Canada’s Nuclear Dilemma

by Gordon Edwards, Ph.D.

Canadian Journal of Business Administration

Special Issue: ”Energy, Ethics, Power, and Policy”

Volume 13, Numbers 1 and 2, 1982
University of British Columbia

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FIGURES

Projected Canadian Nuclear
Capacity in 2000 AD
Future US Primary Energy Consumption
(Illustrative Projections From 20 Sources)
Unavailability of Safety Systems
at Bruce Nuclear Generating Station “A”
Radiotoxic Hazard of Nuclear
Wastes for Ten Million Years
Canada’s Secondary Energy
Consumption by Fuel Type (1977)

TABLES

Federal Energy R&D
Expenditures (in millions $)
Ontario Hydro Over-Capacity
Above Peak Demand (Megawatts)
Ontario Hydro Peak Load Growth
Forecasts to Year 2000
Employment in the Canadian
Nuclear Industry (1977)
AECB Reactor Licensing Criterion
Until 1980
Calculated Probabilities for
Accidents in CANDU Reactors

Introduction

For thirty-five years, successive Canadian governments have been gambling that nuclear power will become a commercial success [1]. The stakes are very high — not only in financial terms (see Table 1), but also in terms of unprecedented risks related to public health, [2] environmental integrity [3], political acceptability [4], energy self-sufficiency [5], and world peace [6].

It is becoming increasingly clear that Canada’s nuclear gamble is not likely to pay off in this century, if ever. According to the draft report of an internal government review (Canada, 1981b) that was leaked to the Ottawa press in the spring of 1981 [7], it is even doubtful “whether the nuclear industry in Canada will survive the 1980’s” (p. 125). The beleaguered industry has not sold a CANDU reactor since 1978, and prospects for the 1980s are not good [8].

Ottawa’s belated recognition that Canada’s nuclear industry is in a desperate plight contrasts sharply with earlier perceptions. As recently as 1978, the LEAP report — a major study published by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources (EMR) — had this to say [9]:

. . . of all Canada’s resources, the nuclear power system is the one which offers the most ready scope for expansion to meet Canada’s growing energy needs, at least over the next 30 years. No other resource or combination of resources, at present, seem capable of expansion in amounts adequate to meet the energy required … (Canada, 1978a, p. 35).

Yet others had concluded by the summer of 1978 that the Canadian nuclear industry was already in serious trouble [10]. By the time the government’s internal review was completed in 1981, nuclear expectations within EMR had changed beyond recognition:

If actual sales performance coincides with one of the more cautious scenarios, all firms surveyed, and by implication virtually all firms in the industry, will be without nuclear business by 1985-86. Even the most optimistic scenario indicates that the current structure of the industry cannot be maintained in the 1990’s (Canada, 1981b, p. 89).

In its draft report, the internal review considers two basic policy approaches to deal with the situation . Both of them are unpleasant. Ottawa could adopt a laissez-faire approach and allow the Canadian nuclear option to perish, or undertake heroic efforts to bail the industry out by promoting demand for nuclear power over and above market-determined levels [11]. As formulated, it is a difficult dilemma indeed.

Table 1
FEDERAL ENERGY R&D EXPENDITURES
(in millions $)

  Year    1976/77    1977/78    1978/79    1979/80    1980/81

  Total    120.5      118.2      150.7      157.9      205.9
  Nuclear   90.3       87.9      105.8      106.4      118.4
  % Nuclear  75%        74%        70%        67%      57.5%

Source: EMR, Office of Energy R&D, Ottawa.

The present paper suggests a third approach that Ottawa could take: to maintain the nuclear option without expanding the industry during the 1980s, thereby side-stepping the apparent dilemma. This could be accomplished by channeling funds and efforts into major problem areas requiring urgent attention , such as reactor safety, decommissioning, and waste disposal. Such an approach would keep Canada’s nuclear technologists busy developing the valuable tools and skills that will eventually be needed domestically, and that may also have great export potential, regardless of the future of nuclear power. At the same time, considerable amounts of investment capital could be diverted away from nuclear expansion projects into much-needed energy conservation programs [12].

[ back to TABLE OF CONTENTS ]

Domestic Over-Capacity

In order to survive, the Canadian nuclear industry needs new business before 1985; but where will it come from? Domestic markets are currently saturated.

Nuclear power can supply bulk electricity. However, over 80 per cent of Canada’s energy needs are non-electrical [13], and we are not short of electricity. The “energy crisis” refers primarily to an impending shortage of low-priced liquid fuels for heating and transportation. Bulk electricity is not presently an economic substitute for either of these uses [14]. As a result, there is little domestic market for nuclear power plants. Given existing commitments and trends, the current slack in demand is expected to last until the 1990s, and possibly beyond.

Ontario Hydro has ten nuclear power reactors operating (totaling 5300 MW) and twelve more under construction (for an additional 8500 MW). Current electrical over-capacity above peak demand exceeds 40 per cent in Ontario (see Table 2); a comfortable reserve margin is generally considered to be 20 to 25 per cent above peak demand.

Table 2
ONTARIO HYDRO OVER-CAPACITY ABOVE PEAK DEMAND
(Megawatts)

     Year         1976     1977     1978     1979     1980     1981

Peak Capacity   19,677   21,347   22,845   24,429a  24,457b  24,595c
 Peak Demand    15,896   15,677   15,722   16,365   16,808   16,600
Overcapacity      24%      36%      45%      49%      45%      48%

Source: Ontario Hydro Annual Reports.

Notes:

a) includes 550 MW mothballed
b) includes 1704 MW mothballed
c) includes 1913 MW mothballed

As the Pickering B (2000 MW) and Bruce B (3000 MW) nuclear power stations come into service in the 1980s, Ontario Hydro’s over-capacity will remain in excess of 30 per cent unless the trend reverses sharply. In addition, the Darlington A nuclear power station (3500 MW) is scheduled to come on line by 1990 [15]. Electrical demand in the province would have to grow at more than 3 per cent per year to justify any further nuclear power plants before the turn of the century [16]. The forecasts have been consistently dropping (see Table 3).

Table 3 ONTARIO HYDRO PEAK LOAD GROWTH FORECASTS TO YEAR 2000
(annual percentage growth rate)

   Year        1970-76   1977   1978   1979   1980   1981   1982
Forecast Rate  over 7%   6.2%   5.3%   4.5%   3.4%   3.1%   3.0%

Source:

Ontario (1978); Ontario Hydro Annual Reports.

Only two other provinces have reactors under construction: Quebec with Gentilly-2 and New Brunswick with Lepreau-1. Both 600 MW reactors are expected to come into service in 1983. Further reactor orders are anticipated in both provinces, but not immediately.

Hydro-Quebec has announced an ambitious $55 billion expansion plan for the 1980s (mainly hydro-electricity), which will add 20 000 MW of capacity by 1990 (Hydro-Quebec, 1980). If peak demand in Quebec grows at 5 per cent per year, Hydro-Quebec will have 20 per cent over-capacity by 1990 without any more nuclear plants [17].

Nevertheless, the internal review concludes that the best short-term prospects for the Canadian nuclear industry would be federal incentives aimed at achieving an early commitment by Quebec and New Brunswick to Gentilly-3 [3500 MW] and Lepreau-2 [600 MW] respectively. To secure these commitments in the absence of a ready market, Ottawa should be prepared to finance “75% of the delivered cost” of each reactor at “more favourable interest rates” than previously available (Canada, 1981b, p. 93) [18].

Due to a variety of complicating factors, however, such federal inducements may not be sufficient. The Quebec government is considering an extension of its declared moratorium on further nuclear commitments to 1985 [19], and it seems probable that there will be broad public debate on the nuclear question before further decisions are made [20]. In New Brunswick, construction problems and related political scandals surrounding the Lepreau-1 reactor may make Premier Hatfield reluctant to embark on another such project without a cooling-off period [21]. Besides, any acceleration of these nuclear commitments will aggravate the already-serious cash-flow problems being experienced by both provincial utilities, causing domestic electricity rates in both provinces to increase even faster than they are now increasing. It is not a foregone conclusion that the provinces will co-operate with Ottawa by building more CANDU reactors.

The Canadian nuclear industry “is therefore facing an indeterminate period of excess capacity, its future clouded by uncertainty regarding the timing and magnitude of the next round of orders” (Canada, 1981b, p. 122). Realistically speaking, the internal review expects that “from zero to seven reactor units will likely be required” before the turn of the century (ibid., p. 123). Even if the upper end of this range is realized, “only one supplier of each [CANDU] component will remain in the nuclear business” (ibid., p. 89) [22]. At best, the CANDU industry will barely survive.

Closely linked to the CANDU technology is the heavy water industry, which is also in deep trouble, since there are no alternative markets for heavy water [23]. Over $800 million in unpaid loans owed by AECL’s Heavy Water Division had to be forgiven by the federal government in the spring of 1981 (Ottawa Citizen, 6 April 1981). Despite such lavish assistance, the prospects for the heavy water industry remain dismal:

There does not appear to be any plausible scenario in which the output of all Canada’s heavy water plants will be required…. Even with the most optimistic [CANDU] sales scenario, AECL and Ontario Hydro [heavy water] inventories could total 15 reactor loads by 1990 at a cost of about $2.0 billion ($1980) (Canada, 1981b, pp. 94-95).

Yet the internal review offers no palatable plan for rationalizing the heavy water industry [24]:

For technical reasons [heavy water] plants must be run close to full capacity or not at all…. The stark alternatives are to accumulate costly inventories or to shut plants down. It is not clear, however, that a mothballed plant can ever be returned to production, so that closing a plant for an extended period may involve its total write-off (ibid., p. 94).

It now appears that unrealistic expectations concerning the ability of nuclear electricity to substitute for imported oil led to extravagant overbuilding of nuclear facilities during the 1970s (see Figure 1).

a) Each point on this graph represents an official published projection of estimated nuclear capacity by the year 2000. The great expectations of 1973 had all but disappeared by 1979. Since then, the Energy, Mines & Resources (EMR) internal review has estimated less than 22,000 MW installed by 2000. [ Update: In 1998, installed nuclear capacity was 14,200 MW, of which 4,870 MW has been ordered shut down, leaving 9,350 MW available — about 1/3 of the lowest projection (“recommendation”) indicated on this graph, and far less than the “confirmed” capacity in 1980. ]

b) Leonard and Partners, 1978.

c) Ontario (1978) for Ontario; Leonard and Partners (1978) for other parts of Canada.

 

Source: Canadian Renewable Energy News , 1978.

 

In its efforts to maintain this artificial industrial momentum, there is a danger that Ottawa may only succeed in compounding earlier errors; for in order to fill the gap in the domestic market, Ottawa is forced to turn to the even more unsettled export market.

 

 

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Export Opportunities

The internal review concludes that “while the export sector will not likely sustain the nuclear [reactor] industry in the long run, one or more near term sales will be critical to maintaining the industry into the mid-1980’s” (Canada, 1981b, p. 125).

Mexico, Korea and Romania are the best near term prospects, but are by no means assured. Other prospects are concentrated late in the decade, too late to provide immediate relief to the industry, and are in any case highly uncertain (ibid., p. 89).

The sale of CANDU reactors has become a common theme of Canadian diplomatic missions overseas [25], necessitating a staunchly pronuclear attitude from ministers of the Crown and their parliamentary secretaries. It is recognized, however, that federal policies designed to promote overseas sales of CANDU reactors could be very costly in both political and economic terms. Past nuclear deals with India, Pakistan, Argentina, and Korea have elicited a storm of protest from concerned Canadians who are deeply disturbed over Canada’s role in the global proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially considering the human rights records and the military ambitions of some of our trading partners. Canada has not profited from such deals; in fact, substantial losses have been incurred [26]. Charges of bribery, corruption, and financial mismanagement within AECL in connection with past overseas sales have not been convincingly answered [27].

