test, on May 22, 1974, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mitchell Sharp stated,

“The Canadian government has suspended shipments to India of nuclear equipment and material and has instructed the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, pending clarification of the situation [it took two years to “clarify”], to suspend its cooperation with India regarding nuclear reactor projects and the more general technological exchange arrangements which it has with the Indian Energy Commission.” [298]

In December of 1974, a new proliferation policy was partially revealed. It required a binding assurance that Canadian nuclear material, equipment and technology would not be used for a nuclear explosive device, and rejected the excuse of “peaceful nuclear explosions”. The policy also prohibited in the “contamination clause” the use of Canadian-supplied technology for nuclear explosive devices. Thirdly, exporters of nuclear technology and materials had to go through the Department of Industry Trade and Commerce, and the Atomic Energy Control Board. [299] These three points were actually part of an 8-point program approved by Cabinet in December 1974, but not made public until 1975. The other safeguards included:

“…a binding recognition of Canada’s right of prior consent over: transfers to third countries; reprocessing of Canadian-origin material; and enrichment of uranium beyond 20%. As well, Canada maintained the right to apply fall-back safeguards on reprocessing and enrichment should IAEA safeguards cease to be applied for any reason. Finally a binding commitment required the provision of adequate physical protection for Canadian-origin material.” [300]

For two years after the Indian nuclear test, Canada continued with negotiations in order to convince India to accept the new safeguards. However, India remained obdurate, and on May 18, 1976, Canada formally terminated nuclear co-operation. The nominal reason was that India agreed to safeguard only the two Rajasthan reactors. [301]

In December 1976, the Canadian government announced a further upgrading of its non-proliferation policy when its decided that nuclear trade would be restricted to those countries which had signed the Non Proliferation Treaty. [302] The fundamental problem of course with paper safeguards, is that agreements can simply be ignored. This was clearly seen in the original transgression of India in the use of plutonium from CIRUS despite a bilateral agreement. The ineffectiveness of safeguards was also seen more recently in the case of Iraq, which developed a nuclear weapons program despite being a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Regardless of whether India has continued to use plutonium from the CIRUS reactor for nuclear weapons, it now has other sources which it can use. In 1985, the 100 MW Dhruva reactor went critical, and it is theoretically capable of making 25 kilograms of plutonium per year. It is usually estimated that 5 to 8 kg of plutonium is the minimum required for a basic fission weapon.

A 200 MW CANDU is capable of making 50 to 60 kg of weapons grade plutonium annually. [303] Indian now has six reactors of this size operating, in addition to the two RAPS reactors that operated sporadically since 1972 and 1981. All of these reactors were built using the CANDU technology that Canada provided. India’s decision to opt for an advanced fuel cycle with a breeder reactor involves the reprocessing of fuel to extract plutonium, which provides the infrastructure and effective camouflage for military production and reprocessing.

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3.2.4. Indian Politics and the BombThe initial motivation for the Indian nuclear weapons program was the first nuclear weapons test by China in 1964. However, in the 1970s, nuclear competition shifted to Pakistan. Hostilities run deep between Pakistan and India after the post-colonial partition, three wars, and an ongoing bitter conflict over the possession of Kashmir, aggravated by the Sikh separatist movement in India.

Recent events have made the escalation of nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan a distinct possibility. In 1995, it was widely reported, after satellite surveillance reports by US intelligence, that India was preparing for another nuclear test in Rajasthan. [304] It is very likely that if India tested another nuclear weapon, Pakistan would respond in kind.

Both India and Pakistan have refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. India also blocked consensus for adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in Geneva in August 1996, meaning that it could not be forwarded to the United Nations General Assembly and approved with immediate legal force. While Pakistan voted for the Treaty at the General Assembly, all 44 nations with nuclear reactors (including India) must sign the treaty to bring it into legal force, and Pakistan has said that it will not sign unless India does. [305]

The nuclear bomb is popular in India. In the May 1996 national election, the Congress Party, dominant in India since independence, received a lower vote than ever before. The Hindu fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) received the largest share of the vote. The BJP is a longtime and consistent supporter of an open nuclear weapons program, as well as the deployment of short and intermediate-range missile delivery systems. [306] Although the BJP only exercised power briefly before being replaced by a coalition government, the political situation is very unstable. Support for the BJP is a measure of the popularity of the ‘Hindu bomb’.

Over the last 20 years, India has certainly had the opportunity to produce enough plutonium for several hundred nuclear weapons. [307] A test would allow it to try a so-called ‘boosted’ fission weapon, or even a thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb. Nuclear weaponeers in Pakistan would like to see another Indian test, in order to justify bringing their nuclear program out of the closet. It remains to be seen if the CTBT agreement will exercise any constraint on India and Pakistan.

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3.2.5. The Downgrading of Canadian Safeguards – IndiaIn October 1996, Foreign Affairs spokesperson John Bell denied a report from India that Canada would end its 22 year boycott on nuclear trade with India. [308] However, Bell was less than honest about the real situation. Canada has been backing off from its boycott since 1989.

In the 1988 Annual Report of the CANDU Owners Group (COG), Chairperson Hugh Irvine stated that “…discussions were opened with the Canadian government on the possible participation of India and Pakistan in the COG Information Exchange Program.” [309] In the following year’s Annual Report, it was noted that “India and Pakistan joined this program [the Information Exchange Program] mid-year…”. [310] There was no public consultation or parliamentary debate on the re-start of Indo-Canadian nuclear relations.

In June 1994, former AECL CANDU President Donald Lawson wrote to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to draw their attention to safety problems at the RAPS reactors. At that time he said, “The conditions are such that there is a real potential for a … pressure tube rupture to occur at any time”. [311] AECL’s motivation was certainly not altruistic, however. In 1993, S.K. Chatterjee, managing director of India’s Nuclear Power Corporation, had invited western nuclear companies to submit “pre-qualification documents” for the retubing of India’s PHWRs. [312] AECL would undoubtedly like to bid on these contracts, and has been pressuring the federal government to remove or loosen its restrictions on nuclear relations with India.

In October 1994, an Ontario Hydro Nuclear employee on secondment to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Frank King, reported that he had arranged a meeting between “nine Canadians from AECL and Ontario Hydro and nine Indian experts” in July 1994 to discuss the safety of pressure tubes in the two RAPP reactors sold to them by Canada. King stated that he would be making his second trip to India in December 1994. [313] In February 1995, it was reported that “In the interest of safety, Canada has now reinstated limited contacts with India”. [314]

In April 1995, the Canadian television station CTV reported that AECL staff visited India in March 1995 to discuss Canadian assistance on the retubing of the RAPP reactors, and have also been discussing the sale of CANDU reactors to India. [315] In fact, the Managing Director of the CANDU Owners Group (COG), Barry Collingwood, led a four-person group to India in March 1995 to meet with officials of the Nuclear Power Corporation. He stated, “We have reached informal agreement on a broad scope of possible cooperation on core assessment, in-service inspection, and safety related quality assurance associated with retubing.” [316] The nuclear industry, led by COG, has clearly been pressing the federal government to downgrade its non-proliferation policy for both India and Pakistan. In the COG 1994-95 Annual Report, Collingwood stated,

“Another impediment to the flow of information between CANDU stations is the Canadian export policy restrictions currently being placed on two of our members; India (with nine operating CANDU stations) and Pakistan (with one operating station). We will continue to encourage the Canadian Government to review their export policy with the ultimate objective of reducing the current restrictions on cooperation among CANDU stations” [317]

In May 1995, Collingwood formally asked the Canadian government to allow the restart of commercial nuclear relations with India. [318] There has been no public response on this matter from the government. Clearly, however, without any public consultation or parliamentary debate, the government has quietly been eroding its non-proliferation restrictions for India and Pakistan over a period of years. This process began in 1989 by allowing the provision of nuclear technical information through the CANDU Owners Group. Information exchange and provision of various services may be a prelude to the re-introduction of full-scale commercial relations.

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3.3. Pakistan

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3.3.1. KANUPP

In 1964 an agreement was made between Canadian General Electric and Pakistan to build a 137 MWe CANDU reactor on the coast, 30 km west of Karachi. The reactor, known as the KANUPP (Karachi Nuclear Power Project), became operational in 1971. Aid was provided in the form of concessional financing through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). [319] The total cost of KANUPP was $63 million, $51 million of which was financed by Canada, half as external aid at 3/4% interest over 40 years, with 10 years’ grace; the other half at 6% over 15 years with 5 years’ grace. [320] Aid was provided through the ECIC, the External Aid Organization (EAO) and CIDA. The Export Development Corporation (EDC) took over from the ECIC in 1969. The financing arrangements have been described as follows:

“Between 1966 and 1978 a total of $12.4 million was provided in export credits, and $29.4 million was loaned through the EAO/CIDA account. (Grants of about $1.5 million, which covered supervision, training and the financing of spare parts, were also extended by CIDA.) The EAO/CIDA loan was concessionary. Its terms included a 10-year period of grace followed by a 50-year repayment schedule with no interest charges.” [321]

Following the Indian nuclear explosion in May 1974, Canada turned its attention to Pakistan as a proliferator. It is widely accepted today that Pakistan is a ‘threshold’ nuclear weapons state, and that it was on its way to being one even in 1976. Following the December 1974 upgrade of Canadian proliferation safeguards, negotiations ensued to convince Pakistan to accept the new standards. Pakistan argued that the retroactive application of safeguards was unfair. With Korean and Argentinean export sales in the offing, Canada ended nuclear cooperation with Pakistan on January 1, 1977, shortly after its December proliferation decision that nuclear trading partners with Canada must sign the NPT.

3.3.2. The Downgrading of Canadian Safeguards – Pakistan

As noted in the discussion above on downgrading of Canadian proliferation safeguards for India, discussions took place with Pakistan in 1988 about participation in the Information Exchange Program of the CANDU Owners Group. [322] The following year, “Pakistan, along with India joined the Information Exchange, ending 12 years of isolation from the Canadian nuclear industry”. [323] There was no public consultation or parliamentary debate on this reversal of Canadian proliferation policy.