At present — and for the foreseeable future — export markets are very soft and the competition is fierce [28]. Reactor vendors from other countries, just as desperate for business as the Canadians, are offering large subsidies to prospective buyers in the form of concessional financing [29]. In such a business climate, it is difficult to maintain lofty principles or even to turn a profit. The Canadian government is under strong pressure to authorize a more costly international CANDU marketing program [30], to relax Canada’s nuclear safeguards requirements [31], to allow business practices overseas that would be illegal in Canada [32], to negotiate special counter-trade agreements [33], and to grant exceptionally generous financing terms through the Export Development Corporation (equivalent to a 25-30 per cent discount on the purchase price of a reactor) [34]. All of these options are dutifully discussed by the internal review, along with a stark warning: “Even with strong policy action, there is no assurance of success” (Canada, 1981b, p. 117).

Another kind of export opportunity presents itself: building reactors in Canada so as to export power south of the border. Despite “complex institutional, regulatory and contractual [hurdles]” (ibid., p. 97), the internal review suggests that a power export policy could generate attractive profits “and, in addition, provide badly needed business for the Canadian nuclear industry” (ibid., p. 102). Without major changes in American utility practices, however, the export market for Canadian electricity “may be confined to an ‘export window’, beginning in 1990 and lasting to 2000 or 2005…. this implies a decision must be made soon if Canada wishes to take advantage of this market” (ibid., pp, 99-100).

The surprisingly brief “export window” tentatively identified by the internal review is based on a transition strategy away from oil-fired generators in the United States, together with anticipated regulatory delays in bringing new capacity on line. It is suggested that a potential oil-displacement market might develop for the output of “five or six 630 MW reactors in New Brunswick and from five to seven 850 MW reactors in Ontario” (ibid., p. 98). Regulatory delays could create additional opportunities for short-term power exports, depending on “the nature and cost of alternatives facing potential importers” (ibid., p. 99) [35]. However, long-term exports of nuclear-generated electricity from Canada would likely require far-reaching decisions on the part of American utilities: for example, a deliberate policy to displace coal-fired generation with electricity imports on the basis of comparative cost studies and/or environmental concerns [36].

Unfortunately, whether reactors built in Canada are totally dedicated to power exports, or merely pre-built “with the ultimate intention of repatriating the power to meet expected Canadian demands” (ibid., p. 100), it is an unavoidable fact that most of the risks during the export period would accrue to Canadians, and most of the benefits would not. Although attractive profits may eventually be realized, the economic risks of such a sizable speculation could be enormous in the absence of firm long-term contracts [37].

 

Important non-economic risks are also involved, including increased environmental and safety risks, and the commitment of Canadian non-renewable resources to long-term export…. The construction of increased transmission facilities . . . because of strong environmental opposition … could be a serious bottleneck…. The key question to be answered at this stage, then, is whether further investigation of this potentially lucrative market is warranted; or whether overall public acceptability is so unlikely as to make further efforts futile (ibid., pp. 102-3).

Even if public acceptability were assured, there is a distinct possibility that the “export window” predicted by the internal review will never actually materialize. Current over-capacity in the United States averages almost 40 per cent, and load forecasts are almost certainly inflated [38]. If industrial cogeneration of electricity becomes popular, export markets may evaporate [39]. Meanwhile, energy conservation measures and solar heating devices will displace imported oil and also electricity during the 1980s. Electrical demand will level out or even drop as the American heating market shrinks [40]. It seems unwise for Canadian utilities to overbuild in anticipation of an American power crisis that will probably never come.Concerning the export of reactors and power, the internal review suggests that the very survival of our home-grown nuclear industry appears to depend on decisions made in other countries, over which Canadians have little control.

 

 

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Future Prospects

In view of the great political and economic risks that have been contemplated to keep our nuclear industry alive during the 1980s, the obvious question is: would it not be more sensible to phase out nuclear power and turn towards other energy sources for the future?

There are two schools of thought on this subject. Some energy analysts believe that centrally generated electricity will ultimately displace oil as the driving force of our industrial civilization , and that nuclear power — for economic and environmental reasons — is destined to play a central role in supplying the necessary power [41]. From such a perspective, it appears vital to preserve the nuclear option. However, other analysts argue that centrally generated electricity is simply too expensive to substitute for oil in heating and transport applications, compared with a judicious mix of energy conservation and renewable forms of energy supply [42] (see Figure 2).

 

Figure 2
Future US Primary Energy Consumption
(Illustrative Projections From 20 Sources)
 

~ compiled by the U.S. Department of Energy ~

 

 

Source:

Low Energy Futures for the United States,
U. S. Department of Energy, 1980.

 

Notes [ from the US DOE ] :

U.S. energy demand has not been following the exponential growth curve since 1973. Nevertheless, utility forecasters continue to project exponential growth into the future.

Other studies, indicated on this chart, have concluded that energy demand could level off and even drop over the next fifty years due to more efficient energy use, without any decline in GNP growth or population growth.

Studies that involve changes in life-style are excluded from consideration in this DOE review.

 

  1. Edison Electric Institute, Economic Growth in the Future (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976).
  2. Exxon Corporation Background Series, ”World Energy Outlook”, (December 1979).
  3. Stanford I: The E235 Alternative Energy Futures Study Team, Alternative Energy Futures: An Assessment of the U.S. Options to 2025 (Stanford Institute for Energy Studies, 1979). Scenario I.
  4. Lovins, Amory B. Soft Energy Paths : Toward a Durable Peace (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).
  5. Ford Foundation Report. Energy: The Next Twenty Years, administered by Resources for the Future (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1979). … low economic growth, high energy prices, or a decrease in electrification would tend to yield primary energy demands for the year 2000 less than 100 quadrillion BTUs, p. 104.
  6. HBS = Harvard Business School. Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin, eds. Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School (New York: Random House, 1979). Exact data of this forecast not specified; targeted for late 1980s.
  7. DPR = Domestic Policy Review of Solar Energy, U.S. Department of Energy. Includes 12 quads of primary energy displacement for solar for the $32 per barrel of oil base case.
  8. Stanford II: The E235 Alternative Energy Futures Study Team, Alternative Energy Futures: An Assessment of the U.S. Options to 2025 (Stanford Institute for Energy Studies, 1979). Scenario II.
  9. Rodberg, L. Employment Impact of the Solar Transition, prepared for the U.S. Congress , Subcommittee on Energy of the Joint Economic Committee (1979).
  10. Taylor. The Easy Path Energy Plan (Union of Concerned Scientists, 1979).
  11. CONAES A. The Report of the Demand and Conservation Panel to the Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems (CONAES). Alternative Energy Demand Futures to 2010 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1979). Scenario A.
  12. Leach, G. et al. A Low Energy Strategy for the United Kingdom (London: Science Reviews Ltd. for the International Institute for Environment and Development, 1979).Inferred by applying the percentage reduction possible in the United Kingdom to U.S. baseline energy use without adjustment for sectoral composition of industry, climate, or other geographic differences.
  13. Brooks, David. Economic Impact of Low Energy Growth in Canada: An Initial Analysis, Discussion Paper No. 126 (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1978).Inferred by applying the percentage reduction possible in Canada to U.S. baseline energy use without adjustments for sectoral composition of industry, climate, or other geographic differences.
  14. Sant, Roger. The Least-Cost Energy Strategy: Minimizing Consumer Cost Through Competition (Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon University Press, 1979).Contains a what-if scenario for 1978 rather than explicit forecasts. A hypothetical primary fuel forecast for 1990 meets demand with 1978 actual primary fuel levels (79 quads) plus efficiency improvements. The forecast shown on the graph for 2000 was inferred by applying Sant’s percentage energy savings from efficiency improvements to the Ford Foundation Study’s upper limit.
  15. CONAES A*. The Report of the Demand and Conservation Panel to the Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems (CONAES). Alternative Energy Demand Futures to 2010 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1979). Scenario A*.
  16. Ross/Williams. M. Ross and R. Williams. “Our Energy/Regaining Control”, unpublished draft manuscript.
  17. Brookhaven: Hudson/Jorgenson. E.A. Hudson, D. Jorgenson, and D. Behling, Jr., Energy Conservation Policies: Possibilities, Mechanisms, and Impacts, BNL 50956 (Upton, N.Y.: Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1978).
  18. Stanford III: The E235 Alternative Energy Futures Study Team, Alternative Energy Futures: An Assessment of the U.S. Options to 2025 (Stanford Institute for Energy Studies, 1979). Scenario III.Excluded from this study because it assumes major life-style changes.
  19. American Institute of Physics, Efficient Use of Energy: The APS Studies on the Technical Aspects of More Efficient Use of Energy, AIP Conference Proceedings, Series No. 25 (New York, 1975).
  20. Steinhart, J. et al. , Pathway to Energy Sufficiency: The 2050 Study (San Francisco: Friends of the Earth, 1979).Excluded from this study because it assumes major life-style changes.

If those analysts are right, then nuclear power may be an irrelevancy that merely serves to distract us from addressing our true energy problems in a timely fashion.

Unfortunately, the internal review avoids any comparative analysis of these crucial differences in outlook. Instead, an unimaginative “wait-and-see” attitude is adopted:

 

It appears sensible at this point to pursue policy options which will maintain the nuclear option for the next few years, at which time new orders for reactors to come on stream in the 1990’s should begin to be placed. However, it is also possible that the domestic and export outlook will not improve, and the same problem will have to be faced once again in several years (Canada, 1981-b, p. 126).

In view of the magnitude of the federal investments of money and political will that are proposed to salvage the industry during the early 1980s, one might have hoped for a more definitive assessment of future nuclear prospects.Considering the scale of uncertainties involved, the best solution surely is to maintain the nuclear option through the 1980s without expanding the industry any further. The nuclear enterprise may collapse no matter what is done to save it. This being so, why over-extend ourselves? We do not need to build more CANDU reactors in order to preserve the ability to do so.

 

If demand for CANDU units increases at a later date, the industrial capability could in principle be revived…. [However], advanced technology depends on the skill and motivation of highly trained people working in teams…. Once the teams are dispersed and people have involved themselves in other activities, it is hard to put them back together (ibid ., p. 120).

This revealing passage from the internal review puts Canada’s nuclear dilemma into a much more meaningful and manageable perspective. In order to preserve the nuclear option, the crucial consideration is to keep our Canadian nuclear teams together (see Table 4), actively engaged in useful and challenging work, so that their accumulated knowledge and experience are not lost. This does not necessitate the building of more CANDU reactors. The manufacturing sector can be phased out of production , but the skilled teams do not have to be dispersed. As will be argued in the remainder of this paper, there is ample work to keep our nuclear technologists usefully employed for a decade or more without expanding the industry– provided that the federal government assumes a leadership role, with adequate direction and assured funding for the entire period [43].More precisely, during the 1980s, the Canadian nuclear establishment should devote itself entirely to solving urgent problems of reactor safety, decommissioning, and waste disposal. These problems will require solutions in any event, whether nuclear power has a future or not. Moreover, the techniques and equipment developed in Canada to cope with such problems may be exportable at a profit to other countries facing similar difficulties later on [44]. Within ten years, we will know whether or not the market for nuclear reactors is likely to recover. We will also know if the problems are solved, or close to being solved. If so, the Canadian nuclear industry will be able to resume production of CANDU reactors on a firmer footing than ever before [45]. If not, then Canada will be in a much better position to phase out of nuclear power in an orderly, well-regulated fashion.

 

 

 

Table 4
EMPLOYMENT IN THE CANADIAN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY (1977)

Industry Sector Jobs a Jeopardy c Uranium Mining and Refining 700 b slight Research and Development 3 300 moderate Engineering and Design 4 100 acute Manufacturing Components 6 000 acute to moderate Construction of Plants 11 450 moderate Operations and Maintenance 5 600 slight Public Administration 250 slight Total 31 400 variable

 

Notes: a Leonard and Partners (1978).
b Related to domestic CANDU
c Author’s assessment, based on alternative employment

 

During the proposed ten-year moratorium on reactor construction, investment capital currently slated for nuclear expansion can be diverted into centrally financed, community-based energy conservation programs. Indications are that such programs will cost less money, create more jobs, contribute less to inflation, and provide quicker relief to our energy ills than a comparable program of expansion in any of the conventional energy supply options (Brooks, 1978). Indeed, the energy conservation programs envisaged could be financed by the very utilities that would otherwise be expected to build reactors, thus alleviating their capital requirements, improving their cash-flow situation, and ameliorating their debt-to-equity ratios. Many North American utilities are already moving in this direction [46].

In the meantime, how would the nuclear technologists be able to apply their specialized knowledge in a useful and constructive manner?

 

Reactor Safety

As previously indicated, one area requiring urgent attention is reactor safety. If the core of a nuclear reactor is not adequately cooled, it will become severely damaged, releasing large quantities of radioactive gases and vapours. Every reactor is therefore equipped with a number of critical safety devices: emergency shut-down systems, emergency cooling systems, and an elaborate containment system. Public confidence in CANDU safety has been shaken in recent years by a number of disturbing revelations:

 

  • When the currently operating Ontario reactors were first licensed, it was asserted that their emergency cooling systems would be capable of preventing core damage in the event of any loss-of-cooling accident; this assumption is now known to be untrue [47].
  • CANDU safety systems are supposed to be available 99.9 per cent of the time, according to AECB licensing guidelines; however, operating records reveal that CANDU safety systems are frequently unavailable [48] (out of service while the reactor is operating) more often than the guidelines permit (see Figure 3).

    Figure 3

    Unavailability of Safety Systems
    at Bruce Nuclear Generating Station “A”

     

 

Source:

Atomic Energy Control Board Exhibit E-71
Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs
filed 2 August 1979

Notes:

ECCS = Emergency Core Cooling System (gravity fed injection).
SDS1 = Emergency Shut-Down System 1 (shut-off rods, spring loaded)
SDS2 = Emergency Shut-Down System 2 (liquid poison injection)
CONT = Containment System (e.g. open vents, unsealed doors, etc.)

According to the AECB, no safety system should be unavailable more than 1/1000 of the time — that is, no more than 7 hours per year, based on an assumed 80 percent capacity factor for the plant.

This target was exceeded by all safety systems at Bruce “A” during the last three quarters of 1978.

ECCS, for example, was unavailable for 39 hours during the fourth quarter of 1978; that is 22 times above the target.

It follows that the probability of a serious accident may be much greater than has been asserted by Canadian nuclear authorities.

  • Five of the nine large power reactors in Ontario have been forced to operate at reduced power levels for safety reasons, and Toronto City Council has requested that the other four reactors also be operated at reduced power until current safety standards are met [49].
  • Gentilly-1 has been mothballed for safety reasons, after a very disappointing performance record [50].
  • Cracks have been discovered in the containment walls at Lepreau-1 and Gentilly-2 [51].
  • The AECB has recently decided to abandon its most fundamental reactor licensing criterion, after having assured the Ontario Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning and the Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs that this criterion is and always has been the basis for public protection in Canada (see Table 5) [52].

     

    Table 5
    AECB REACTOR LICENSING CRITERION UNTIL 1980
    (Now Obsolescent)
    Emergency Reference Dose Limits (Not to be Exceeded)

     

                         Individual Dose (rads)   Population Dose
 Type of Accident    Whole Body     Thyroid     (person-rads)

Single Mode Failure    0.5            3.0           10 000
Dual Mode Failure     25.0          250.0        1 000 000

     

    Source: Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (1977b).

     

    Note:

    AECB (1980b) does away with the limit for population dose, though it (and not the individual dose) determines the number of expected cancers and genetic effects.

    The single mode/dual mode categories are replaced by six new categories, each a collection of accident scenarios. Any scenario not explicitly mentioned is not subject to regulatory limits. The scenarios are couched in highly technical language conveying little or no meaning to the non-specialist.

    No official reason has been given for abandoning the traditional criterion.

 

 

While nuclear reactors are considered relatively non-polluting in normal operation, a major reactor accident involving substantial core melting could be an unmitigated disaster [53]. As the Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs has pointed out,

. . . It is not right to say that a catastrophic accident is impossible…. The worst possible accident … could involve the spread of radioactive poisons over large areas, killing thousands immediately, killing others through increasing susceptibility to cancer, risking genetic defects that could affect future generations, and, possibly contaminating for future habitation or cultivation, large land areas (Ontario, 1979b, pp. 9- 10).

Off-site property damage following a core melting accident can run into many billions of dollars–enough to ruin any corporation. For this reason, the Nuclear Liability Act was passed in 1970 and proclaimed in 1976, limiting the liability of Canadian utilities to a maximum of $75 million for each nuclear site [54]. Private insurance companies, recognizing the potentially ruinous implications, have refused to provide any coverage to property owners for damage caused by radioactive contamination [55].Noting that accident scenarios involving fuel melting have never been examined in any technical detail by Canadian nuclear authorities, the Select Committee made the following recommendation (which has yet to be acted on):

 

. . . The AECB should commission a study to analyze the likelihood and consequences of a catastrophic accident in a CANDU reactor. The study should be directed by recognized experts outside the AECB, AECL and Ontario Hydro. It should be funded by a special grant from the federal government. If this study is not commissioned by July 31, 1980, the province of Ontario should ensure that it is undertaken (Ontario, 1980d, p. 37).

During thirteen weeks of safety hearings conducted by the Committee, representatives from AECB, AECL, and Ontario Hydro objected that such a study “would likely take a number of years to complete and would represent a very major research undertaking” (ibid., p. 47). The extensive manpower requirements for such an investigation, it was argued, would conflict with other high-priority tasks in the nuclear field. However, in view of the current slump in sales, those very manpower requirements can be seen as a powerful argument for embarking on a comprehensive CANDU safety study without delay. It will help to keep the nuclear option alive by keeping the nuclear technologists busy.Such a “worst case” study would be valuable to decision makers, particularly in formulating emergency contingency plans and establishing reactor siting policies. Four major questions requiring definitive answers are the following:

 

  1. Meltdown Probabilities. According to the Ontario Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning, the most realistic probability estimate for a complete core melt-down in a CANDU reactor is about 1 in 10 000 per reactor per year, or about 1 in 300 for a reactor lifetime of thirty to thirty-five years. With twenty reactors now committed in Ontario, the overall probability of a complete core meltdown is therefore about 1 in 15 — which is more than twice the probability of rolling a ‘twelve’ with two dice (see Table 6) [56]. If this probability estimate is borne out by more detailed study, it may be wise to prohibit the construction of any more nuclear reactors near large population centres, significant agricultural regions, or important navigation routes.

 

Table 6
CALCULATED PROBABILITIES
FOR ACCIDENTS IN CANDU REACTORS

 

Type of            1 Reactor  1 Reactor  20 Reactors  20 Reactors
Accident            (Annual)  (Lifetime)   (Annual)     (Lifetime)

Loss-of-coolant a     1/100      1/4          1/5         99.7 %
Core Melt-down  b  1/10 000    1/300        1/500         1/15

 

Sources:

a) AECL Safety Report for Lepreau-1, 1979.
b) Ontario, 1978, pp. 78-79.

These calculations assume a 30 to 35-year lifetime for a CANDU reactor.

 

 

  1. Extra Cooling. According to the U.S. Reactor Safety Study (WASH 1400), a prolonged loss of regular cooling and emergency cooling will inevitably result in a complete core melt-down [57]. However, Canadian authorities have argued, without proof, that core melting would be prevented in a CANDU reactor by the extra cooling capability of the heavy water moderator [58]. If this claim can be convincingly substantiated, then the superior safety of CANDU reactors would constitute an important selling feature in competition with American light water reactors.
  2. Melt-through Phenomenon. According to American studies, a molten reactor core will unavoidably melt through the floor of the reactor building into the ground below, thereby breaching containment [59]. Ontario Hydro officials have argued, without proof, that even if the core of a CANDU reactor did melt, it would not penetrate the floor of the reactor building [60]. If it can be authenticated, this feature would provide yet another strong selling point for the CANDU.
  3. Evacuation Plans. Core melting in a CANDU reactor is assumed to be so improbable by the AECB that large-scale evacuation plans are not considered necessary [61]. However, if the AECB assumption is shown to be unwarranted, then detailed evacuation strategies and specialized medical facilities may become mandatory [62]. Considering the amount of advance preparation that might be required, it seems irresponsible not to carry out the necessary technical studies as soon as possible.

The foregoing paragraphs refer to catastrophic accidents. However, as the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident has dramatically demonstrated, even non-catastrophic accidents, involving extensive fuel damage but little or no fuel melting, can have profound economic repercussions [63]. Indeed, several major American reactor safety studies published in the last ten years have called special attention to the potential hazards associated with a “small loss-of-coolant accident,” such as the one that occurred at TMI [64]. Until quite recently, this particular type of accident was considered as inconsequential by most nuclear authorities, including Canadian authorities. It was felt that the emergency safety systems could easily cope with any small loss-of-coolant accident, so as to prevent significant damage to the reactor. The major contamination at TMI, which will take many years and cost billions of dollars to clean up, proves that any complacency on this score is unjustified.According to official AECL estimates, the probability of a small loss-of-coolant accident in a single CANDU reactor, during its expected lifetime of thirty to thirty-five years, is greater than one in four. With twenty reactors currently committed in Ontario, the overall probability of at least one small loss-of-coolant accident occurring at some time in the future is greater than 99.7 per cent (see Table 6) [65]. Before any further nuclear commitments are undertaken, therefore, a thorough investigation should be launched into the likelihood of severe core damage occurring in a CANDU reactor as a result of a small loss-of-coolant accident [66]. It is sobering to realize that a single such accident in a complex of eight reactors (such as the Pickering complex) or four reactors (such as the Bruce complex) would require all eight (or four) reactors to be shut down for an extended period of time, because they are all connected to the same vacuum building. Careful study may identify measures that could be taken to prevent, or at least help to mitigate, the effects of such an accident.

There are other safety questions requiring urgent attention, such as those relating to the seismic integrity of CANDU reactors. In 1974, an American study concluded that a small loss-of-coolant accident would likely result if an earthquake occurred during a CANDU refuelling operation [67]. If it can be shown that such fears are unfounded, or that the CANDU emergency cooling system will not be incapacitated by such an incident [68], the CANDU system will appear more attractive to many potential customers situated in regions of high seismic activity.

All of these safety questions are challenging and significant ones. Canadian nuclear technologists should welcome the opportunity to wrestle with them during the slack period of the 1980s. All that is required is leadership, determination, and adequate funding from the federal government.

 

 

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Decommissioning

When a nuclear reactor has outlived its usefulness, it cannot be simply abandoned or salvaged for scrap, because the structure itself remains intensely radioactive long after the conventional generating equipment and the spent fuel have been removed [69]. A study conducted for the U.S. Atomic Industrial Forum recommends a cooling-off period of seventy to one hundred years in order to reduce the occupational exposures of the men who will eventually be hired to dismantle the reactor [70]. When a small American research reactor at Elk River was dismantled in 1971, radiation fields of 8000 rads per hour were measured two years after shutdown. In the core area of a large power reactor, radiation fields of millions of rads per hour could be encountered shortly after shutdown [71]. A lethal dose of radiation is about 700 rads.

The high capital cost incurred in building a nuclear reactor is echoed by the high capital cost required to decommission it. However, because no commercial power reactor has yet been decommissioned [72], there are wide discrepancies in the available estimates. A U.S. Congressional Committee reported that decommissioning costs will probably lie in the range of 3 to 100 per cent of the initial capital cost of the plant [73]. An AECL study on CANDU decommissioning favours a cost figure near the lower end of this spectrum: $30 million per reactor, with work commencing just one year after shut-down [74]. Ontario Hydro officials have since admitted that the actual cost could be $100 million or more, and that the entire decommissioning phase may have to be spread out over forty years [75]. Because of the high radiation fields, it would not be surprising if decommissioning costs prove to be several hundred million dollars per reactor [76]. At any rate, decommissioning the twenty reactors now committed in Ontario will cost at least $600 million, if not several billion [77]. These estimates do not include the disposal costs for the radioactive rubble.

If any serious reactor accidents occur, the associated decommissioning costs will of course be much higher. As at TMI, reactors that have malfunctioned may prove to be extraordinarily difficult and dangerous to decommission. At present, for example, no one knows how to decommission a reactor that has melted down. The TMI clean-up may be a portent of much worse to come.

It is vitally important that Canada gain some experience in decommissioning power reactors before many more years go by. As the U.S. General Accounting Office has pointed out to the U.S. Congress,

 

The possibility of [the nuclear] industry ending raises questions as to whether there will be nuclear-related organizations, nuclear equipment, and individuals expert in the nuclear field that would be capable of dealing with the decommissioning and decontamination problems that could remain for about 100 years after the last reactor is shut down (U.S., 1977, p. 24).