In 1989, Barry Collingwood, Manager of the CANDU Owners Group (COG) noted that “provision of fuel channel inspection services, and design reviews of critical safety components and systems” had been proposed for KANUPP. [324] The following year, Collingwood noted,

“A second major development in 1990 was the initiative taken by COG in providing assistance to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in assessing the state of the KANUPP reactor. The assistance is provided under the auspices of an IAEA Steering Committee and with the approval of the Canadian Government. This initiative is consistent with the COG mandate of promoting co-operation and mutual assistance in the safe operation of CANDU reactors and is a positive step towards re establishing technical co-operation with Pakistan.” [325]

In 1992, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) requested US $40 million from the Pakistani government to upgrade the reactor. [326] PAEC initiated negotiations with AECL, Ontario Hydro, New Brunswick Power and Babcock & Wilcox Canada for a contract on fuel channel assessment, boiler and balance of plant inspection, and a safety analysis. The CANDU Owners Croup served as a project manager for the Canadian companies. [327] A Canadian team visited KANUPP in 1989 to initiate the project. Problems identified with KANUPP included: bellows leaks, condenser tube leaks, heat exchanger tube leaks, sticking and rupture in the refuelling machine, problems with the shield plug, flow blockage in one channel, and problems with computer software and hardware. [328]

By 1993, based on the promise of Canadian aid, PAEC announced that the Pakistan government had approved a US $32 million package for the “Safe Operation of KANUPP” (SOK) project. Pakistan expects that the Canadian work will allow a ten year extension of the 30 year life expectancy of the KANUPP plant. Paul Barton of External Affairs tried to justify the project by separating “safety” work from “efficiency” work on KANUPP – i.e. arguing that safety improvements by Canadians are acceptable, from the point of view of Canada’s proliferation policy, while efficiency improvements are not. Barton noted however, that “you cannot clearly delineate between operational efficiency and safety with a nuclear reactor”. [329] Safety improvements by Canadian companies on KANUPP were taking place despite the fact that Canada has no Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Pakistan, and the fact that Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In March 1993, the Atomic Energy Control Board commented on a May 1992 IAEA report on KANUPP, and concluded that on safety grounds, continued operation of the KANUPP reactor could not be justified. [330]

Despite a plethora of other problems at KANUPP that have resulted in a lifetime load factor of only 25% [331] it was confirmed in 1994 after investigation by the Canadian team, that re-tubing of the reactor will not be necessary. It was reported in 1994 that permission was being sought to export various hardware items from Canada to Pakistan, including control computers, fuel channel bellows, spare valves, neutron power monitors and power regulation instruments. [332] AECL confirmed in 1994 that it is doing fuel channel maintenance work on the KANUPP reactor. [333] As noted above with regards to India, the Canadian nuclear industry has been pressing the federal government to lift its export restrictions for Pakistan, as well as India [334]

3.4. Taiwan

3.4.1. Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR)

In 1969, AECL sold a 40 MWt ‘research’ reactor to Taiwan. Like CIRUS it was based on the NRX. The TRR was a turnkey project with a total cost of $35 million, of which 80% or $28 million was sourced in Canada. [335] AECL clearly anticipated possible future sales to Taiwan, but relations were terminated when Canada recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1970. In 1976, US intelligence sources confirmed that Taiwan had begun operation of a small clandestine plutonium reprocessing plant in 1975, used irradiated fuel from the TRR. Only after intense political pressure was the reprocessing facility dismantled in 1977. [336]

Despite Taiwan’s attempt to make nuclear weapons, AECL complained bitterly that it was not allowed to subsequently bid on nuclear power reactors for Taiwan. Despite the lack of diplomatic relations, AECL officials met with the Taiwan Power Corp. in 1983, and were clearly lobbying the government for the right to do business in Taiwan. [337]

Taiwan apparently only shelved its program to make nuclear weapons temporarily. In 1988, it had begun work on another reprocessing plant. Upon discovery of this, the US government insisted that the TRR be shut down. The US government had earlier insisted that Taiwan ship all of the irradiated fuel from the TRR to the USA. [338] Canada had come close to helping yet another country to make a nuclear bomb.

4. Other CANDU Sales Attempts

4.1. Australia

In the late 1960s, the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) requested proposals by June 15, 1970 for a proposed 500 MW reactor. However, before a final selection was made, Australia decided that it could not afford a nuclear power program. [339]

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4.2. Chile

AECL has proposed the sale of a CANDU-6 to Chile, and has entered into discussions for cooperation with three Chilean companies, Chilquinta (an electrical utility currently acting as Ontario Hydro’s partner in a Peruvian venture); Chilgener, and the state corporation Colbun Machicura. In January 1995, an AECL agent, Ernesto Puig, met with Mr. Bobadilla, Executive Director of the Chilean commission of Nuclear Energy (CCHEN) to present the project. [340] The $1.7 billion reactor is proposed for the Antofagasta region, 1,400 km north of Santiago. [341] Jean Chrétien apparently raised the possible sale of a CANDU during his visit to Chile and meeting with Chilean President Eduardo Frei on January 24, 1995.

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4.3. Egypt

In 1989, AECL announced that along with the American corporation Overseas Bechtel Inc., it had received a contract in Egypt for a “CANDU localization program” [342] – actually a reactor fuel manufacturing program. In 1993, AECL said that the Egyptian Energy Ministry and the Nuclear Plans Authority were continuing their “ongoing review of CANDU technology to determine its suitability…”. [343] In 1994, AECL reported that sales efforts were continuing. [344]

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4.4. France

As in the case of the United Kingdom, AECL was unsuccessful in selling CANDU in France, in the face of a strong, publicly owned military and civilian French nuclear industry. Like the United Kingdom, however, in 1968 an agreement was signed with the French Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA) transferring CANDU technology to them for a rumoured $1 million. [345] Another agreement in the same year transferred radioactive waste to France for plutonium extraction. [346]

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4.5. Greece

Following the withdrawal of Canadian General Electric from the reactor export market, Greece was one of AECL’s first sales targets. However, AECL’s 1969 bid was rejected in favour of a British bid, which reportedly was supported because of related (non-nuclear) trade deals. [347]

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4.6. Hungary

In 1988, AECL signed a Memorandum of Understanding with three Hungarian companies to study the marketing and construction of Slowpoke reactors in Eastern Europe. [348] In 1989, AECL and Ontario Hydro’s New Business Ventures signed an agreement with the Hungarian state utility to study the feasibility of building a CANDU reactor in Hungary dedicated to the export of electricity to western Europe. [349] In 1991, AECL reported that

“A market feasibility review and analysis for Czechoslovakia and Hungary has been completed and presented to marketing management. The purpose of the review is to confirm preliminary assessments of the long-term opportunity for CANDU in those countries”. [350]

In 1996, Canada supported a Hungarian radioactive waste program. In May 1996, it was announced that the federal government had already given Hungary $230,000 to “assist with drilling underground tunnels and to develop the disposal research program”. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was providing another $500,000 to complete the project. Monies for the funding were committed in the 1996 federal budget. [351] David Iftody, MP Provencher stated, “Hungary needs Canada’s know-how as well as capital to expand its nuclear power generation capacity and at the same time safely dispose of spent fuel”. [352]

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4.7. Italy

In 1970 a contract was signed with the Comitato Nazionale per l’Energia Nucleare (CNEN) (an R&D body) and the Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica (ENEL, the national electric agency) for transfer of CANDU-BLW (Boiling Light Water reactor) technology. AECL never revealed how much it was paid for the reactor design, but it has been speculated that it was a complete or virtual gift, designed to prepare the way for a reactor bid. [353] Despite this incentive, and its connection with the Italian company Italimpianti (its partner in the Cordoba deal in Argentina), AECL failed to win an ENEL contract for four reactors in the early 1970s. The contract went to an Italian licensee of an American LWR.

AECL next decided to promote a licensing strategy itself, with a December 1976 agreement with Progettazione Meccaniche Nucleari (PMN). In a controversial move, for an undisclosed fee, the agreement gave AECL a consulting role for design of the nuclear system and the supply of heavy water, while PMN would design and contract for the balance of the plant. The agreement stipulated certain levels of Canadian content, but also gave PMN the right to export CANDU itself under certain conditions. [354] Despite AECL’s willingness to give away CANDU technology, the strategy could not overcome the American competition and the effect of a weak Italian economy.

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4.8. Japan

In September 1971, AECL completed a five year agreement with Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) of Japan, again for technology transfer. The Japanese were interested in the CANDU-BLW (Boiling Light Water reactor), although the abject failure of Gentilly-1 BLW undoubtedly reduced their interest. [355]

In 1976, AECL signed a $1.7 million contract with the government owned Japanese company, Electric Power Development Company (EPDC), for a study on the introduction of the CANDU to Japan by 1981. AECL proposed the construction of four CANDU reactors as an “intermediate step” between their existing light water reactors, and the fast breeder reactor that Japan was planning even at that time. In June 1979, Prime Minister Joe Clark met with Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, and later with his trade minister to promote a CANDU sale. [356] In order to sweeten the deal, Clark offered a 30-year guaranteed supply of uranium. [357] As part of the negotiation, the Japanese were also pressing for favourable terms in access to Alberta tar sands. [358] However, after an initial announcement in August, the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission turned down the AECL proposal for four CANDUs in October 1979 [359], supporting instead the construction of their own Advance Thermal Reactor (ATR) – also a heavy-water moderated reactor. [360]

In 1983, AECL maintained a full-time representative in Tokyo, [361] but the chances of a CANDU sale were negligible. The Japanese utilities are closely associated with the three Japanese nuclear suppliers whose reactor systems are each licensed by either General Electric or Westinghouse. [362]

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4.9. Mexico

In 1969, Mexico requested bids on a reactor to be located at Laguna Verde in the state of Veracruz. AECL lost out in the bidding to General Electric, but this was probably a blessing in disguise. When construction began in 1973, it was estimated that GE’s Laguna Verde reactor would be completed in three years at a cost of $263 million [363] – when it finally began operation in 1988, it had escalated to a final cost of about $3.5 billion. [364]

This disastrous experience did not stop Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Energia Nuclear (INEN) from issuing a call for bids in October 1980 for a second station at Laguna Verde with a capacity of 2,300 MW. The contract was worth more than $2 billion. [365] It was to be part of a massive nuclear expansion program of 20,000 MWe by 2000, estimated to cost $32 billion (US). The same companies that had bid on Laguna Verde, also put in bids by February 1982.

Cheap financing and technology transfer, were as usual the key bargaining chips in the competition, but Canada’s marketing effort, dubbed “CANDU Diplomacy” was truly stupendous. It included a free $2 million study performed by AECL looking at Canadian importation of Mexican oil. [366] As a official “bribe”, in 1980 the Canadian-Mexican Agreement on Industrial and Energy Cooperation was signed under which Ottawa said it would buy Mexican crude oil if Mexico considered buying a CANDU. In 1983, a million dollars worth of Mexican crude oil was coming into Montréal every day, despite the fact that Mexico had killed the whole nuclear deal in 1982. [367]

Mexico pressured Canada to supply generous concessionary financing for 100% of the cost of the package, estimated at as much as $6 billion for 4 CANDU-6 reactors. The Canadian government was apparently willing to borrow billions of dollars at commercial rates (then about 16%) to finance the project for Mexico at 7% or 8% – in effect providing a subsidy for as much as 40% to 60% of the station. [368] It was also suggested that Mexico was pressuring for a “guaranteed cost agreement” putting the risk of cost overruns onto AECL. [369]

In January 1982, two weeks before the bid deadline, Pierre Trudeau visited Mexico for the third time in a year, along with MP Roy MacLaren. MacLaren was parliamentary assistant to Energy Minister Marc Lalonde, and was known at that time as Canada’s “unofficial CANDU salesman”. [370] A number of government agencies had also been involved in the bidding process, including the Export Development Corporation, the Atomic Energy Control Board, Ontario Hydro and various private corporations. AECL even established an office in Mexico City, and one source reported that $50 million (CDN) had been spent on the Canadian bid. [371] However, under the weight of falling oil prices, and its $70 billion debt, the Mexican peso had collapsed in February, 1982. Mexico announced the cancellation of its grandiose nuclear expansion plans in June 1982. [372]

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4.10. The Netherlands

In 1987, AECL noted that discussions were continuing with Netherlands, providing information for a technical evaluation of nuclear power. [373] At this time there was already an AECL office in The Hague. In 1989, Dutch media reported that as part of its CANDU campaign, AECL’s Marketing Director Bill Wemmers had suggested that Canada would take back the high level radioactive waste from CANDU reactors sold to the Netherlands. [374] In 1992, AECL reported that the Dutch technical assessment was continuing; that a team of Dutch scientists were visiting Canada in June 1992; and that France, Germany and Canada were “finalists” in the selection of a reactor system by the Dutch utility SEP. [375] In 1994, AECL reported that sales efforts were continuing. [376]

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4.11. The Philippines

In June 1981 Canada signed a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the dictatorial Marcos regime, opening the way for the sale of reactors, nuclear fuel and other technology. However, the following year, a Canadian embassy official said “Our chances of selling a reactor here are as slim as anywhere in the world. The Philippines won’t go that route again. With the interest rates they are paying on their only nuclear plant, they could almost buy a thermal plant”. [377] This did not stop Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau from promoting the sale of CANDU reactors in Manila in January 1983. [378] AECL continues to promote the sale of CANDUs to the Philippines. [379]

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4.12. Russia

In 1992, AECL reported that in conjunction with the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, it was “assessing the possibility of locating a CANDU-6 power reactor in the St. Petersburg region”. [380] Also in 1992, Canada signed a three-year nuclear safety initiative with Russia, sending Canadian nuclear personnel to Russia, and bringing Russians to Canada. [381] In May 1992, Minister of Energy, Mines & Resources Jake Epp went to Russia and Ukraine, visiting Chernobyl and the Sosnovy Bor nuclear station near St. Petersburg. While calling Chernobyl one of the world’s “greatest human tragedies”, he promoted the sale of CANDUs. [382] In June 1992, Brian Mulroney and Boris Yeltsin signed an accord that sent $30 million in Canadian aid to Russia. [383] The program, headed by the Roger Lucy of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is known as the Canadian Nuclear Safety Initiative (CNSI). At the end of 1995, about 75% of the $30 million had been spent on work including a $12 million study to improve safety at RBMK reactors. [384] Most prudent nuclear analysts have simply supported shutdown of the dangerous nuclear plants. AECL is using this aid as the first step in a marketing campaign aimed at future CANDU sales in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. [385]

In October 1995, AECL met with officials of the Ministry of Atomic Energy for the Russian Federation (MINATOM) to discuss the possibility of building two CANDU-6 reactors near Vladivostok. Given the fact that the Russian nuclear industry is itself looking for business [386], it is highly unlikely that any sale could be made in the absence of extravagant financial support from the Canadian government. Nevertheless, AECL is apparently doing a feasibility study on “the energy problems of the region”. [387]

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4.13. Thailand

AECL has reported that it is trying to sell the CANDU in Thailand. [388] In December 1995, Thailand’s Office of Atomic Energy for Peace (OAEP) invited bids to supply a research reactor; an isotope production facility; and a waste processing and storage facility. Vendors bidding include AECL, as well as Chinese, American, Argentinean, German, and French companies. [389] The AECL bid is for the MAPLE reactor, which has not even been built in Canada, although the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has built one.

The Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board has trained members of the Nuclear Facility Regulatory Centre of Thailand for “several years”. [390] In the Fall of 1995, the Thai Deputy Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej visited Canada and toured AECL’s Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories. AECL also cosponsors a Human Resources Development Linkage Program in Thailand with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). [391] Canada is sending a trade mission to Thailand in early 1997, in which AECL will undoubtedly participate. [392]

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4.14. United Kingdom

In 1963, a UK-Canada Nuclear Power Agreement was concluded, but instead of selling a CANDU, AECL sold the CANDU design to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority for $750,000. [393] In the mid-1970s, AECL again tried to interest the United Kingdom in CANDU, when the British nuclear industry was trying to determine which type of reactor system to support. However, the effort failed. [394]

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4.15. United States

While Canadian producers of plutonium (for the American weapons program) and uranium (for both military and civilian use) have been successful in penetrating the American market, the CANDU has been a non-starter. The American reactor market has been dominated by indigenous private-sector companies – mainly General Electric and Westinghouse. However, AECL established an American subsidiary (AECL Technologies- AECLT) in Rockland, Maryland, which headed up what it calls the “U.S. CANDU Initiative”, mainly aimed at marketing engineering services to American nuclear utilities.

In 1993, AECL began the process of application to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission for Standard Design Certification of the CANDU-3 reactor system. [395] However, this attempt to break into the US market also seems doomed to failure. In March 1995, AECL called an “indefinite” halt to its attempt to license the CANDU-3 in the US. AECLT has estimated that the certification review could cost US $50 million. [396] The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission performs a much more detailed comprehensive review of reactor design than Canada’s Atomic Energy Control Board, and requires the reactor designer to pay for the review. The CANDU-3 is a 450 MW reactor which AECL began designing in 1987. As a relatively small reactor, it is billed as suitable for developing countries, or to reduce the risk of overbuilding capacity. However, faced with the failure of its proposals to build a CANDU-3 in Canada, [397] it seems unlikely that AECL will be successful in selling the reactor in the US or in the developing world.

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4.16. Yugoslavia

In June 1986, AECL submitted a proposal to Yugoslavia for a CANDU nuclear program, and an office was maintained for some years in Zagreb. [398] Yugoslavia’s international call for tenders attracted 10 bids including AECL’s. The tender was for four plants to be built by the year 2000 at an estimated cost of $10 billion (US). [399] Yugoslavia had one nuclear plant at the time in northwestern Krsko, built by Westinghouse in 1981. The nuclear expansion program eventually collapsed.

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5. Payment of Bribes & ‘Agent Fees’ by AECL

While ‘Agent Fees’ undoubtedly include fees for legitimate public relations and promotional activities, monies allocated as ‘agent fees’ by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) have also been used in the past for bribery. The payment of bribes by AECL to secure CANDU sales has been well documented in the cases of Argentina and South Korea. The details of these cases have been provided in sections 2 and 3 above.

In the case of Argentina, almost $4 million was reported to have been spent on bribes in the 1973 to 1975 period. This was prior to the time when AECL was required to report ‘agent fees’, so these monies are not reflected in Table 2. In the case of South Korea, over $18 million was paid to an agent, who in turn bribed Korean officials to secure the initial CANDU sale to South Korea. The bulk of this bribe is reflected in the ‘agent fee’ in Table 2, for the year 1976-77. Despite the scandal around this incident, AECL’s bribery of South Korean officials almost certainly continued at least until 1991.

Following a report by Canada’s Auditor General in 1976 on AECL financial irregularities [400], the federal government authorized a review of AECL by the House of Commons Committee on Public Accounts (1976 77). The Committee found AECL witnesses to be uncooperative – in particular AECL President Lorne Gray. Subsequently, the government launched an inquiry by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (1977-78) on AECL use of bribery. The reviews did little to restrict AECL in its marketing practices. However, beginning in 1977, AECL was required to report ‘agent fees’ in its Annual Reports. The Annual Reports name the companies of the agents, but only provide a total for the monies paid out, i.e. the amounts paid to each individual agent is not provided.

From 1977 to 1994, AECL paid almost $60 million – an average of about $3 million per year (see Table 2).

Table 2 : “Agents’ Fees” Paid by AECL 1977-1996

Year Agents’ Fees   ($ of the year) Year Agents’ Fees   ($ of the year)

1976-77 $17,400,000.00   [$17.4 million] 1986-87 $2,000,000.00   [$2.0 million]

1977-78 $2,200,000.00   [$2.2 million] 1987-88 $2,400,000.00   [$2.4 million]

1978-79 $1,600,000.00   [$1.6 million] 1988-89 $2,500,000.00   [$2.5 million]

1979-80 $800,000.00   [$0.8 million] 1989-90 $1,000,000.00   [$1.0 million]

1980-81 $600,000.00   [$0.6 million] 1990-91 $3,100,000.00   [$3.1 million]

1981-82 $800,000.00   [$0.8 million] 1991-92 $900,000.00   [$0.9 million]

1982-83 $3,400,000.00   [$3.4 million] 1992-93 $1,700,000.00   [$1.7 million]

1983-84 $1,900,000.00   [$1.9 million] 1993-94 $3,800,000.00   [$3.8 million]

1984-85 $1,600,000.00   [$1.6 million] 1994-95 $7,300,000.00   [$7.3 million]

1985-86 $2,300,000.00   [$2.3 million] 1995-96 $2,000,000.00   [$2.0 million]

Total ‘Agent Fees’ Paid by AECL 1977-1996 $59,300,000.00   [$59.3 million]

Annual Average ‘Agent Fees’ 1977-1994 $2,970,000.00   [$2.97 million]

Source: AECL Annual Reports 1976-77 to 1995-96

6. Conclusion

Since construction was completed on Ontario Hydro’s $14 billion Darlington Nuclear Generating Station in 1993, no utility in Canada has agreed to further nuclear construction.