If the Canadian nuclear industry fails in the next ten or fifteen years, despite all efforts to secure additional sales, before the tools and techniques needed to decommission CANDU reactors have been devised, the burden on future generations could be staggering [78].To prevent such a fiasco, action should be taken now. Nuclear experts hitherto engaged in reactor construction should be hired by the federal government to assist in the decommissioning of the now-defunct Gentilly-1 reactor on a priority basis. Since this 250 MW reactor operated for less than two hundred days in a period of more than ten years, radiation fields will be much less intense than in a larger reactor that has seen many years of regular service. Gentilly-1 will provide an excellent training ground for decommissioning, because errors caused by inexperience will be less threatening to the workers. Rugged and reliable robotic equipment, which will be needed to minimize radiation exposures when larger reactors are decommissioned, can be field-tested at Gentilly-1. Techniques for packaging radioactive rubble and controlling radioactive dust released from blasting and cutting operations can be developed as needed [79].

Following the Gentilly-1 experience, more realistic cost estimates for future decommissioning activities can be derived. If the cost turns out to be much higher than expected, the economic viability of nuclear power might be adversely affected. In any event, the sooner it is known whether current industry estimates are high or low, the better.

The successful development of advanced robotic tools to assist in decommissioning, such as remote-controlled cutting torches and versatile manipulative machinery, could make Canada a world leader in the field of industrial robotics. Canada could get in on the ground floor of a brand new service industry attracting customers from all over the world: nuclear demolition [80]. The non-nuclear technological spin-offs could also be significant, in terms of specialized robotic tools for use in hostile environments of various kinds. It is a promising field.

If developed in time, this new equipment could be used in the latter half of the 1980s, when Ontario Hydro intends to retube seven of its presently operating reactors at a cost of $500 million or more (1980 $). Inside the core of each reactor, several hundred metallic pressure tubes have gradually stretched out of shape because of intense neutron bombardment [81]. The resulting mechanical strain on the tubes can only be relieved by removing them one at a time and replacing them with new tubes. In an attempt to reduce radiation exposure to the workers, the heavy water moderator will be drained, the cooling pipes will be flushed and decontaminated, and the spent fuel will be removed and/or shuffled to new locations. When the job is complete, the old tubes will be shipped off-site for burial as radioactive waste. Each reactor will have to be shut down for a year or more while this extraordinary repair work is undertaken.

Decommissioning Gentilly-1 and retubing Ontario’s reactors will provide employment for the nuclear industry during the 1980s. Retubing is a difficult and dangerous job, which must be carried out in the presence of high radiation fields. It is, in effect, a “mini-decommissioning” effort. If the workers are to have adequate tools when the time comes, research and development in robotics must be initiated without delay. Decommissioning Gentilly-1 will provide needed experience. Hundreds of technologists and thousands of workers will be required to carry out these tasks [82].

 

 

[ back to TABLE OF CONTENTS ]

 

Nuclear Wastes

Still another high priority item for the 1980s is nuclear waste disposal.

 

  • After careful and detailed investigations during the 1970s, two Royal Commissions — one in the United Kingdom and one in Canada — both concluded that there should be no major commitment to nuclear power as an energy source until at least one method for the safe, permanent disposal of all associated nuclear wastes has been demonstrated [83].
  • These wastes are capable, in principle, of causing “millions to billions of fatal cancer doses … an admittedly unlikely scenario.”[84]
  • The British Columbia Medical Association considers it “irresponsible in the extreme for the government of Canada to allow the further development of uranium milling and reactor construction until a safe, proven, permanent disposal technology is developed for the wastes that have already been produced.”[85]
  • The Ontario Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning has recommended a moratorium on further reactor construction by 1990 if adequate progress has not been made in this field [86].

Obviously, research and development into waste disposal should be given the highest priority.

There is plenty of work that needs to be done, ranging from basic scientific research to the manufacture of specialized equipment and the construction of large engineered facilities. Given a comprehensive plan of attack, large segments of the nuclear industry could be usefully employed for years. Canada does not yet have such a plan, but it could be put together in six months or a year. Unfortunately, the federal government has tended to regard waste disposal as a public relations problem, rather than recognizing it as a grave technical and political challenge requiring urgent attention [87]. Responsibility for research in this area has been unwisely delegated to AECL, a Crown corporation that has been singularly inept in dealing with the public [88]. As a result, the Canadian waste management program has been stalled and, in some respects, bungled.

Some clarification is in order at this point. There are basically two major nuclear waste problems in Canada, quite different in nature. Neither of them is being handled responsibly at the present time. The high-level waste disposal problem has been mismanaged by AECL. The low-level waste disposal problem has been largely ignored [89].

The first problem relates primarily to the fiercely radioactive spent fuel bundles, which can only be handled by remote control [90]. Spent fuel is classified as high-level waste: compact in volume, but incredibly concentrated in toxicity. The U.S. Geological Survey has pointed out that there is not enough fresh water in the entire world to dilute the high-level waste from the American nuclear power program to acceptably low levels of radiation [91]. It is hoped that such waste can be buried deep in the bowels of the earth, so that none of it will ever escape. This concept, which has not yet been scientifically verified, is called “geological disposal.”[92] Canada’s existing nuclear fuel management program, under the control of AECL, is actually a research program into the concept of geological disposal. The program, which dates from 1978, has suffered a series of severe set-backs [93]. It is now proceeding at a slow crawl. AECL has recently leased nine hundred acres of land at Lac du Bonnet near Winnipeg, where it hopes to construct an underground test repository to facilitate scientific studies.

The second major nuclear waste problem is how to dispose of the vast quantities of sand-like mill residues known as uranium tailings — over 100 million tons in Canada alone. These radioactive wastes are generally deposited in huge outdoor piles, where they can be blown by the wind and washed by the rain. Though classified as low-level wastes, uranium tailings are highly toxic and will remain dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years (see Figure 4) [94].

 

 

Figure 4:

Radiotoxic Hazard of Nuclear Wastes
for Ten Million Years

 

 

 

Source: Bredehoeft et al., (1978)

Notes:

 

Ra = radium
Pu = plutonium
U = uranium
Np = neptunium
Th = thorium

The solid lines indicate the ingestion hazard of selected radionuclides in high-level waste during 10 million years.

The radiotoxic hazard measure is the volume of water required to dilute the radionuclide to its maximum permissible concentration.

Data are normalized for one metric ton of light-water reactor fuel. The dotted line indicates the ingestion hazard of the associated uranium mill tailings.

The radioactive poisons that are routinely released from the tailings into the air and water — notably radon and radium — are among the most potent carcinogens known to medical science. Fatal cancers can result from chronic inhalation or ingestion of even minute doses [95]. Yet the radioactive sand is so inoffensive in appearance that it has frequently been used as construction material by unsuspecting or unscrupulous persons [96]. Below-grade disposal is considered necessary to reduce atmospheric radon emissions, and some form of immobilization is needed to prevent serious contamination of ground water [97]. No satisfactory disposal technology has yet been developed, but cost estimates for disposing of the Elliot Lake tailings have ranged from $300 million to $18 billion [98]. It is not obvious that revenues generated by uranium mining will be adequate to pay for the ultimate disposal of the tailings, if and when a technology for doing so has been found [99]. According to the terms of uranium contracts signed by Ontario Hydro in 1977, the cost of tailings disposal will be passed on to the utility, yet this cost is not reflected in the price of nuclear electricity [100].

With a vastly expanded and restructured nuclear waste management program, both the high-level waste problem and the low-level tailings problem could be addressed in earnest during the 1980s. Postponing this research is not in the public interest, since the results may have a decisive influence on any future decision to build more reactors or to phase out nuclear power. As Dr. Chris Barnes, past president of the Canadian Geoscience Council, has remarked:

 

[Waste disposal] is not simply an engineering problem…. In many cases the basic [scientific] work has not been done, particularly in the areas of hydrogeology and hydrogeochemistry…. We are scared as hell that the [time] limits, the actual dates . . . being bandied around, are totally unrealistic…. It seems to me we should be spending more money…. Look at the amount of investment that society has placed in both the development of a nuclear reactor system — the CANDU system — and what it spends in actually promoting this abroad…. It is an absolute disgrace that we are not prepared to accept [waste disposal] as a problem and fund it accordingly (Ontario 1978/81, 24 January 1980, pp. 25-37).

During 1979, only $16 million out of a total AECL budget of $250 million was spent on waste research; almost nothing was spent on tailings disposal research [101]. Technical people outside the nuclear establishment have had difficulty in obtaining information about the status of the research that is being conducted. Normal standards of scientific review are not being followed [102].In 1978, as already noted, AECL was authorized by the federal government to initiate a research program towards the ultimate disposal of spent fuel in the pre-Cambrian shield of northern Ontario [103]. However, AECL soon succeeded in antagonizing many communities in the north by its pro-nuclear bias and its public relations approach. Glossy brochures and promotional films intended to win public support for nuclear power often had the opposite effect [104]. It seemed to many that AECL had already prejudged the research and concluded that it was bound to be successful — a conclusion unsupported by hard evidence [105]. Many northerners became justifiably concerned that if they accepted field research from AECL now, they might be forced to accept an unpopular nuclear waste repository later on [106]. Such fears were compounded when it was revealed that AECL had plans to build a large plutonium separation plant, eventually, on the same site as the proposed waste repository [107]. To make matters even worse, citizens felt totally excluded from the decision-making process because of AECL’s practice of holding closed-door meetings with local town councils [108]. On numerous occasions, AECL spokesmen made it perfectly plain that they regarded the waste disposal question primarily as a public relations problem [109]. The resulting loss of public confidence was devastating. Before long, many northern communities had passed resolutions barring AECL from conducting any research activities whatsoever within their jurisdictions [110]. By the summer of 1980, AECL’s program of field research was in a shambles [111].

During testimony to the Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs, representatives from the Canadian Geoscience Council [112] suggested a number of improvements that would help to restore public (and scientific) confidence in the waste management program:

 

  • Overall responsibility for the research effort should be taken away from AECL because of a perceived conflict of interest, which may jeopardize the validity of the research — at least in the eyes of the public and perhaps in the eyes of the scientific community as well. Independent scientists and agencies, with no stake in the nuclear industry, should play a leading role in guiding the research effort [113].
  • Since hundreds of sites are expected to be suitable as waste repositories , any community willing to participate in field research should be given an unconditional guarantee (if desired) that no repository will ever be located at that site. By removing a major stumbling block to public acceptance, this innovation would allow research to proceed on schedule, unimpeded, until the concept verification stage has been completed.
  • Because hard rock formations may prove to be unsuitable as waste repositories, soft rock formations located in southern Ontario should be studied as well. This even-handed approach has more scientific merit than the current one-sided approach, and it also avoids the charge that northern Ontario has been chosen in advance as the dumping ground for southern Ontario’s nuclear garbage [114].
  • Greatly increased funding is needed so as to support a truly ambitious research program, with much of the work contracted out to private firms and independent research teams. Ontario Hydro, and other utilities having nuclear power plants, should be required to contribute to help defray the cost of the program.

In its report, the Select Committee was generally supportive of these suggestions. The Committee added a few extra recommendations concerning mechanisms for ensuring adequate public participation in the decision-making process. The Committee also called attention to the fact that the AECB, as the regulatory body for the nuclear industry, is presently unequipped to deal with the waste disposal issue [115].The call for reorganization is clear . The need for an expanded research program is urgent. The way to proceed is well delineated. There is much to be done. All that is required is the political will to carry it out.