Internationally, nuclear power is experiencing a brown-out. For the first time since commercial nuclear programs began in the 1950s, the tide is clearly turning against nuclear power. As of January 1996, only 34 nuclear plants worldwide were under construction – the smallest number in 25 years. A total of 84 reactors had been shut down, and 434 reactors were operating. [401] Nuclear power’s share of world electricity supply probably peaked in 1994-95 at about 17%, and is expected to decline to 13% by 2015. [402]

Countries which are targeted by AECL marketing efforts typically have dictatorial regimes, or have only recently democratized. The same countries tend to have serious problems with human rights and corruption. Public consultation on energy futures in CANDU client countries is virtually non-existent. Small elite groups are responsible for promoting nuclear power programs despite their high cost, environmental and safety risks, and technological complexity.

The potential for reactor sales to contribute to nuclear weapons capability cannot be avoided.

This author of this report recommends:

Canada should terminate its subsidization of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL). If reactor exports are as promising as AECL claims, then the industry should be able to support itself.

Because AECL is a crown corporation, supported by public funds, the Canadian government should require full public disclosure of the financial structure and terms of CANDU export agreements.

Canada should end governmental financial backing for nuclear exports. Financing by the Export Development Corporation (EDC) should be limited to its ‘Corporate Account’, and aid from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for exports of nuclear technology should be prohibited.

Canada should strengthen rather than weaken its non-proliferation policy. No nuclear cooperation should be permitted with known or suspected proliferators.

The Canadian government should require detailed public disclosure of the amounts and the purposes of fees paid to each foreign agent of AECL. Marketing costs should also be itemized and reported by AECL.

Canada should abandon its policy of ‘constructive engagement’ on human rights, and be prepared to impose trade sanctions in response to serious and sustained human rights violations.

[ . . . MORE . . . (Footnotes) ]

Appendix A

Table 3 : Canada’s Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

Country Signed In Force

1. Argentina ^a June 1994 July 1996

2. Australia October 1959 March 1981

3. Brazil May 1996 NIF

4. China November 1994 November 1994

5. Columbia 1986 June 1988

6. Czech Republic February 1995 February 1995

7. Egypt May 1982 November 1982

8. EURATOM ^b November 1959 see note

9. Hungary November 1987 January 1988

10. Indonesia July 1982 July 1983

11. Japan ^c July 1960 July 1960

12. Lithuania November 1994 May 1995

13. Mexico November 1994 March 1995

14. Philippines June 1981 April 1983

15. Republic of Korea ^d January 1976 January 1976

16. Romania October 1977 June 1978

17. Russia November 1989 November 1989

18. Slovak Republic 1996 ?

19. Slovenia May 1995 April 1996

20. Switzerland December 1987 June 1989

21. Turkey June 1985 July 1986

22. Ukraine December 1995 NIF

23. United States of America ^e June 1955 see note

NCA = Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
NIF = Not in Force (as of October 1996)

^a The NCA with Argentina updates the earlier 1976 agreement.

^b The NCA with EURATOM includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden & the United Kingdom.

Austria, Finland & Sweden joined EURATOM on January 1, 1995.

The EURATOM NCA was amended in 1978, 1981, 1985, 1991, and 1995.

^c The NCA with Japan was amended in 1980 and 1983. notes cont’d

^d The NCA with Korea was amended in June 1989.

^e The NCA with the USA was amended on June 1956, May 1959, July 1960, July 1962, and July 1980.

In addition, Canada has a Third Party Arrangement in place with Taiwan, effective March 1993:“A special agreement between Canada and the United States, whereby Canadian uranium can be exported for use in nuclear reactors in Taiwan. Such uranium must be transferred from Canada to the United States for enrichment and fabrication into nuclear fuel elements in the United States prior to retransfer to Taiwan.”

Source: Communication with Ross Glasgow, Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, October 29, 1996

FOOTNOTES

written by David Martin
of Nuclear Awareness Project
for the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout

November 1996

For a copy of the complete report ($10 + shipping) write
Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout
1 Nicholas Street Suite 412
Ottawa Ontario
K1N 7B7 Canada

. . . back to [ Table of Contents ]

FOOTNOTES

A federal crown corporation that designs and markets the CANDU reactor as well as other nuclear technology and services.

Safe Energy Communication Council, International Nuclear Power, Myth Busters # 10, Spring 1996.

1995 average load factors were as follows:

PWR = 75.2%;

BWR = 76.6%;

PWHR (CANDU) = 61.4%;

Magnox = 65.6%; and

AGR = 69.5%.

See: Laurie Howles, “Load Factors: 1995 annual review”, Nuclear Engineering International, May 1996, p. 30.

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

“Canada’s Reactor Exports”, Nuclear Policy Review Background Papers, Energy, Mines & Resources Canada, Report No. ER81-2E, 1981, p. 264.

This is in dollars of the year. See: AECL Annual Reports 1992-93 to 1995-96, and Natural Resources Canada 1996-97 Estimates, Part III.

“Canada’s Reactor Exports”, Ibid., p. 265.

Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Annual Report 1986-87, p. 6.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Annual Report 1988-89, p. 12.

AECL CANDU advertisement, Nuclear Engineering International, May 1994.

Barrie McKenna, “Canadian Firms see $2.7 billion in Candu deals”, Globe & Mail, November 9, 1994, p. B1.

“China still interested in CANDU, AECL says”, Globe & Mail, October 18, 1980.

Thomas Claridge, “Chinese plans for nuclear could aid ailing Canadian industry”, Globe & Mail, April 7, 1980.

Bryan Johnson, “Hope for CANDU sale dashed by Chinese”, Globe & Mail, February 24, 1981.

AECL Communiqué, AECL Closer to China Reactor Sale, October 13, 1996.

Ray Silver, “Morden upbeat about CANDU sales despite ‘onerous’ Chinese terms”, Nucleonics Week, February 15, 1996, p. 8.

Ray Silver, “Demand for price cuts may kill AECL bid to sell CANDUs to China”, Nucleonics Week, March 14, 1996, p. 4.

Ibid.

Ray Silver, “China-Canada CANDU deal wobbles with parties $1.8 billion apart”, Nucleonics Week, April 25, 1996, p. 3.

Canadian Press, “McLellan presses China on CANDU deal”, Globe & Mail, May 22, 1996, p. B9.

Ray Silver, “Canada, China move closer to deal for two CANDU reactors at Qinshan”, Nucleonics Week, July 18, 1996, p. 4.

AECL Information, Break-through in Sino-Canadian Cooperation in the construction of NPP in Qinshan, July 13, 1996.

“Canadian Breakthrough at Qinshan”, Nuclear Engineering International, September 1996, p. 3.

Ray Silver, “As financing deadline looms, AECL and CNNC renew CANDU talks”, Nucleonics Week, July 11, 1996. p. 4.

Ray Silver, “AECL Executive Rejects Claim that Canada subsidizes China Sale”, Nucleonics Week, August 22, 1996, p. 3.

“Canadian Breakthrough at Qinshan”, Nuclear Engineering International, September 1996, p. 3.

Barrie McKenna, “Canadian firms see $2.7 billion in Candu deals”, Globe & Mail, November 9, 1995, p. B1.

Michael Urlocker, “China’s deal for CANDUs won’t cure AECL’s ills”, Financial Post, November 11, 1994, p. 6.

Martin & Argue, Nuclear Sunset: The Economic Costs of the Canadian Nuclear Industry, CNP, 1996.

Anthony Wilson-Smith, “The China Deal: Chrétien’s Team Canada wins big contracts for Canada”, Maclean’s, November 21, 1994, p. 14.

Hon. Anne McLellan, Minister of Natural Resources, letter to Mr. Rich Krechowicz, May 4, 1995.

Ray Silver, “AECL executive rejects claim that Canada subsidizes China sale”, Nucleonics Week, August 22, 1996, p. 3.

Ibid.

Ann MacLachlan, “South Korea’s Qinshan-II financing forces other countries to follow”, Nucleonics Week, October 17, 1996, pp. 15-16.

Ibid.

Personal communication from Rhea Cohen, AECL, October 8, 1996.

“Canada’s Reactor Exports”, Nuclear Policy Review Background Papers, Energy, Mines & Resources Canada, Report No. ER81-2E, 1981, p. 271.

Romania has nominally ordered 5 reactors, however, only one reactor has proceeded with financing from Canada. A second reactor at Cernavoda is about 40% complete, but is not proceeding pending negotiation of a financing agreement with Canada.

Bruce Rolston, “Chinese steal our nuclear Secrets… and here they are again”, NOW Magazine, October 12-18, 1995, p. 20.

Ibid.

International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Research Reactors in the World, Reference Data Series No. 3, December 1995, pp. 28 & 29.

OECD Consensus Document, “Appendix: Prior Consultations on Terms of Export Credits for Nuclear Power Plants”, p. 41.

This Week in Trade and Foreign Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, May 27 – June 2, 1996, p. 2.

Ray Silver, “Demand for price cuts may kill AECL bid to sell CANDUs to China”, Nucleonics Week, March 14, 1996, p. 4.

“Daya Bay control rod ills pose hurdle for Chooz-B1 fuel load”, Nucleonics Week, June 1, 1995, p. 1.

“Lin Ao contracts signed”, Nuclear Engineering International, December 1995, p. 12.

The two 700 MW CANDU reactors will be ‘Qinshan Phase III’ if that deal completed.

“China’s Fourth N-Plant Unit: Construction to Start in June”, Nucnet, April 24, 1996.

“Datafile: China”, Nuclear Engineering International, October 1993, p. 22.

“Known nuclear tests worldwide, 1945-1993”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1994, pp. 62-63.

Tom Zamora Collina, “China bucks ban with bang”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1993, p. 3.

Jeff Sallot, “To keep nuclear materials in check”, Globe & Mail, September 9, 1994, p. A21.

“Notes for an Address by the Honourable Roy MacLaren, Minister for International Trade, To the Annual General Meeting of the Canada-China Business Council, Beijing, China”, This Week in Trade and Foreign Policy, November 8, 1994.

Paul Knox, “Chinese nuclear test draws fire”, Globe & Mail, May 16, 1995, p. A14.

“Canada Deplores Chinese Nuclear Weapons Test Explosion”, This Week in Trade and Foreign Policy, May 15, 1995.

Reuters, AP & CP, “China blast sparks anger”, Globe & Mail, August 18, 1995, p. A7.

Andrew Higgins, “China to continue nuclear-arms tests”, Ottawa Citizen, January 31, 1996, p. A12.

Reuters, “China’s nuclear test decried”, Toronto Star, June 9, 1996, p. A13.

“Canada deplores Chinese nuclear test”, The Week in Trade and Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs and international Trade, July 29 – August 5, 1996.

The NPT is premised upon the intrinsically flawed concept of providing “civilian” nuclear technology to non-nuclear weapons states in order to encourage them to forego nuclear weapons. The other part of the NPT bargain is that the declared nuclear weapons states will voluntarily disarm. Progress has been slow and dubious at best, since the five nuclear powers still support deterrence as a strategic concept, and the US and Russia apparently do not intend to reduce their arsenals below 3,000 to 3,500 weapons each. Difficulties in achieving the CTBT have been added evidence of failure on the part of the weapons states.

William Epstein, “Give more to get more”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1994, p. 15.

AP, “Chinese blast comes on eve of urgent talks to end nuclear tests”, Ottawa Citizen, July 30, 1996, p. A6.

Ibid.

Dingli Shen, “Toward a nuclear-weapons-free world: a Chinese perspective”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1994, p. 51.

“Known nuclear tests worldwide, 1945-95”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1996, p. 63.

“Turbine for Chashma completed”, Nuclear Engineering International, August 1996, p. 7.

Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, “Officials say Pakistan developing nuclear manufacturing capability”, Nucleonics Week, June 1, 1995, p. 15.

“Chasma Plant Opposed”, Nuclear Engineering International, November 1995, p. 12.

Rauf Siddiqi, “Pakistan reduces PAEC budget 9% but maintains Chashma Funding”, Nucleonics Week, June 20, 1996, p. 14.

“China challenges US data pointing to Pakistan aid”, Nucleonics Week, February 22, 1996.

Oxford Analytica, “China: Nuclear Expansion”, Globe & Mail, November 28, 1994, p. B6

“China said aiding Kahuta project; US Credits, NPT Status on line”, Nucleonics Week, February 8, 1996. p. 1.

“Nuclear firms push administration, Congress to allow sales to China”, Nucleonics Week, June 13, 1996, p. 7.

R. Jeffrey Smith, “China aids Pakistan’s nuclear build-up”, The Washington Post, The Guardian Weekly, September 1, 1996, p. 16.

Robert Sheppard, “CANDUs for China? Hold on There”, Globe & Mail, November 7, 1994, p. A13.

“Spate of discord sours quick romance with China”, Globe & Mail, December 3, 1994, p. B6.

Peter Cook, “Lessons in the China trade”, Globe & Mail, November 4, 1994. Also: “Spate of discord sours quick romance with China”, Globe & Mail, December 3, 1994, p. B6.

“Spate of discord sours quick romance with China”, Globe & Mail, December 3, 1994, p. B6.

See for example comments of Ontario Hydro International executives in Ontario Energy Board, EBRLG 36 – OHII, Technical Conference, October 19, 1994, p. 137.Hopewell Holdings is a Hong Kong construction and engineering company. In 1993, a new company called Consolidated Electric Power of Asia (CEPA) was formed, 75% owned by Hopewell. CEPA acts as holding company for three power plants in China, built by Hopewell (including an 800 MW coal plant in Guangdong). The assets of Hopewell plus global equity financing of US$800 million make CEPA one of largest private power generation companies in Asia.Source: Ontario Energy Board, EBRLG 36 – OHII, Interrogatory Response 7.15.14, November 16, 1994.

“Spate of discord sours quick romance with China”, Globe & Mail, December 3, 1994, p. B6.

Greg Ip, “China yet to prove profitable”, Globe & Mail, May 3, 1996, p. B5.

Rod Mickleburgh, “US, China avert trade war”, Globe & Mail, February 27, 1995, p. B1.

Steven Mufson, “China, US make up — and fall out again”, Toronto Star, March 12, 1995, p. A4.

Rod Mickleburgh, “US set to impose tariffs on China”, Globe & Mail, May 15, 1996, pp. A1 & A2.

Rod Mickleburgh, “US, China avoid costly trade war”, Globe & Mail, June 18, 1996, p. B11.

Paul Watson, “Good fortune for China uncertain in Year of Pig”, Toronto Star, January 31, 1995, p. A1.

Rod Mickleburgh, “Graft must end, Chinese are told”, Globe & Mail, March 1, 1996, pp. A1 & A10.

Ibid.

Guide for Canadian Business in China, cited in: Tom Korski, “Canadian businesses warned on increasing corruption in China”, Toronto Star, December 27, 1996, p. B2.

Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report: 1996, AI, London, 1996, pp. 117-118.

Carol Goar, “Chinese ignore proposal on rights”, Toronto Star, November 8, 1994, p. A1.

Rod Mickleburgh, “Hated Chinese Leader due in Halifax tonight”, Globe & Mail, October 12, 1995, pp. A1 & A8.

Rod Mickleburgh, “Chinese hand dissidents long terms”, Globe & Mail, December 17, 1994, p. A14.

Amnesty International, China: Human Rights Violations Five Years After Tiananmen, ASA 17/20/94, June 1994, p. 3.

Notes for an Address by the Honourable Raymond Chan, Canadian Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific), to the Society of Democratic Movement, Vancouver, BC, May 28, 1995.This Week in Trade and Foreign Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, June 1-7, 1995, p. 2.

Paul Watson, “Repression surging in China, critics say”, Toronto Star, June 3, 1995, p. A17.

“Visit to Canada by Chinese Premier Li Peng”, This Week in Trade and Foreign Policy, September 28 – October 4, 1995, p. 2.

Kim Bolan, “Boycott ‘butcher of Beijing’ premiers told”, Vancouver Sun, October 12, 1995, p. B5.

Shawn McCarthy, “Chinese premier’s visit boosts deal on reactors”, Toronto Star, October 14, 1995, p. A8.

Edward Greenspon, “Li wanted protests stopped”, Globe & Mail, October 16, 1995, pp. A1 & A7.

“China charges dissident with bid to stage coup”, AP, Toronto Star, November 22, 1996, p. A22.

Rod Mickleburgh, “China sentences activist to 14 years”, Globe & Mail, December 14, 1995, pp. A1 & A18.

Rod Mickleburgh, “China assails West’s criticism of activist’s prison term”, Globe & Mail, December 13, 1995, p. A17.

Bob Cox, “Chrétien boosts trade with Indonesia”, CP, Chronicle Herald (Halifax), January 18, 1996.

“Manning tiptoes on rights issue”, CP, Toronto Star, July 7, 1996, p. A6.

Ed Broadbent, “Chrétien should talk to Li Peng about human rights”, Montréal Gazette, October 13, 1996, p. B3.

Rod Mickleburgh, “China discusses rights: Talks with Canada low key”, Globe & Mail, January 16, 1996, pp. A1 & A10.

Doug Saunders, “Rights groups call off planned protest against Chinese Official”, Globe & Mail, April 13, 1996, p. A8.

“China quashes UN rights draft”, Globe & Mail, April 24, 1996, p. A12.

Rod Mickleburgh, “Hong Kong remembers massacre”, Globe & Mail, June 5, 1996, p. A1 & A10.

“China executes 1,000 people in two months”, Reuters, Toronto Star, July 4, 1996, p. A15.

John Murray Brown, “Despite fossil fuel riches Indonesia taking a step toward nuclear threshold”, Globe & Mail, April 28, 1987, p. B22.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Annual Report 1987-88, p. 9.

Associated Press, “AECL eyes Indonesian nuclear job”, Financial Post, October 11, 1991, p. 5.

AECL 1991-1992 Annual Review, p. 17.

AECL 1992-1993 Annual Review, p. 13.

Carol Goar, “Chrétien makes pitch to sell Candu to Indonesia: Canada’s also offering training”, Toronto Star, November 15, 1994, p. B2.

Robert Fife, “Team Canada deals could pass $9B”, Ottawa Sun, January 18, 1996.

Bob Cox, “Chrétien boosts trade with Indonesia”, Canadian Press, The Chronicle Herald (Halifax), January 18, 1996.

George Aditjondro, Nuclear Power Plant Building: For the Sake of Civilization, International Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID), April 1996, p. 3.

John Murray Brown, Ibid.

David Crane, “We mustn’t miss on Asian megaprojects”, Toronto Star, July 4, 1996. p. B2.

Djali Ahimsa, “Why? When? How? Nuclear power in Indonesia”, Nuclear Engineering International, April 1995, p. 20.

Aditjondro, Ibid., & Michael Richardson, “Indonesian officials taking long look at nuclear power, International Herald Tribune, Globe & Mail, February 3, 1996, p. A14.

Aditjondro, Ibid., pp. 22-23.

Aditjondro, Ibid., pp. 15-19.

John Stackhouse, “Indonesian riot police, troops storm opposition headquarters”, Globe & Mail, July 27, 1996, pp. A1 & A11.

Ghafur Fadyl, “Indonesian dissident leader carries powerful name”, Associated Press, Globe & Mail, June 22, 1996, p. A15.

Aditjondro, Ibid., p. 8.

Aditjondro, Ibid., p. 10.

Aditjondro, Ibid., p. 11.

Douglas Goold, “Bre-X hits snag in Indonesia”, Globe & Mail, October 4, 1996, pp. B1 & B4.See also: Allan Robinson, “Bre-X faces more claims over gold mine”, Globe & Mail, October 16, 1996, pp. B1 & B8.

“Bre-X forges new alliance”, Toronto Star, October 29, 1996, pp. E1 & E8.

Canada-Asia Working Group, Human Rights in Asia: Submission Prepared for the 52nd Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 18 March – 26 April 1996, March 1996, pp. 36-37.

Canada-Asia Working Group, Ibid., pp. 32-34.

Canada-Asia Working Group, Ibid., pp. 34-35.

Canada-Asia Working Group, Ibid., pp. 35-36.