 

  • The Canadian waste management program has to be reconstituted on a firmer footing, to embrace both the disposal of high-level waste and the disposal of uranium tailings.
  • Unbiased information and veto power must be extended to any community willing to participate in field research, such as test drilling.
  • Hard rock and soft rock formations must both be thoroughly evaluated as candidates for the geologic disposal of high-level waste.
  • Test facilities will have to be excavated and extensive research conducted within them.
  • A fleet of shipping flasks, weighing up to 70 tons each, has to be designed and built for transporting spent fuel to the repository [116].
  • An automated process for immobilizing (encapsulating) spent fuel on an assembly-line basis, without direct human intervention, must be developed [117].
  • Appropriate machinery must be designed and tested for the remote controlled emplacement of the spent fuel (immobilized) within the repository [118].
  • Techniques for retrieving spent fuel from the repository in case something goes wrong must also be investigated [119].
  • The possible existence of a truly impermeable covering, or lining, for uranium tailings needs to be thoroughly investigated [120].
  • Potential immobilization (or solidification) techniques for uranium tailings must be evaluated [121].
  • The acceptability of below-grade disposal of tailings in specially prepared cavities must be carefully evaluated [122].
  • Advanced milling processes to chemically remove the long-lived radioactive contaminants from the tailings are urgently needed [123].
  • Techniques for cleaning up following a catastrophic failure of tailings containment need to be developed and costed [124].

As in the case of decommissioning, Canadian expertise in nuclear waste disposal may be exportable at a profit later on, since a great many countries around the world will ultimately have to face these same problems [125]. Some of the management and disposal techniques devised for nuclear wastes will undoubtedly be applicable to other dangerous wastes, such as persistent chemical toxins. These spin-offs could also be marketed.By 1990, more realistic cost estimates for nuclear waste disposal may be available than those currently given. From the foregoing discussion, it should be apparent that present cost estimates have little basis in fact [126].

 

 

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Conclusion

As an energy source, nuclear power in Canada is relatively insignificant. In 1977, only 1.3 per cent of Canada’s delivered energy was in the form of nuclear-generated electricity, compared with a 4.1 per cent contribution from wood-pulp wastes burned on the west coast in the same year (see Figure 5).

 

 

Figure 5:

Canada’s Secondary a Energy Consumption
by Fuel Type (1977)

Source:

Norm Rubin, What Keeps Us From Freezing in the Dark?

A Breakdown of Canada’s Secondary a
Energy Consumption by Fuel Type

(Toronto: Energy Probe, 1977)
based on Statistics Canada data.

Notes:

 

a) “Secondary Energy” refers to energy delivered to the consumer. Nuclear power contributes three times as much primary energy, but since more than two thirds of this energy is wasted, it is not reflected in these figures.

b) “Direct woodpulp” available to the B.C. pulp and paper industry only.

Moreover, according to EMR data, the gap between wood-pulp wastes and nuclear power is expected to widen in the next fifteen years [127]. Even in terms of base-load electricity generation, the economic advantages of nuclear power are often exaggerated. The costs of safety, decommissioning, and waste disposal are almost certainly underestimated. Under pessimistic conditions, any one of these costs could increase the price of nuclear electricity dramatically. Even without considering such externalities, however, nuclear power is no bargain. As Jack Gibbons has shown, when a nuclear plant is compared with a coal plant in the Ontario context, using a competitive rate of return figure, the difference between the two is really quite minimal (with a slight advantage for coal) [128].

On the other hand, the problems posed by nuclear power are awesome. Nuclear annihilation [129], environmental contamination [130], cancer epidemics [131], catastrophic accidents [132], genetic defects [133], sabotage [134], economic bankruptcy [135], energy insufficiency [136] — these are possibilities that must be weighed very soberly, because they are all very real.

According to one definition, politics is the art of foreseeing the inevitable and facilitating its occurrence. Instead of trying to prop up a faltering industry that has no markets, the Canadian government should offer alternative employment to those whose careers are threatened. As indicated in the foregoing article, much of the money and effort now going into needless nuclear expansion can be fruitfully rechannelled. With a ten-year moratorium on nuclear expansion, less public opposition to the nuclear industry will be encountered, and more co-operation will be possible. There is much important work to be done in the fields of reactor safety, decommissioning, and waste disposal — enough to keep the nuclear option alive during the 1980s by keeping the critical teams of nuclear technologists intact. There might even be some profitable developments arising out of these activities. Meanwhile, during the 1980s, investment capital liberated from the nuclear industry can be used to finance a massive transition towards a more energy-efficient society in Canada. Such an attempt at rationalization may prove to be a lot easier than, for example, trying to make a profit on the overseas sale of a CANDU reactor.

 

 

[ back to TABLE OF CONTENTS ]

Canada’s Nuclear Dilemma:

Footnotes and Bibliography

by Gordon Edwards, Ph.D.

Special Issue:
“Energy, Ethics, Power, and Policy”

Volume 13, Numbers 1 and 2, 1982
University of British Columbia

 

 

[ back to TABLE OF CONTENTS ]

 

                1. For the military origin of Canada’s nuclear industry, see Eggleston (1965); for subsequent developments, see Torrie (1977). Ottawa spent many billions subsidizing CANDU reactors (Ontario, 1978, p.117), heavy water production, and the uranium industry (Wood and Blair, 1981).
                2. The B.C. Medical Association has published an annotated bibliography and a detailed analysis of the health hazards of the nuclear fuel chain (Woollard and Young, 1979; 1980). See also Marshall (1981).
                3. The environment is threatened by both high-level wastes (Bredehoeft et al.., 1978) and low-level wastes (Landa, 1980). See the reports of the Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs (Ontaro, 1980b; 1980c), and Figure 4 of the text.
                4. Besides the issues of safety, waste, and weapons, nuclear power poses problems of public accountability (Canada, 1978c; CCNR, 1977), ethical conduct (Stewart, 1980; CCNR, 1979), and democratic principles (Edwards, 1976; Miyata, 1980; CCNR, 1980b). See also Ayres, 1975.
                5. It is “difficult to avoid the conclusion that the nuclear option, far from guaranteeing energy self-reliance . . . at best promises uncertainty.” (Ontario, 1978, p. 135). Amory Lovins argues that a highly electrified society is unaffordable (Lovins, 1977) and therefore irrelevant (Lovins and Lovins, 1980).
                6. In the 1940s and 1950s, Canada supplied uranium and plutonium for the American weapons program (Eggleston, 1965; Wood and Blair, 1981), and gave India, Pakistan, Argentina, and South Korea much of the equipment and know-how to produce atomic bombs (Anderson, 1975; McKay, 1981; Adams, 1980; Inter-Church Uranium Committee, 1981). Canada is also the world’s largest exporter of uranium, upon which all nuclear weapons ultimately depend. Although Trudeau has advocated a “strategy of suffocation” to choke off the supply of fissionable material (Trudeau, 1978), 85 percent of Canadian uranium production is sold overseas; 40 percent of that goes to the USSR [Riga, Latvia] for further processing (Eldorado Nuclear Annual Report, 1980).
                7. Announced in the House by Trudeau on May 1, 1980, the review was conducted by an interagency committee under the direction of Reiner Hollbach of EMR. At no time were public interest groups allowed direct input to the committee (CCNR, 1980b). In August 1981, a November 1980 collection of background papers related to the review was published (EMR, 1981b).
                8. As of June 1982 no orders had been processed for the CANDU reactor purchased by Romania in 1978; a $1 billion line of credit has been withdrawn (Globe and Mail, 25 June and 28 July 1981). The proposed sale to Mexico may not materialize due to indefinite postponement of the Mexican nuclear program (New York Times, 23 May 1982).
                9. The EMR LEAP Report states that electricity should provide “at least one-half of total primary energy” by the year 2000 (Canada, 1978a, p. 6 — c.f. figure 5) necessitating a fourfold increase in coal production and 70 000 MW of nuclear capacity. A Quebec nuclear engineer declared that “such an objective is totally unrealistic.” (Royal Society, 1979, p. 212). 
                  . . . back to Introduction
                10. The Canadian Nuclear Association (CNA) suspected in 1977 and knew in 1978 (through Leonard and Partners, 1978) that the industry would be facing hard times in the 1980s (Ontario, 1978, chapter 8).
                11. “In this case, to meet load growth in the 1990s, Canada could:

                  (i) do without nuclear power

                  (ii) import light water technology from abroad or

                  (iii) reassemble the industry.

                  All these options involve significant costs and risks.” (Canada, 1981b, p. 125).

                12. “Capital must be redirected to allow for energy efficient city and town planning.” (Ontario, 1978, p. 180).
                  “By relatively straightforward efficiency improvements. . .. the expected annual growth rate of total Canadian energy consumption would drop . . . to less than 2 per cent per annum. The effect, by 1990, would be petroleum consumption lower by the equivalent of the annual output of 6 Syncrude oil-sands plants, natural gas consumption lower by 80 per cent of the annual Canadian output of the Mackenzie Valley pipeline, electricity by the equivalent annual output of 15 Pickering sized nuclear plants, and coal by about 10 million tons.” (Science Council, 1977, p. 42).
                  “A cut in the growth rate . . . by as little as 0.1 per cent per year will, by the turn of the century, provide annual savings equivalent to half of the output of a $6 billion tar sands plant.” (Brooks, 1981, p. 62).
                13. Electricity supplied 14 percent of Canada’s energy needs in 1969 (Puttagunta, 1975) and 16.8 percent in 1978 (Canada, 1981c, p. 46). However, necessary electrical use (excluding low-temperature heat) accounts for less than 10 percent of energy use in Canada (15 percent in Quebec). See Robinson et al. (1977); Conway et al. (1978); Lajambe (1979); Alternatives (1979; 1980); and Brooks (1981).
                14. Any breakthrough in storage will make small-scale intermittent sources competitive with bulk electricity. In the meantime fuel-efficient and electric hybrid systems will remain economically superior to all-electric vehicles (Lovins, 1980, p. 94). Gibbons (1981) calculates the replacement cost of nuclear electricity at 8.74¢ per kWh (1981 $), using a rate of return of 7.5 percent per annum (see note 128). At that rate, heating with electricity is equivalent to burning oil at $97 per barrel (assuming 100 percent efficiency for electricity and 65 percent for oil). Thus, electric heat cannot compete at the margin with oil, gas, conservation, or solar-assisted heating. Canada’s Nuclear Dilemma 245
                15. Darlington was exempted from environmental hearings on grounds of urgent need. Since then, load forecasts have plummeted (table 3). By December 1979, it was recognized that “the Darlington station will not be required until between 1996 and 2004.” (Ontario, 1979a, pp. 2 and 4).
                16. “At a 2 percent to 3 percent growth rate, no further expansion beyond Darlington is required to the turn of the century.” (Ontario, 1979a, p. 4). See also Porter et al., (1980, vol. 1, p. 101).
                17. Hydro-Quebec is planning for a 6.0 percent growth rate from 1980 to 1996 (Hydro-Quebec, 1980, p. 35), which is almost certainly too high. EMR estimates a growth rate of 3.8 percent for Quebec electrical demand to the turn of the century (Canada, 1981a, p. 13). At that rate, no nuclear plants will be needed in Quebec this century (ibid ., p. 16).
                18. “Current federal government policy provides for financing at crown corporation rates for 50 percent of the estimated cost of the first nuclear unit in each province…. [Because of] substantial cost over-runs, the actual federal share has fallen well short of 50 percent.” (Canada, 1981b, p. 92, emphasis added).
                19. In a press release (26 February 1981) Quebec Energy Minister Bérubé declared his intention to extend “jusqu’en 1985 au moins [le] moratoire sur l’énergie nucléaire” — a moratorium announced by his predecessor, Guy Joron, in 1977. Hydro-Quebec has announced that it is postponing consideration of Gentilly-3 for at least ten years (Les Affaires, 12 December 1981). 
                  . . . back to Domestic Over-Capacity
                20. Quebec Liberal Energy Critic Pierre Fortier, president of CANATOM until November 1980, declared “que la question du nucléaire devrait faire l’objet d’un débat global ou l’on envisagerait également toutes les autres possibilités.” (La Presse, 21 February 1981). Ex-Energy Minister Bérubé proposed an ambitious framework for such a public debate (Le Soleil, 3 March 1981).
                21. Low work productivity (averaging 1.3 hours per day) and absence of supervision (fed by “fear of and reprisals from . . . a strong and militant work force”) are documented in Emerson Consultants (1980, p. 61). Other problems at Lepreau-l have included the installation of faulty steam generators (note 22) and an inadequate emergency cooling system (note 47) as well as cracks in the containment building (note 51). Cost estimates have almost tripled, from $460 million in 1974 to $1.25 billion in 1981 (EMR Press Release, 28 May 1981).
                22. The delivery of 32 defective steam generators from Babcock and Wilcox to Ontario Hydro (Financial Post, 1 September 1979) dramatized “the dangers of dependence on one supplier” (Ontario Hydro Annual Report, 1979, p. 8). To keep B&W solvent, Hydro accepted $10 million in direct costs for repairs and about $400 million in replacement power costs. The delay escalated the estimated construction cost of Pickering B from $1.1 billion to $2.35 billion (Globe and Mail, 5 September 1979 and 14 January 1981).
                23. “Current . . . policy precludes nuclear co-operation with . . . South Africa, the middle east and Taiwan. These exclusions affect the size of the reactor market open to AECL. Other exclusions — for example, the U.S. military program — primarily affect the size of AECL’s heavy water market. One policy option, therefore, is to modify Canada’s exclusion policies.” (Canada, 1981b, p. 112).
                24. “AECL’s Maritime plants are an important source of income and employment in an economically depressed region. Closure of the plants would generate adverse socioeconomic impacts.” (Canada, 1981b, p. 95).
                25. Romania, Korea, Mexico, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, and China have all been subject to diplomatic efforts to sell CANDU reactors.
                26. AECL will lose $130 million or more on the 1974 sale of a CANDU to Argentina (AECL Annual Report, 1977/78, p. F10).
                27. AECL executives were “reluctant and uncooperative in testifying [about] immense expenditures, of public funds….
                  “The successful concealment … of the identities of the ultimate recipients of the funds and the nature of services rendered, leads your Committee to suspect … illegal or corrupt purposes….
                  “AECL management did not follow acceptable business practices….
                  “The senior management of AECL, including the Secretary, the Treasurer, and the Internal Auditor, did not properly discharge their responsibilities.” (Canada, 1978c, pp. 5-6). Two presidents (J.L. Gray and J.S. Foster) and one chairman of AECL (R. Campbell) were cited for various improprieties.
                28. In 1979, AECL offered Argentina a 600 MW CANDU reactor, a small research reactor, a heavy water plant, a five-year supply of uranium fuel, a long-term supply of heavy water, and extensive co-operation on nuclear research — all for less than $2 billion. Argentina accepted a more expensive West German/Swiss bid for a similar package, involving a 600 MW heavy water reactor that has not even been designed yet (Globe and Mail, 4 April and 2 October 1979).
                29. In January 1982, to remain competitive with other vendors, Canada offered Mexico a loan of several billion dollars at about 7 1/2 percent interest as an inducement to purchase four CANDU reactors (Globe and Mail, January 1982).
                30. “A broad sustained marketing effort is costly…. Given soft export markets and intense competition, there is no guarantee of success.” (Canada, 1981b, p. 115). “It is likely that much more controversial policy changes would be required.” (ibid ., p. 108). 
                  . . . back to Export Opportunities
                31. These are “high risk options in political and public acceptability terms” (Canada, 1981b, p. 126), marking “a retreat from the entire thrust of development of Canadian safeguards policy since 1974.” (ibid., p. 111). The relaxation of safeguards for uranium exports (Globe and Mail, 7 July 1981) may herald a new era of relaxed safeguards for reactor sales as well.
                32. “The controversy surrounding AECL’s relationship with local agents in Korea . . . resulted in a 1976 policy . . . that no practices be allowed which would be illegal in the importing country, or . .. in Canada. This leaves two . . . choices: observe the 1976 policy . . . and lose a sale; or modify the 1976 policy . . . and conclude a sale.” (Canada, 1981b, p. 7).
                33. Romania wants Canada to purchase or promote Romanian farm machinery and textiles at a time when Canadian producers of these goods are in great difficulty (Le Devoir, 28 July 1981).
                34. “Meeting ‘crédit-mixte’ terms (5 to 6 percent per annum to countries which qualify) offered by competitors may involve subsidies equivalent to 25 to 30 percent of the cost of a reactor sale.” (Canada, 1981b, p. 114).
                35. Among the alternatives are energy-efficiency measures (notes 12 and 40), cogeneration facilities (note 44), and solar-assisted heating (Solar Energy Research Institute, 1981).
                36. At present, it is doubtful whether nuclear-generated electricity is cheaper than coal generated electricity (Komanoff, 1981; Gibbons, 1981). In future, “compared with conventional coal plants, [fluidized bed] plants would have lower capital costs due to reduced size, material, and lead time requirements; slightly lower fuel use due to improved efficiencies; and a significant reduction in emissions.” (Ontario, 1980a, vol. 4, p. 20). These advantages could tip the balance in favour of coal on both environmental and economic grounds.
                37. Short-term contracts assume “a probable — but far from certain — domestic demand for nuclear energy in the 1990s.” (Canada, 1981b, p. 125).
                38. In a 1978 press release, the U.S. Department of Energy admonished the electrical industry to “tell it like it is”. The National Electric Reliability Council had predicted that demand would grow at 4.5 percent per annum between 1980 and 1982; however, an in-house DOE study using the same data foresaw an increase of only 1.06 percent per annum. See note 40.
                39. Cogeneration in the United States could eliminate the need for more bulk electrical generating facilities until at least the turn of the century (Williams, 1978; Harding, 1978a). Lead times are from 12 to 18 months, and capital costs are about half those of conventional generating stations (per kilowatt installed).
                  “Ontario Hydro’s chief economist . . . concluded that ‘co-generation [is] an economically viable alternative to purchasing power from Hydro’.” (Ontario, 1980a, vol. 1, p. 138). For cogeneration potential in Ontario, see Middleton Associates (1977) and Ontario (1980a, vol. 1, p. 138).
                  . . . back to Export Opportunities
                40. “Efficiency improvements . . . have the potential to reduce future U.S. primary energy consumption [beyond the turn of the century] to levels at or below current consumption.” (U.S., 1980; see figure 2). If U.S. consumers had chosen the least expensive options to meet energy needs in 1978, purchased electricity would have been down by more than 40 percent (Sant, 1979, p. 27). U.S. electrical growth to the turn of the century could average between 0.4 percent per annum and – 1.4 percent per annum (Solar Energy Research Institute, 1981), using standard assumptions concerning GNP growth and population growth.
                41. Beginning with a presumed “energy gap,” based on extrapolations of past trends, it is often assumed (without detailed consideration of costs, logistics, implementation, or even feasibility) that nuclear power is destined to fill this gap (Canada, 1978a). Such analyses ignore the possibility of changing patterns of energy use without adversely affecting the economy, thereby preventing the energy gap from developing. See note 40 and figure 2.
                42. Sant (1979); Lovins (1977); Lovins and Lovins (1980); Middleton Associates (1978); Gibbons (1981); Brooks (1978, 1981); U.S. (1980); Solar Energy Research Institute (1981). Half of today’s purchased electricity is used for uneconomic heating applications. Electricity consumption might well decline without any loss of electrical service.
                43. The crucial teams in Engineering and Manufacturing (Ontario, 1978, p. 133) are not as large as might be thought (Leonard and Partners, 1978, p. VI-24). What is necessary is to preserve the fundamental skills; for example, those with “the skills to design and build complex equipment like the CANDU fuelling machine” (Canada, 1981b, p. 120) could be reassigned to design and build robotic decommissioning equipment. A careful inventory of such skills should be compiled. Only then can alternatives to nuclear expansion be realistically assessed.
                44. See notes 80, 89, and 113.
                45. The sale of a German heavy water reactor, which has not yet been designed (note 28), indicates that it is not necessary to have an instantly available manufacturing capability in order to secure sales.
                46. “The California Public Utilities Commission directed the state’s private utilities to develop ‘zero interest loan’ programs for residential conservation and solar hot water heaters. Other utilities . . . have impressive conservation financing programs.” (Harding, 1980; California Public Utilities Commission, 1980). The key concept is that “energy conservation measures are financed by the energy cost savings they generate” (Quebec, 1980).
                47. In 1976 it was discovered that, contrary to earlier assurances, none of the existing CANDU ECCS could be counted on to prevent massive core damage following a loss-of-coolant accident (AECB, 1978a). Improvements were ordered at each existing plant (Ontario, 1978, p. 213) and a new high-pressure ECCS was designed and installed in all new CANDUs. The new design may not be able to prevent core damage either (AECB, 1978a, p. 35; Lisak, 1979a). The high-pressure design may also be less reliable (i.e., more frequently unavailable) than the low-pressure design (Edwards and Hatfield, 1980/ 81).
                48. It is difficult to assess the safety implications of partial unavailability, whereby a safety system is impaired but not completely inoperative (Ontario, 1980d, pp. 23-26 and 32).
                49. Douglas Point was derated to 70 percent of full power because of an inadequate ECCS and a leaky containment (Ontario, 1978, p. 213). Bruce A would also have to operate at 70 percent for ECCS to be fully effective in an emergency (AECB, 1978a, p. 40); however, AECB allowed the plant to operate at 88 percent because of a superior containment system. In April 1981, Toronto City Council asked AECB to derate the Pickering A reactors to 70 percent because they have only one fast SDS each, whereas all new plants are required to have two fully independent SDS. There have been six loss-of-regulation accidents at Pickering (Ontario, 1978, p. 79) — these are power surges requiring the action of an SDS to prevent the destruction of the core (Edwards, 1980, pp. 17 – 19). 
                  . . . back to Reactor Safety
                50. Gentilly-1 (250 MW) is a highly unstable experimental power reactor owned by AECL, which operated less than 200 days over several years and leaked large quantities of radioactivity into the St. Lawrence River (Lisak, 1979b). It has been inoperative since 1977.
                51. Patterns of hairline cracks (some of them several feet long) have been patched with epoxy. The two reactors had “a large number of these cracks . . . in the same location,” suggesting that the problem is due to a basic design flaw (Schatz, 1980).
                  According to the regulatory body, “No cracking (or potential through cracking) is permitted for the design basis accident.” (AECB, 1978b, p. 14; 1980a, p. 1-5).
                52. The “single mode/dual mode” licensing criterion (table 5) has been in force for over 10 years. For details, see AECL (1977b, p. 15); Ontario (1978, p. 78); Ontario (1980d p. 19). Since 1976 (note 47) AECB has been attempting to replace this criterion — presumably because it does not quite work. The first attempt, known as the IOWG proposal (AECB, 1978a, pp. 46-65 and 82-88), involved a substantial relaxation of standards. It was abandoned as a result of intense public pressure in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident (Ontario, 1980d, pp. 35-36). A second attempt was made in the fall of 1980, when AECB issued a Draft Licensing Guide containing no mention of the single mode/dual mode criterion (AECB, 1980b). Instead, a very complicated set of new criteria was proposed (commentary, table 5). In June 1981, AECB issued a construction licence for Darlington on the basis of these new criteria, which had not yet been formally adopted by the Board.
                53. “The only way that potentially large amounts of radioactivity could be released is by melting the fuel in the reactor core.” (Rasmussen et al., 1975, Executive Summary, p. 6).
                54. The U.S. Price-Anderson Act limits liability to $560 million. According to the Rasmussen report, off-site property damage can run as high as $14 billion following a “worst case” accident (Rasmussen et al., 1975).
                  In this context, a New Zealand Royal Commission concluded: “It is clear that . . . the personal, social and economic consequences .. . could be disastrous to a degree unparalleled in our history.” (Burns et al., 1977, p. 234).
                55. Every homeowner’s insurance policy voids coverage in the event of radioactive contamination . The Nuclear Liability Act provides for a compensation board to adjudicate claims in excess of $75 million (AECB, 1974). Canadians owning radioactively contaminated homes are generally unable to obtain compensation for the decline in their property values (Sanger, 1981), or for the threat to their health (Woollard and Young, 1980, p. 283).
                56. Ontario (1978a, pp. 78-79). This is in rough agreement with the Rasmussen probability of   1 in 20 000   per reactor per year for a meltdown in a light-water reactor (Rasmussen et al., 1975, Executive Summary, p. 8).
                  • The probability of at least one meltdown occurring in   r   reactor-years of operation is:   1 – (1 – p) r ,   where   p   is the probability of a meltdown per reactor per year.
                  • This is approximately equal to   p r   (p times r)   provided that   pr   is significantly less than   1   (say   pr < 0.1 ).