Canada-Asia Working Group, Ibid., p. 27.

Canada-Asia Working Group, Ibid., p. 30.

John Stackhouse, “Indonesia moves to cleanse nation of ‘Communists'”, Globe & Mail, August 1, 1996, p. !10.

Raju Gopalakrishnan, “Indonesian activists may get death penalty”, Reuters, Globe & Mail, August 14, 1996, p. A8.

Shawn McCarthy, “Action urged against ‘corrupt’ Indonesia”, Toronto Star, August 2, 1996, p. A8.

John Stackhouse, “East Timor Defenders awarded peace prize”, Globe & Mail, October 12, 1996, pp. A1 & A16.

Finch, Ibid., pp. 141-142.

Export Development Corporation, News Release, NR 79-21, April 30, 1979.

Finch, Ibid., p. 143.

Since this time, AECL, the Canadian Government and other nuclear industry sources have claimed that five CANDUs have been under construction in Romania. The outer shells of five reactors were constructed in a propaganda move by Ceausescu, however, there has only ever been firm agreement with Canada to construct one reactor.

“Turning back the clock in Romania”, Utne Reader, July/August 1988, pp. 28-29.

Ian Austen, “CANDU deal for food, goods, hurt Romanians, critics charge”, Ottawa Citizen, January 5, 1990.

Ibid.

Dave Todd, “Conscripts built CANDU reactor: Government never protested to Romanians”, Ottawa Citizen, December 30, 1989.See also: Dave Todd, “Forced Labor used in Romanian CANDU”, December 30, 1989, p. A1.See also: Paul Watson, “Life Harsh for 14,000 CANDU workers”, Toronto Star, January 3, 1990, pp. A1 & A17.

William Walker, “CANDU overseer dismisses reports of forced labor”, Toronto Star, January 3, 1990, p. A17.

Charlotte Montgomery, “Knew Romanian work conditions were harsh, CANDU official says”, Globe & Mail, May 25, 1990, pp. A1 & A2.

Paul Koring, “Opposition MPs seek inquiry over conditions at CANDU site”, Globe & Mail, May 23, 1996, p. A5.

Paul Koring, “Grim labor conditions continue at CANDU reactor site”, Globe & Mail, May 15, 1996, p. A4.

“Datafile: Romania”, Nuclear Engineering International, August 1993, p. 53.NEI reported that between them, the Canadian EDC and the Italian MCC financed the project in the amount of US $419 million. Funding from Romania was claimed, but not specified.

Ray Silver, “With funding found, RENEL readies for criticality of Cernavoda-1”, Nucleonics Week, February 1, 1996, p. 5.

Jennifer Wells, “Going Critical: Canada’s Nuclear Misadventure in Romania”, The Globe & Mail Report on Business Magazine, June 1995, p. 38.

Jennifer Wells, Ibid., pp. 50-51.

“Datafile: Romania”, Nuclear Engineering International, August 1993, p. 51.

AECL reports of electricity shortages may be simply exaggerated, or may reflect fossil fuel shortages due to RENEL’s inability to pay. Additional nuclear capacity will only aggravate the financial crunch for RENEL, and may in fact worsen the electricity supply situation.

Jennifer Wells, Ibid., pp. 50-51.

Jennifer Wells, Ibid.

“Datafile: Romania”, Nuclear Engineering International, August 1993, p. 52.

CP, “Canadian Nuke Plant safe, Romanians say”, Halifax Daily News, April 18, 1996.

See for example: Geoffrey York, “CANDU reactor gives Romania Western fission”, Globe & Mail, April 18, 1996, p. A14.

Mark Hibbs, “Romania hopes to save remains of $10 billion know-how investment”, Nucleonics Week, July 18, 1996, pp. 6-8.

Ibid.

Beppi Crosariol, “Ex-Romanian spy-boss: ‘My secret agents stole Canada’s nuclear secrets'”, Kingston Whig Standard, December 19, 1987, p. 1.

Ray Silver, “AECL signs pact to help complete Cernavoda and heavy water plant”, Nucleonics Week, March 12, 1992, p. 8.

“HWD Disappointment”, Ontario Hydro Nuclear: Nuclear Business Review, September 1994, p. 8.

“OHN Heavy Water Deal with Romania”, Ontario Hydro Nuclear: Nuclear Business Review, November 1994, p. 1.

See also “Romanian Shipments Wrap Up”, Ontario Hydro Nuclear: Nuclear Business Review, December 1994, p. 4.

Mark Hibbs, “Canadians Liable for Cernavoda QA problems, Romanians assert”, Nucleonics Week, August 1, 1996.

Ibid.

“Canada/Romania”, Nucleonics Week, June 20, 1996, p. 17.

Mark Hibbs, “Replacement parts problem looms for first two Cernavoda units”, Nucleonics Week, July 4, 1996, pp. 1 & 10-11.See also: Ann MacLachlan, “RENEL says it has resolved issue of spare parts for Cernavoda-1”, Nucleonics Week, September 12, 1996, pp. 5-6.

Mark Hibbs, “Cernavoda core damage probability above CANDU reference, PSA shows”, Nucleonics Week, July 11, 1996, pp. 8-9.

“Cernavoda 2’s future under discussion”, Nuclear Engineering International, October 1993, p. 4.

Jennifer Wells, Ibid., p. 53.

Mark Hibbs, “Replacement parts problem looms for first two Cernavoda units”, Nucleonics Week, July 4, 1996, pp. 1 & 10-11.

Mark Hibbs, “RENEL aims to finish Cernavoda-2 by 2000, but later date likely”, Nucleonics Week, July 4, 1996, pp. 11-12.

Ibid.

Stevie Cameron, “Ceausescu planned to use CANDU data for bomb, author says”, Globe & Mail, May 2, 1990, p. A11.

Ann MacLachlan, “Romania separated tiny amount of plutonium in secret in 1985”, Nucleonics Week, June 25, 1992, p. 16.

“Canadian reactor used in illegal sale”, Toronto Star, May 1, 1990.See also: David Owen, “Canada in N-sale dilemma”, Financial Times, June 29, 1989.

Paul Watson, “7,000 died in Romanian revolt Western diplomats estimate”, Toronto Star, January 2, 1990.

Geoffrey York, “Romanian palace cast in new light”, Globe & Mail, May 4, 1996, p. A14.

Geoffrey York, “Feeling of betrayal, bitterness hangs like cloud over Romania”, Globe & Mail, May 1, 1996, pp. A1 & A11.

Finch, Ibid., pp. 58-59.

Finch, Ibid., p. 58.

Finch, Ibid., pp. 58-61.

Section 31 of the Export Development Act is used if a loan or guarantee is for a term or amount greater than EDC would normally undertake for a single export transaction, and if in the opinion of the government it is in the national interest. Funds are paid by the Minister of Finance to the EDC out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Section 29 of the Act is used for most of EDC’s lending, and transactions under this account are judged on criteria that would normally be used by a bank in lending for overseas projects.

Finch, Ibid., p. 61.

Ray Silver, “AECL Signs Agreement to Build Second 680-MW CANDU at Wolsong”, Nucleonics Week, January 3, 1991.

Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., AECL Information: Media Questions & Answers, 1992, Q&A #2.

Rod Mickleburgh, “AECL tries to convince Seoul it can’t do without the CANDU”, Globe & Mail, October 27, 1995, p. B6.

Barrie McKenna, “Nuclear renaissance seen following AECL deal”, Globe & Mail, September 19, 1992, p. B2.

Rod Mickleburgh, “AECL tries to convince Seoul it can’t do without the CANDU”, Globe & Mail, October 27, 1995, p. B6.

Byung-Koo Kim, “Korea: Going for more home-grown plants”, Nuclear Engineering International, April 1992, pp. 30-33.

“South Korea announces plan for 27 units by 2010”, Nuclear Engineering International, March 1996, p. 2.

Rick Doust, “Canadian-Korean partnership works towards a tandem fuel cycle”, Nuclear Engineering International, April 1992, p. 36.

Seong-Yun Kim, “Hopes for HANARO”, Nuclear Engineering International, December 1995, p. 40.

Export Development Corporation, “AECL lands sale in Korea with financing from EDC”, News Release, NR 88-16, March 14, 1988.

CBC Radio, Sunday Morning (program segment hosted by Bob Carty), May 21, 1995.

CBC Radio, Ibid.

“South Korea: Ex-Kepco head sentenced”, Nucleonics Week, December 15, 1994, p. 16.See also: Ray Silver, “AECL Breaks with South Korean Agent in Wake of Kickback Scandal”, Nucleonics Week, August 11, 1994.

CBC Radio, Ibid.

David Crane, “Canada’s Know-how fuels Korean surge”, Toronto Star, p. C2.

Ann MacLachlan, “Hanjung to supply steam generators for Qinshan Phase III project”, Nucleonics Week, July 25, 1996, p. 6.

CANDU Owners Group 1993/1994 Annual Report, p. 22.

Kathleen Hart, “KEDO settle dispute on US role in North Korean LWR project”, Nucleonics Week, March 7, 1996, pp. 16-17.

Kathleen Hart, “Ground-breaking on North Korea reactors expected within weeks”, Nucleonics Week, September 19, 1996, pp. 14-15.

Ann MacLachlan, “KEPCO gets government mandate to manage Korea’s nuclear waste”, Nucleonics Week, September 19, 1996, pp. 15-16.

Ibid.

“Korea Chooses First Waste Site”, Nuclear Engineering International, February 1995, p.

Kenichi Nishina, “Situation of Nuclear Power in South Korea”, Nuke Info Tokyo, March/April 1996, No. 52, p. 8.

US Congress, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978, p. 80. Cited in: Leonard Spector, The New Nuclear Nations, Vintage Books, 1985, p. 270.

Robert Gillette, “US squelched apparent S. Korea A-Bomb drive”, Los Angeles Times, November 4, 1978. Cited in: Leonard Spector, The New Nuclear Nations, Vintage Books, 1985, p. 271.

Harry Sterling, “Generals’ legacy haunts South Korea”, Toronto Star, December 7, 1995, p. A27.

Rod Mickleburgh, “Crackdown in South Korea Widens”, Globe & Mail, December 1, 1995, p. A15.

Rod Mickleburgh, “Korean court sends message”, Globe & Mail, August 27, 1996, p. A9.