                  Thus, when   r = 33   and   p = 1/10 000 ,   pr = 1/300   is a very good approximation to the correct answer (for the lifetime probability of a meltdown in a single CANDU reactor).

                57. Rasmussen et al. (1975, Executive Summary, p. 7).
                58. Rogers (1979) purports to show that a CANDU core will not melt as long as the heavy water moderator is in place. Under questioning, however, Rogers revealed that his study is only indicative and not conclusive: “Certainly from my analysis I couldn’t say definitely that the UO2 fuel won’t melt.” (Ontario, 1978/81, 23 July 1979, p. 11). Enormous damage to the core would result even without melting (AECL, 1977b, p. 16; Rogers, 1979).
                59. Rasmussen et al. (1975, Executive Summary, p. 7). 
                  . . . back to Reactor Safety
                60. Ontario (1978, p. 78). Once a reactor core has begun melting, it cannot readily be resolidified: “Even the continued addition of water would not avert containment melt-through…. The upper surface of the melt is likely to be covered with a solid crust [but] at least some of the mass will remain in a fluid state for considerable time . . .
                  “spalling of the concrete [will] result in a very rapid penetration of the melt into the concrete…. The best estimate for the time required to penetrate the containment foundation mat is 18 hours.”
                  Quotations are all from Rasmussen et al. (1975, Appendix VIII).
                61. Before the Three Mile Island accident, Jon Jennekens (now President of AECB), said: “Our American colleagues have always felt there should be evacuation plans. We in Canada do not subscribe to that view…. the best precautionary measures … [is] to simply ask people to go within their homes and close their doors and windows.” (Ontario, 1977/78, 28 February 1978).
                  Following the Three Mile Island accident, Mr. Jennekens was questioned again:
                  “(Q) You feel that the contingency plans that were drawn up 20 years ago were of such high quality that there has been no need to change them?
                  “(A) I’m convinced that the resources . . . available over the last 20 years . . . are quite effective and do not need to be augmented.” (Ontario, 1978/81, 25 April 1979).
                62. Of 45 000 persons requiring hospitalization following a “worst case” accident, only 3 300 are expected to die if bone marrow transplants are readily available (Rasmussen et al., 1975, Appendix VI).
                  “Any radiologic emergency plan … must not overlook population density for at least 20 miles around…. The public health and safety of tens of thousands, if not millions . . . are at risk.” (MacLeod, 1980).
                  Evacuation plans will be complicated by a “shadow” phenomenon; more people will actually evacuate than those who are told to (Zeigler, 1981).
                63. The clean-up of Three Mile Island will cost at least $1 billion (New York Times, 19 March 1981). The Kemeney Report estimates from $1 billion to $1.86 billion; but if the plant “cannot be refurbished, the total cost will be significantly higher” (Kemeney et al., 1979, p. 32).
                64. Rasmussen initially thought that the probability of a meltdown is less than one in a million. After detailed analysis, he concluded that the true figure is about 50 times greater — mainly because of the much higher probability of a small loss-of-coolant accident. The Lewis Committee (Lewis et al., 1978), the Kemeney Commission (Kemeney et al., 1979), and the Rogovin Report (Rogovin et al., 1980) have all reinforced Rasmussen’s concern about small LOCAs. Because the CANDU involves more small piping than a light water reactor, the probability of a small LOCA is correspondingly higher.
                65. The Lepreau Safety Report (1979) states that the probability of a small pipe break is between   1 in 10   and   1 in 100   per reactor per year (Edwards and Hatfield, 1980/81). Using the formula given in note 56 with   p = 1/100   and   r = 30 ,   the probability of a small LOCA over a 30-year lifetime is   0.26 .   — about one in four.
                  The Three Mile Island accident was “a small-break loss-of-coolant accident” (Kemeney et al., 1979, p. 27).
                66. Much of the small piping in a CANDU is located inside the core of the reactor, where a small pipe break could be devastating. Such an accident occurred in Switzerland in 1969; the plant was a complete write-off (Patterson, 1976, pp. 185 -87).
                67. A “seismic event during refueling could cause mechanical interaction between refueling machines and feeder lines and calandria, resulting in LOCA as well as damage to the calandria.” (Argonne National Laboratory, 1975, p. 15). The coolant and the moderator could be lost as a result, eliminating two of the most important “heat sinks” (note 58).
                68. Since refuelling machines operate in pairs, pipe breaks at both ends of the core are likely (note 67). The resulting lack of pressure difference may prevent emergency coolant from flowing through the core (AECB, 1978, p. 78). This accident scenario has never been studied (Z. Domaratzky, Director of Reactor Licensing, AECB, private communication, July 1981).
                69. Structural materials (mainly metal and concrete) become highly radioactive as a result of “neutron activation” (IAEA, 1979). The calandria shell of a used CANDU will have to be stored for 700 years before its activity will decay to “innocuous levels”. (Unsworth, 1977, p. 65). 
                  . . . back to Decommissioning
                70. Manion and LaGuardia (1976). The U.S. Comptroller General (U.S., 1977, p. 5) advises a cooling-off period of 65 – 110 years. Radiation levels after 100 years are estimated to be 30 millirad per hour by Glauberman and Manion (1977, p. 217), because of nickel-59 (with an 80 000-year half life). Stephens and Pohl (1977, p. 1) argue that the residual dose rate will be closer to 1 rad per hour, because of niobium-94 (with a 20 000-year half life).
                71. Edwards (1978a, pp. 13-14). The dose rates two years after shut-down, according to Glauberman and Manion (1977, p. 216), are in the order of 100 000 rads per hour.
                72. IAEA (1979) mentions 65 reactors decommissioned since 1960; but most have only been ‘mothballed’ (stage 1) or ‘entombed’ (stage 2) without actually being dismantled (stage 3) (Unsworth, 1977, pp. 3-4). André Crégut, head of France’s decommissioning program, believes that total dismantlement is essential (New York Times, 17 June 1978).
                73. U.S. (1978). IAEA (1979) uses 10 percent. The chief of nuclear engineering for Consolidated Edison has remarked, “who knows what it will cost — $500 million, $1 billion? It’s like figuring the cost of a 747 going to the moon. . .” (New York Times, 21 September 1980).
                  “When a large portion of the structure is too ‘hot’ to approach . . .
                  “when dust . . . or rainfall . . . present a spreading, deadly hazard,
                  “when thousands of tons of radioactive metal and masonry . . . have to be cut up into chunks . . . and then sealed away . . .
                  “when even the most . . . experienced engineers don’t know how to begin . . .
                  “it becomes obvious that the burial costs of a dead power plant can equal or exceed the already alarming cost of its construction” (Harding, 1978b, quoting Howard Morgan, a member of the Federal Power Commission during the Kennedy administration).
                74. Unsworth (1977) says dismantling a CANDU reactor can be completed in five years at a cost of $30 million (1975 $). Not included are costs associated with removing spent fuel and contaminated heavy water, acquiring special equipment required for decontamination, and disposing of bulky radioactive equipment (e.g., the fuelling machines) as well as 400 truckloads of radioactive rubble.
                75. Sissingh and Alpay (1981). “After 32 years, the reactor would be disassembled under water by a remote-controlled plasma arc cutter . . . using teams of workers rotated to keep the radiation doses within permitted limits.” (Globe and Mail, 11 June 1981).
                76. Louis H. Roddis Jr., President of Consolidated Edison, commenting on the 1970 repair of a faulty cooling pipe at Indian Point #1 nuclear plant: “In the seven-month effort . . . 700 men were used [including] every welder … qualified in a certain welding technique. A similar repair effort . . . in a conventional plant, would have required two weeks and would not have involved more than twenty-five men.” (New York Times, 19 November 1972).
                  At Chalk River, 600 men were required to “mop up” following a 1958 accident because of high radiation fields (Hughes and Greenwood,1960).
                77. Raising capital will be a problem . Only $3 million was set aside for decommissioning a defunct nuclear reprocessing plant in upstate New York, but official estimates for the job range as high as $600 million (U.S., 1977, p. 15).
                78. The construction manager of the French Phénix breeder reactor, André Crégut: “By the time I retire I want to have a clear conscience that everything I built can be taken apart properly . . . knowing that it will take hundreds, perhaps thousands of years before they cease to be dangerously radioactive.” (Harding, 1978b; New York Times, 17 June 1978).
                79. The Elk River reactor (58 MW), was dismantled in the early 1970s at a cost of $6.2 million — about equal to its construction cost — without any blasting (U.S., 1977, p. 9). In a large power reactor, however, blasting may have to be considered. Glauberman and Manion (1977, p. 220) refer to “controlled explosive demolition of heavily reinforced activated concrete.” 
                  . . . back to Decommissioning
                80. “Around 100 of these plants will have shut down by the end of this century. Decommissioning of nuclear plants will therefore become a routine industrial activity during the next 20 years” (IAEA, 1979, p. 8).
                81. “New Reactor Problems To Cost 500 Million” (Globe and Mail, 15 August 1978). The bulk of the cost will be replacement fuel. The problem is not expected to occur in newer plants.
                82. Reactor designers should participate so that in future they might design reactors “with this long term problem in mind” (Ontario, 1978, p. 102). Replacing steam generators — a task far less ambitious than total decommissioning — costs over $100 million (excluding the cost of new equipment or replacement power) and requires a work-force of over 1000 (Brown and Oncavage, 1980; Virginia Electric, 1979, p. 6).
                83. United Kingdom (1976); Ontario (1978).
                  Robert Uffen, Dean of Engineering at Queen’s University, once Vice-Chairman of the Board of Ontario Hydro, came to much the same conclusion (Uffen, 1977; Canada, 1977/78, Issue No. 28).
                84. Cohen (1977); Bredehoeft et al. (1978).
                85. Resolution passed by the B.C. Medical Association in 1978.
                86. The original deadline of 1985 (Ontario, 1978, p. xiii) has since been extended to 1990 (Ontario, 1980a, p. xix).
                87. Ottawa’s analysis (Canada, 1977) was largely based on AECL’s commercial perceptions (Edwards, 1978a). The research program was launched in June 1978 without regard for extensive criticisms contained in over 300 briefs presented to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Resources and Public Works; the Committee consequently aborted its hearings (Canada, 1977/78, especially Issue No. 37). The waste disposal problem “is an important factor in public opposition to further nuclear expansion…. One straightforward option, therefore, is to issue a clear indication of confidence by the government that the waste management question is on its way to solution.” (Canada, 1981b, p. 91).
                88. Vastokas et al. (1977) and Miyata (1980) describe how AECL earned the distrust of the citizens of Madoc and Atikokan. See also Ontario (1980b, pp. 23 – 27).
                89. Edwards (1978b). On high-level waste: “As the program is currently managed, there is very little chance that any technical solution — no matter how well conceived — will be publicly accepted.” (Ontario, 1980b, p. 25). On low-level waste: “We are strongly of the opinion that [low-level wastes] are just as significant . . . and we recommend that they be studied also.” (Canada, 1977, p. 4). “A minimum period of ten years will probably be needed to address the true long term aspects of uranium tailings management.” (AECB, 1981; see also Ontario, 1980c).
                90. “When fuel bundles are removed from the reactor, they are very hot, very radioactive and extremely dangerous. An individual standing one metre from a fresh spent fuel bundle would receive a lethal radiation dose of about 200 000 rem per hour.” (Ontario, 1980b, p. 3).
                91. “Almost 4 percent of the oceanic volume would be needed to dilute the wastes on hand at the year 2000 to levels specified in the Radiation Concentration Guides; this volume is almost double that of fresh water in global storage in lakes, rivers, ground water, and glaciers. Even after a million years, the volume of water needed . . . is significant.” (Bredehoeft et al., 1978, p. 2).
                92. Directed by the Legislature to do so, in 1976 the California Energy Commission undertook a thorough investigation of geological disposal; in June 1977, an Interim Report identified hundreds of unanswered technical questions on the subject (California Energy Commission, 1977). By January 1978, it was concluded that “scientific evidence is lacking even to confirm the feasibility of waste isolation in geologic formations.” (California Energy Commission, 1978, p. 209). See also Bredehoeft et al. (1978).
                93. “A number of [town] councils have opposed any research in their area…. We have lost some time … in marshalling the effort required to get the program underway.” (Hatcher, 1980).
                  “The main concerns with continuing delays are that they erode public confidence . . . increase public confusion . . . and add to the overall cost of research.” (Ontario, 1980c, p. 8).