Reuter, “Korean Moguls face jail in bribe scandal”, Toronto Star, August 27, 1996, p. B8.

Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report: 1996, AI USA, 1996, p. 200.

Amnesty International, Republic of South Korea – Update on National Security Law arrests and ill treatment: The need for human rights reform, AI Index: ASA 25/09/96, March 1996, p. 4.

Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report: 1996, AI USA, 1996, p. 201.

Thijs de la Court, Deborah Pick & Daniel Nordquist, The Nuclear Fix: A Guide to Nuclear Activities in the Third World, World Information Service on Energy, 1982, p. 100. See also: Nuclear Research Reactors in the World, Reference Data Series No. 3, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1995.

Nuclear Research Reactors in the World, Reference Data Series No. 3, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1995.

IAEA, Ibid.

Kenan Unlu, “Turks take steps to revive their nuclear programme”, Nuclear Engineering International, January 1995, p. 16.

Unlu, Ibid.

Unlu, Ibid.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Annual Report 1984-85, p. 6.

AECL Annual Report 1985-86, pp. 2 & 6.

The existence of this office is noted in AECL’s Annual Reports for 1986-87 and 1987-88.

Diane Francis, “Let’s scrutinize financing for $1 billion reactor”, Toronto Star, November 12, 1985, pp. D1 & D2.

Ibid.

Robert Mcdonald, “Canada may sell Turkey CANDU reactor”, Toronto Star, November 1, 1983.

CP, “Turkey set to accept new CANDU proposal”, Globe & Mail, January 13, 1987, p. B7.

David Stewart-Patterson, “ECL expects CANDU sale to Turkey to close shortly” Globe & Mail, June 15, 1985, p. B3.

CP, “Turkey set to accept new CANDU proposal” Globe & Mail, January 13, 1987, p. B7.

CP, “Sale of CANDU a step closer” Globe & Mail, July 19, 1985.

“Turkish decision shelves sale of Canadian nuclear plant” Toronto Star, October 16, 1986, p. E3.

The Turkish ambassador to Canada suggested in 1987 that another Canadian proposal would be entertained, but it came to nothing. See: CP, “Turkey set to accept new CANDU proposal” Globe & Mail, January 13, 1987, p. B7.

AECL 1992/93 Annual Review, p. 13.

AECL Annual Report 1993-1994, p. 6.

Ibid.

Unlu, Ibid., p. 17.

Unlu, Ibid.

Unlu, Ibid.

“Akkuyu plans meet opposition”, Nuclear Engineering International, March 1995, p. 8.

“Turkey Close to Launching N-Plant Project”, NUCNET, March 29, 1996.

Mark Hibbs, “Turkey expected to request bids for PWR project in coming weeks”, Nucleonics Week, March 21, 1996, pp. 1-2.

Ibid.

AECL Annual Report 1994-1995, p. 5.

AECL Annual Report 1995-1996, p. 7.

Unlu, Ibid., p. 16.

Stephen Kinzer, “Turkish leader may be a ‘gentle demon'”, New York Times Service, Globe & Mail, July 2, 1996, p. A10.

Suna Erdem, “Turkey leans toward its Muslim neighbours”, Reuters, Globe & Mail, August 14, 1996, p. A8.

Amnesty International USA, Amnesty International Report: 1996, p. 301.

Editorial, “Turkey and Islam”, Toronto Star, July 11, 1996, p. A22.

Amnesty International, Turkey: Information on Continuing Human Rights Abuses, February 1996, AI Index: EUR 44/10/96, Summary.

Amnesty International Report: 1996, p. 301.

Amnesty International Report: 1996, pp. 302 & 303.

Allan Thompson, “Canadian arms sales like dabbling in arson”, Toronto Star, April 8, 1995, p. C4.

“Arms sales to Turkey protested”, Globe & Mail, April 14, 1995, p. A14.

Finch, Ibid., p. 52.

This loan was made under Section 31 of the Export Development Act, at the behest of the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, who argued that it was “in the national interest”. Funds for loans are paid by the Minister of Finance out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, and the government assumes the risk of the loan directly.See: “An Overview of the Federal Government Financial Involvement in the Canadian Nuclear Industry”, p. 313.

“An Overview of Federal Government Financial Involvement in the Canadian Nuclear Industry”, p. 313.

Former AECL President and CEO Bruce Howe stated that “…AECL did not report a loss on the Argentina contract. Rather, the company made a provision for a loss that could have arisen in the event that contract renegotiations proved unsuccessful. They were successful, and in fact, AECL has been fully compensated, with interest, for its work in Argentina.” (Letter from Bruce Howe to David H. Martin, Nuclear Awareness Project, October 26, 1992).It should be noted however that AECL has never disclosed the outcome of contract renegotiations. The AECL 1991-1992 Annual Report noted that there was a “reduced return this year from the Argentine contract debt” (p. 4).

It is not clear if AECL had to pay the entire cost of boiler replacement. In 1979, AECL was attempting to negotiate a deal with Babcock & Wilcox similar to that negotiated by Ontario Hydro when similarly defective boilers were supplied for the Pickering “A” reactors. Ontario Hydro paid 25% of the replacement cost. See: Finch, Ibid., p. 55, and FN 14, pp. 163-163.

Finch, Ibid., p. 54.

Associated Press, “$4 million bribe given on Candu Argentina says”, Toronto Star, June 13, 1985.See also: Joel Ruimy, “RCMP should probe bribery scandal in Candu sale to Argentina, Tory says”, Toronto Star, June 14, 1985.

“An Overview of Federal Government Financial Involvement in the Canadian Nuclear Program”, Nuclear Policy Review Background Papers, EMR, Report No. ER81-2E, 1981, p. 311.

Gordon Sims, The Evolution of AECL, MA Thesis, Institute of Canadian Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, August 1979, p. 123.

Ron Finch, Exporting Danger, Black Rose Books, Montréal, 1986, p. 79.

“Datafile: India”, Nuclear Engineering International, February 1995, p. 22.

Sims, Ibid.

Robert Morrison & Edward Wonder, Canada’s Nuclear Export Policy, Carleton University Press, Ottawa, October 1978, pp. 17-18, cited in Finch, Ibid., FN 47, p. 160.

“Datafile: India”, Nuclear Engineering International, February 1995, p. 22.

“Narora ready to go back on line”, Nuclear Engineering International, December 1994, p. 10.

Neel Patri, “Rajasthan-2 down for 3 years to replace all pressure tubes”, Nucleonics Week, May 25, 1996, p. 3.

“Repairs continue at Rajasthan”, Nuclear Engineering International, September 1996, p. 4.

Neel Patri, “Rajasthan-2 down for 3 years to replace all pressure tubes”, Nucleonics Week, May 25, 1996, p. 3.

RAPP is now known as RAPS, for Rajasthan Atomic Power Station.

“Datafile: India”, Nuclear Engineering International, February 1995, p. 19.

PHWR is the non-commercial, or generic description of the CANDU reactor. Because India’s reactors (other than RAPS 1 & 2) have been built independently, this study refers to them as PHWRs.

Ibid., p. 21.

IAEA, Nuclear Research Reactors in the World, December 1995.

“Narora ready to go back on line”, Nuclear Engineering International, December 1994, p. 10.

“Outgoing regulator attacks industry shortcomings”, Nuclear Engineering International, August 1996, p. 6.

Ibid.

Neel Patri, “NPC funding continues to drop as Indian nuclear revenues lag”, Nucleonics Week, March 7, 1996, pp. 17-18.

Ibid.

“Datafile: India”, Nuclear Engineering International, February 1995, p. 24.

Thijs de la Court, et al., The Nuclear Fix, p. 108.

Leonard Spector, The New Nuclear Nations, Vintage, 1985, pp. 99 100.

Finch, Ibid., p. 84.

Finch, Ibid., pp. 86-87.

Finch, Ibid., p. 87.

Finch, Ibid., p. 96.

Finch, Ibid., pp. 97-98.

Finch, Ibid. p. 101.

Zia Mian and A.H. Nayyar, “A Time of Testing?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1996, p. 36.

Donna Bryson, “India’s nuclear stand based on fear, loss of face”, Globe & Mail, September 13, 1996.

Paul Watson, “India’s election winner vows atomic arsenal”, Toronto Star, May 12, 1996, p. A1 & A12.

Zia Mian and A.H. Nayyar, “A Time of Testing?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1996, p. 38.

CP, “Canada denies easing of ban”, Globe & Mail, October 15, 1996, p. A4.

COG CANDU Owners Group 1988 Annual Report, Chairman’s Message.

COG CANDU Owners Group 1989 Annual Report, p. 18.

“India’s CANDUs in bad condition”, WISE News Communiqué, October 7, 1994, p. 5.

“Retubing on the cards at Rajasthan”, Nuclear Engineering International, July 1993, p. 8.

Frank King, “Frank King – International Atomic Energy Agency”, Nuclear Business Review, Ontario Hydro Nuclear, Vol. 2 No. 10, October 1994, p. 8.

“Datafile: India”, Nuclear Engineering International, February 1995, p. 22.

Canadian Press, “AECL, Indian officials meet secretly, CTV says”, Globe & Mail, April 7, 1995.

Ray Silver, “COG seeks government guidance on cooperation with India”, Nucleonics Week, June 1, 1995, pp. 3 & 4.

CANDU Owners Group 1994/1995 Annual Report, “Manager’s Message”, p. 1.

Ibid.

R.W. Morrison, “Canada’s Reactor Exports”, in Nuclear Policy Review Background Papers, Report No. ER81-2E, 1981, p. 263.

Finch, Ibid., FN 48, p. 160.

“An Overview of Federal Government Financial Involvement in the Canadian Nuclear Program”, Nuclear Policy Review Background Papers, Energy Mines & Resources, Report No. ER81-2E, 1981, p. 312.

COG CANDU Owners Group 1988 Annual Report, Chairman’s Message.

COG CANDU Owners Group 1989 Annual Report, p. 18.

CANDU Owners Group 1989 Annual Report, p. 2.

CANDU Owners Group 1990 Annual Report, p. 1.

“PAEC asks government for funds to extend life of KANUPP HWR”, Nucleonics Week, March 12, 1996, pp. 6-7.

“KANUPP seeking safety upgrades from Canadian vendors, utilities”, Nucleonics Week, April 30, 1992, pp. 2-3.

Ibid.