                94. Over 80 percent of the radioactivity in the ore is left in the tailings, with an effective half-life of 76 000 years (Landa, 1980).
                95. Most of the radioactive isotopes in uranium tailings emit alpha radiation. Recent scientific evidence indicates that at low dose rates, alpha radiation is more effective at causing cancer (per unit dose) than at higher dose rates (Woollard and Young, 1979, 1980; Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, 1980, p. 242).
                96. Thousands of homes and schools in the southwest United States were built from uranium tailings; similar problems have occurred in Canada (Metzger, 1972; Sanger, 1981).
                97. “About 9800 premature deaths [from radon-induced lung cancer] are predicted over the period 1978 to 3000 in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, from tailings that would be generated by the full operation of mills in existence in the United States in the year 2000” (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1979, p. 5).
                  “A US Public Health Service study shows increased bone cancer in communities with 4.2 [picocuries per liter radium-226] in drinking water as compared to communities with 1 [picocurie per liter]. [This concentration] is about 6.5 times less than … the proposed maximum acceptable concentration . . .” (Woollard and Young, 1980, p. 9). See also Landa (1980).
                98. CCNR (1980a, p. 8); NRC (1979, p. 15).
                99. At Elliot Lake, extraction of two pounds of uranium yields a ton of tailings. The price of uranium, down from $40 per pound to $27 per pound (US $), is still dropping (Northern Miner, January 1981). If disposal costs are high, say $30 per ton or more, uranium mining may not be economically justifiable.
                  . . . back to Nuclear Wastes
                100. The contracts guarantee $2 billion in profits for the mining companies, while exempting them from the cost of tailings disposal.
                101. U.S. funding for high-level waste research “was in the order of $160 million to $180 million this past year; in Canada it was $16 million.” (Ontario, 1978/81, 24 January 1980, p. 31). As for tailings disposal, “there seems to be an impasse on research…. The national program has not begun.” (Ontario, 1980c, p. 33).
                102. “A good deal of the information is . . . not subjected to the normal process of scrutiny by the scientific community…. If you have no connections … it is impossible to get the information.” (Ontario, 1978/81, 24 January 1980, p. 19).
                  In AECL documents, officials “are pleased to acknowledge the work of the many participants in the program and their cooperation in providing access to, as yet, unpublished information.” (Boulton and Gibson, 1979).
                103. “On June 5, 1978 a joint statement was tabled . . . in the House of Commons and . . . in the Ontario Legislature…. research on immobilization and disposal [of spent fuel] was assigned to AECL as a federal responsibility.” (Ontario, 1980b, p. 13).
                  This statement, based on Ottawa’s green paper (Canada, 1977), was announced before the Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning or the Standing Committee on National Resources and Public Works had a chance to deliver recommendations on the subject . See note 87.
                104. “AECL compounded its credibility problem by its one-sided, overly positive and broadly pro-nuclear presentations of information.” (Ontario, 1980b, p. 26). A classic example of AECL’s public relations material is a booklet entitled “Radiation Is Part of Your Life,” satirized in the Ottawa Citizen on 9 May 1981 (“Why Worry About Something You Can’t Escape? — AECL” by Don Butler).
                105. Canada (1979). “One of the major problems AECL must overcome is the public’s perception that its entire program . . . is biased by its commitment to nuclear power and consequent desire to show that waste disposal is not an insuperable problem.” (Ontario , 1980b, p. 26).
                106. “At its inception the program appeared to enshrine the right of any community to veto a proposed repository in its vicinity…. [However], it is most likely that government will ultimately have to choose . . . the siting of what will be perceived as a garbage dump for frightening nuclear poisons.” (Ontario, 1980b, pp. 24-25).
                107. “The waste disposal aspect … cannot be dissociated from the fuel program…. Plutonium is an extremely useful material and we will be dealing in it.” (AECL, 1977a, Concluding Remarks by President John Foster). See also Science Council of Canada (1979, pp. 46-50).
                108. In Atikokan, AECL claimed “community approval” without ever holding a balanced public meeting; a petition calling for public hearings and a referendum, signed by 17 000 local people, was totally disregarded (Miyata, 1980) as was an earlier petition signed by 18 000 people in the Thunder Bay area (Canada, 1977/78, Issue No. 37, p. 17).
                  “Visits to M.P.s and M.P.P.s are carried out under the guise of ‘informational briefings’. . . . [Those] briefed were unaware that their questions and comments were being noted as indicative of ‘community approval’ ” (Ontario, 1980b, p. 24).
                109. Archie Aikin, ex-Vice-President of AECL and principal author of the government’s green paper (Canada, 1977), was one of these (Edwards, 1978a, p. 1).
                  . . . back to Nuclear Wastes
                110. After AECL boycotted an ambitious three-day Conference on Nuclear Waste Management, the Temiskaming Municipal Association (representing 43 townships) voted overwhelmingly against allowing any AECL research to take place in the area.
                111. “There are no criteria .. . no established procedure … no assurance [of adequate] public hearings . . . no decision on the ultimate responsibility . . . no officially accepted realistic program schedule….
                  “Even the best and most unbiased public information program is bound to appear weak and confused. It can only reflect the true state of the program.” (Ontario, 1980b, pp. 27-28).
                112. The Canadian Geoscience Council is “a group representing the major earth science societies in Canada; it is made up of . . . 12 societies . . .” (Ontario, 1978/81, 24 January 1980, p. 5).
                113. Dr. MacQueen of the Geological Association of Canada: “The problem . . . is unique in the history of engineering and science…. it will be necessary to make very long-term predictions . . . acceptable to the scientific and engineering community, in which there is at present considerable skepticism towards nuclear power…. There are major uncertainties….” (Canada, 1977/78, Issue No. 11, Appendix NR-8). “People … who know about these things . . . should be party to the decisions . . . and they should be . . . referees of the material that is produced. Is it good stuff . . . acceptable . . . scientifically valid . . .?” (Ontario, 1978/81, 24 January 1980: Dr. Strangway.)
                114. “The politics of the situation . . . have partly locked us out of the soft-rock option. We are gambling that the hard-rock option will pay off, . . . it is a gamble . . . not worth taking” (Ontario, 1978/81, 24 January 1980, p. 27: Dr. Barnes).
                115. “Each of the American witnesses . . . pinpointed the lack of criteria . . . as the glaring weakness of the Canadian program. In the words of one, ‘developing a proposal without criteria is like drawing the target around a dart after it has been thrown’.” (Ontario, 1980b, p. 33).
                  The British Columbia Medical Association has called for “significant medical input” (Transitions, June 1978). “Canadians cannot continue to allow vested interest Ministries and regulatory bodies to promulgate maximum permissible [radiation] dose limits.” (Woollard and Young, 1980, p. 277).
                116. Dissenting Opinion on the transportation of nuclear wastes (Ontario, 1980b, pp. 34-36). See also Hamilton and Resnikoff (1980).
                117. AECL did some immobilization of liquid wastes 20 years ago. Immobilization of spent fuel is an entirely different problem, on which research has barely begun (Boulton and Gibson, 1979, pp. 19-21). Since AECL plans to eventually separate plutonium (note 107), however, half of AECL’s current immobilization budget still goes to the glassification of liquid wastes.
                118. Accidents during immobilization or emplacement can cause severe contamination, making subsequent human access dangerous (note 90).
                119. Prior to the green paper (Canada, 1977), AECL never advocated irretrievable storage (Edwards, 1978a, pp. 35-36).
                  “Many experts . . . have severe reservations about the safety of [geologic] disposal operations…. Many feel that it will be extremely difficult, and some would go so far as to say that it is impossible, to obtain the guarantees which would be necessary to justify highly active waste being allowed to pass beyond control.” (OECD, 1973, pp. 1173-74).
                  . . . back to Nuclear Wastes
                120. “The long-term impermeability of tailings basins … cannot be guaranteed….
                  “The Board finds little . . . confidence in the use of synthetic membranes, asphalt, cement or chemical means . . . to inhibit water infiltration in the long term.” (Ontario Environmental Assessment Board, 1979).
                  In 1978, Eldorado Nuclear Ltd. proposed “a bentonite-sand blanket … with an overlay of 1.7 meters of fill…. There was no evidence that this would ensure the integrity of the blanket…. The effects of freak weather situations . . . cannot be determined without extensive field testing” (Canada, 1978b).
                121. Fixing tailings (the slimes) in cement or asphalt is briefly considered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1979, pp. 8-24).
                122. Difficulties here include “loss of tailings dust during loading, shipment, and unloading”; and avoidance of ground-water contamination. Lining the pit would be costly, “from $100 million to $140 million,” and perhaps ineffective. (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1979, pp. 8- 17).
                123. Removing the thorium and radium from the tailings would drastically reduce the scale of the problem (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1979, pp. 8-24).
                124. “Dramatic examples of large radiation releases from tailings areas in the past [include] the desolated environment around the closed Rum Jungle uranium mine in the Northern Territory of Australia . . . the elevation of Radium-226 levels and acidification of lakes in the Elliot Lake region . . . [and] the failure of the ‘state of the art’ uranium tailings dam [in Churchrock, New Mexico] in 1979” (Woollard and Young, 1980, p. 90).
                125. International marketing arrangements used to “fix” the price of uranium in the early 1970s (Stewart, 1980) could finance an international program of tailings disposal research by adding a surcharge to the international price of uranium.
                126. “It is difficult to assess the allegations of some critics of nuclear power that the cost of waste disposal will be sufficient to compromise the currently assumed advantage of nuclear power over coal. The Committee could not find in any of the agencies currently responsible for pieces of the program satisfactory and complete answers on financial details.” (Ontario, 1980b, p. 21).
                127. See Rubin (1980).
                128. The real return to capital invested by Ontario Hydro is approximately 3.5 percent (after inflation). In the private sector it is about 7.5 percent. The Treasury Board recommends the latter figure to evaluate federal investments, so that the public sector does not compete unfairly for scarce capital. But with a large enough return rate, nuclear power becomes uncompetitive with coal. Gibbons (1981) argues that 7.5 percent is large enough.
                129. “A comprehensive international control system for the [strategic materials associated with] civilian nuclear power … would be possible only in a climate of general disarmament.” (United Kingdom, 1976, paragraph 166).
                  The CANDU is considered the most dangerous power reactor on the world market from a proliferation perspective (Nuclear Energy Policy, 1977, p. 279; Edwards and Dyne, 1979).
                  See also Kistiakowski et al. (1976).
                  . . . back to Conclusion
                130. Extensive contamination already exists in some parts of Canada (Sanger, 1981; Ontario, 1976).
                131. “One could well view the allowable exposure to the public from nuclear facilities as [tantamount] to allowing an industrially-induced epidemic of cancer.” (Woollard and Young, 1980, p. 283).
                132. “Nuclear power is by its very nature potentially dangerous, and, therefore, one must continually question whether the safeguards already in place are sufficient.” (Kemeney et al., 1979, p. 9).
                133. CANDU reactors routinely release large quantities of tritium and carbon-14. “Carbon-14 and tritium are of comparable and special concerns for similar reasons. First, they each have long half-lives: 5,730 years for carbon-14 and 12.3 years for tritium. Long half-lives allow them to accumulate in the environment around a reactor and in the global biosphere. Second, they are easily incorporated into human tissue.” (Ontario, 1980d, p. 15).
                134. “If nuclear power . . . had been in widespread use at the time of the last war . . . some areas of central Europe would still be uninhabitable.” (United Kingdom, 1976, p. 124). See also Fetter and Tsipis (1981).
                135. To avoid bankruptcy, Duke Power cancelled a three-unit nuclear station on which $440 million was already spent. Carl Horn, Chairman of the Board, said “We simply cannot reasonably afford to build them…. It’s not my function to liquidate the company.” (New York Times, 8 March 1981).
                136. An accident in a multi-reactor complex (Pickering or Bruce) could cause prolonged blackouts (“A Reactor Blockage,” Globe and Mail 23 January 1981).

 

. . . back to Table of Contents
 

 

 

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Editor’s note:
the revised version of this paper
was accepted for publication in September 1981.