“Canada to aid some KANUPP upgrades but only to ensure plant safety”, Nucleonics Week, February 25, 1996, pp. 17-18.

Atomic Energy Control Board, Significant Development Report 1993 3, March 16, 1993, p. 6.

“Datafile: Pakistan”, Nuclear Engineering International, May 1991, p. 53.

Ray Silver et al., “Rigid garter springs may have saved KANUPP from tube fracture”, Nucleonics Week, January 13, 1994, p. 6.

AECL Annual Report 1993-1994, p. 8.

CANDU Owners Group 1994/1995 Annual Report, “Manager’s Message”, p. 1.

Ron Finch, Exporting Danger, Black Rose Books, Montréal, 1986, p. 48.

Thijs de la Court, et al., The Nuclear Fix, World Information Service on Energy, 1982, p. 131.

Ann Auman, “Lack of ties with Taiwan blocks Candu sale”, Toronto Star, January 18, 1984, p. B1.

Stephen Engelberg, “Taipei halts work on secret plant to make nuclear bomb ingredient”, New York Times, March 23, 1988, p. 3.

Finch, Ibid., p. 185.

Communication from Sara Larrain, Red Nacional de Accion Ecologica (RENACE), January 5, 1995.

IPS, “Government Considers Canadian Nuclear Plant”, San Jose, Chile-Energy, InterPress Third World News Agency (IPS), January 3, 1995.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited 1988-1989 Annual Report, p. 12.

AECL Annual Review 1993-1993, p. 15.

AECL Annual Report 1993-1994, P. 7.

Finch, Ibid., p. 184.

Finch, Ibid., p. 184.

Finch, Ibid., p. 186.

“AECL takes a step toward sale of nuclear reactor”, Globe & Mail, January 16, 1988, p. B6.

CP, “Nuclear firms eye Candu sale to Hungary”, Toronto Star, September 27, 1989, p. F3.

AECL Annual Report 1990-1991, p. 12.

CIDA, Canada helps Hungary dispose of nuclear waste, CIDA Web site, May 24, 1996.

Ibid.

Finch, Ibid., p. 186.

Finch, Ibid., p. 187.

Finch, Ibid., p. 185.Gentilly-1 was a prototype CANDU-BLW, moderated with heavy water and cooled with boiling light water. The $87 million, 250 MW Gentilly-1 started up in 1971, but because of various technical problems, never operated for more than a few weeks at a time.The plant was shut down from 1973-1976, and after 1978. Decommissioning began officially in 1982.

John Honderich, “Clark touts Candu”, Toronto Star, June 26, 1979.

John Honderich, “Japan rejection not death blow we’ve other prospects: AECL”, Toronto Star, August 11, 1979.

“Joe Clark’s pitch fails Japan rejects CANDU”, Toronto Star, October 8, 1979.

Ibid.

“Canada’s Reactor Exports”, Ibid., p. 267.

Michael McDowell “Candu has ‘slim’ hope in Japan”, Globe & Mail, January 22, 1983.

Finch, Ibid., p. 185.

Finch, Ibid., p. 69.

Ana Puga, “Mexico’s nuclear reactor to start up”, Toronto Star, October 17, 1988, p. A22.

William Chislett (Financial Times of London), “Bidding is keen to supply Mexico’s huge nuclear needs”, Globe & Mail, December 14, 1981, p. B12.

Finch, Ibid., p. 69.

Diane Francis, “CANDU can’t sell”, Toronto Star, June 19, 1983, p. H1.

Jennifer Lewington, “Candu financing plan set for Mexican bid”, Globe & Mail, January 12, 1982.

Brian Milner, “AECL eyes revived Mexican nuclear plans”, Globe & Mail, August 7, 1984.

David Vienneau, “Trudeau makes Candu nuclear reactor pitch in Mexico”, Toronto Star, January 13, 1982, p. A3.As personal adviser to Prime Minister Chrétien, MacLaren is still in a position to promote CANDU sales and influence the Export Development Corporation.

Financial Times of London, “Mexico may defer nuclear plan”, Globe & Mail, April 7, 1982.

Bruce Ward, “Mexico’s ‘No’ cripples ailing Candu firms”, Toronto Star, June 12, 1982.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Annual Report 1986-87, p. 6.

Letter from Friends of the Earth-Canada, November 4, 1989.

AECL 1991-1992 Annual Review, p. 17.

AECL Annual Report 1993-1994, P. 7.

Bob Hepburn, “Philippines pact may open door to uranium sales”, Toronto Star, January 16, 1982.Marcos had signed a deal in 1976 to buy a 600 MW light water reactor from Westinghouse. Following the restoration of democracy under Aquino, the plant was cancelled.

Marck Lukasiewicz, “Problems shadow Philippine trade prospects”, Globe & Mail, January 15, 1983

AECL Annual Report 1993-1994, p. 7.

AECL 1991-1992 Annual Review, p. 17.

AECL Annual Review, 1992-1993, p. 11.

CP, “Canada offers to aid Russian nuclear safety”, Toronto Star, May 30, 1992, p. A14.

Dave Todd, “Canada aims to help Russia develop safer nuclear power”, Toronto Star, July 3, 1992, p. A8.

Ray Silver, “AECL-Russians meeting to discuss potential for CANDU sales in east”, Nucleonics Week, October 19, 1995, p. 4.

AECL Annual Review 1992-1993, pp. 11-12.

Mark Hibbs, “Minatom to begin negotiations for CANDU on far east site”, Nucleonics Week, December 7, 1995, p. 11.

“Russian Far East CANDU in the works”, Hydroscope, November 2, 1995, p. 3.

AECL Annual Report 1993-1994, p. 7.

“Thailand invites bids for research reactor”, December 1995, Nuclear Engineering International, p. 12.

Letter from Dr. Agnes Bishop, President, AECB, to David Martin, Nuclear Awareness Project, April 10, 1996.

Letter from JoAnne Cohen Sulzenko, VP, AECL, to David Martin, April 29, 1996.

“Axworthy to visit Thailand, Hong Kong and Indonesia”, The Week in Trade and Foreign Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, July 8-14, 1996, p. 1.

Finch, Ibid., P. 183.

“Canada’s Reactor Exports”, Nuclear Policy Review Background Papers, Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, Report No. ER81-2E, 1981, pp. 266-267.

“CANDU in the USA?”, Canadian Nuclear Society Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 1993, p. 3.

Ray Silver & David Stellfox, “AECL calls off Candu-3 review: NRC Cost apparent consideration”, Nucleonics Week, March 9, 1995, p. 1.

AECL has tried desperately to sell a CANDU-3 in either New Brunswick or Saskatchewan. So far, nobody is buying it.

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Annual Report 1986-87, p. 6.

Reuters, “Canada among world bidders on Yugoslavian nuclear contract”, Toronto Star, July 3, 1986.

Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, 1975-1976, pp. 150-151.The Auditor noted

that AECL was carrying its prototype reactors on its books at an inflated value;

that it was failing to accrue interest on loans from the government of Canada; and

that it had failed to account for an anticipated loss of $100 million in the CANDU sale to Argentina.

Safe Energy Communication Council, International Nuclear Power, Myth Busters # 10, Spring 1996.

International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Yearbook 1995, p. C6.

[ Nuclear Industry Sub-Directory ]

Canada’s Plutonium Contribution to Britain’s Nuclear Weapons Programme

verbatim excerpts from

Independence and Deterrence Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952

the official history of Britain’s nuclear energy programme written by Margaret Gowing (assisted by Lorna Arnold)

Britain’s Atomic Bomb Policy

The Men In Charge: Cockcroft, Penney, Hinton

John Cockcroft and the Canadian Connection

William Penney and the American Connection

Christopher Hinton and the Plutonium Factories

Engineering Attitudes toward the Bomb Project

Recruiting Scientists in Montreal

Plutonium Separation Work in Canada

Plutonium from the Canadian NRX Reactor

Crisis of Confidence in Britain

Pilot Plutonium Plant in Canada Succeeds

Canadian Plutonium Sent to Britain

British Windscale Plant Begins Operations

British Nuclear Weapons Requirements

Canadian Plutonium Essential to Bomb Test

Searching for a Test Site

An A-Bomb Test Site in Canada?

Australia Volunteers

Parting Thoughts

Chapter 3

Argentina, India, Pakistan, Taiwan

written by David Martin of Nuclear Awareness Project for the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout

For a copy of the complete report ($10 + shipping) write Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout 1 Nicholas Street Suite 412 Ottawa Ontario K1N 7B7 Canada

. . . back to [ Table of Contents ]

3. Past CANDU Sales

3.1. Argentina

3.2. India

3.3. Pakistan

3.4. Taiwan

4. Other CANDU Sales Attempts

4.1. Australia

4.2. Chile

4.3. Egypt

4.4. France

4.5. Greece

4.6. Hungary

4.7. Italy

4.8. Japan

4.9. Mexico

4.10. The Netherlands

4.11. The Philippines

4.12. Russia

4.13. Thailand

4.14. United Kingdom

4.15. United States

4.16. Yugoslavia

5. Payment of Bribes & ‘Agent Fees’ by AECL

Table 2 : “Agents’ Fees” Paid by AECL 1977-1996

Source: AECL Annual Reports 1976-77 to 1995-96

6. Conclusion

Appendix A

Table 3 : Canada’s Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

NCA = Nuclear Cooperation Agreement NIF = Not in Force (as of October 1996)

FOOTNOTES

written by David Martin of Nuclear Awareness Project for the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout

For a copy of the complete report ($10 + shipping) write Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout 1 Nicholas Street Suite 412 Ottawa Ontario K1N 7B7 Canada

. . . back to [ Table of Contents ]

FOOTNOTES

Canada’s Plutonium Contribution
to Britain’s Nuclear Weapons Programme

Independence and Deterrence
Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952

the official history of Britain’s nuclear energy programme
written by Margaret Gowing (assisted by Lorna Arnold)

written by David Martin
of Nuclear Awareness Project
for the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout

For a copy of the complete report ($10 + shipping) write
Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout
1 Nicholas Street Suite 412
Ottawa Ontario
K1N 7B7 Canada

NCA = Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
NIF = Not in Force (as of October 1996)

written by David Martin
of Nuclear Awareness Project
for the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout

For a copy of the complete report ($10 + shipping) write
Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout
1 Nicholas Street Suite 412
Ottawa Ontario
K1N 7B7 Canada